Politico The EU risks becoming irrelevant in conflicts in its wider neighborhood. By Nicu Popescu After six weeks of fighting over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh — and several failed cease-fires — Russia has mediated a deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan that appears likely to hold. With the conflict now officially re-frozen, the situation has yielded two clear winners: Russia and Turkey, who flexed their muscle in the region while the European Union sat on the sidelines, appearing increasingly irrelevant in its own neighborhood. Unless the EU rethinks its strategy in the region, it seems relegated to observing as others take charge. The Russia-brokered deal bears striking resemblance to what Armenia, Azerbaijan and the international community agreed would be a reasonable compromise, under the so-called Madrid Principles a decade ago. The main difference is that it is being implement by military force, not diplomats or politicians. As part of the deal, Russia will deploy some 2,000 peacekeepers, ensuring that Nagorno-Karabakh will have a Russian-protected land connection to Armenia, and that Azerbaijan will have Russian-protected communication lines and transport links through Armenia to the Azeri exclave of Nakhchivan. But if Azerbaijan might seem the victor and Armenia the loser, the situation is more complicated for both. For Baku, this is more of a Faustian bargain than a victory. Azerbaijan acquired seven territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, previously occupied by Armenia, and will get to keep the territorial gains it made in the enclave, but will have to accept constraints on its future foreign policy and security. With Russian military presence on what is internationally recognized as Azerbaijan’s territory, and Russian security personnel ensuring Azerbaijani access to its exclave in Nakhchivan, Moscow suddenly acquires much more security leverage in the country. Nagorno-Karabakh will now look more like Georgia’s secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia before 2008. Georgia’s two separatist regions have long been geopolitically convenient conflict zones that allowed Russia to raise or lower the security temperature to influence domestic politics and the security situation in Georgia. Azerbaijan has joined the club now. In the short term, this will lead to an Azeri-Russian honeymoon but could become a source of future instability and acrimony in Moscow-Baku relations. Armenia, meanwhile, retains de facto control of part of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers on the ground makes the country less vulnerable to future conflagrations. As a result, however, Armenia finds itself in the much more difficult situation of having dramatically increased its already high dependence on Moscow, with what remains of Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh now indefensible without Russia. Yerevan now faces the possibility that Russia will push it even harder into making painful concessions in domestic or foreign policy. The real winners of the latest flare-up over Nagorno-Karabakh, ultimately, are Turkey and Russia. Moscow has tightened the screws of its control of Armenia and the country’s domestic and foreign policies. It also has much more military and security leverage on future developments in Azerbaijan. Turkey also has cause for celebration. Its ally Azerbaijan re-acquired its seven districts and part of Nagorno-Karabakh thanks in large part to Turkish support. The Turkish military and Turkish-made drones got good publicity, as did Turkey’s credibility as a power that truly supports its allies (unlike Russia). And despite Turkey’s bold military maneuvering, Ankara and Moscow’s capacity to remain on good terms remained unshaken. None of the above bodes well for the EU’s own foreign policy and international profile. Foreign policymaking in the EU’s wider neighborhood has become increasingly militarized. The key players in the region are not EU countries; instead Turkey, Russia and now Azerbaijan increasingly see bold military action as an efficient and sure way to success, from the South Caucasus to Syria and Libya. As long as the EU continues to focus almost exclusively on diplomatic and economic means to exercise its power in its neighborhood, this trend will continue. There is no quick way out of this irrelevance for the EU. Still, short of sending military troops and inserting itself into every military imbroglio on its periphery, there is another possible way forward. The EU must start developing military, intelligence and cybersecurity partnerships with several countries around its eastern and southern flanks. It needs to become a power that can exert influence in the security realm, in addition to its political and economic clout. Only then, with time, will the EU’s voice be better heard where it matters most. * Nicu Popescu is director of the Wider Europe programme at the European Council of Foreign Relations. *