Asia Times
[Things are moving quickly with both sides making efforts to look like
they're not giving concessions]
By MK Bhadrakumar
The frozen lake of US-Iran confrontation is generating a pinging
sound. The cracking of the ice is yet to produce that loud booming
thunderclap. But these are early days.
It was only last Thursday that the US and the three European states
who are party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015 Iran
nuclear deal) – Germany, France and the UK, or the “E3” – lobbed a
joint statement across the court to Tehran, whereby US President Joe
Biden’s administration announced its willingness to return to
diplomacy with Iran.
It was an opening move, where the Biden administration merely
reiterated its position that it will return to the JCPOA if Tehran
returns to strict compliance with it. The E3 and the US seek to
strengthen the JCPOA to address broader security concerns related to
Iran. But certain other moves went along with it on the same day:
Washington expressed its acceptance of an invitation from the
European Union High Representative to attend a meeting of the
so-called P5+1 countries – Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and
the United States – with Iran for an informal “diplomatic
conversation” to chart a way forward;
The Biden administration rescinded the Donald Trump
administration’s decision in September 2020 to invoke “snapback
sanctions” worldwide at the United Nations – a provision under
Security Council Resolution 2231 – that was earlier rejected by the
other 14 members of the council; and
The Biden administration also informed Iran’s UN Mission in New
York that it had removed Trump’s travel restrictions on its diplomats
in New York, which allows them now to move anywhere within a 25-mile
(40-kilometer) radius of the UN headquarters. Some Iranian officials
also may be allowed to travel to the UN.
A conversation between US and Iranian diplomats in an informal setting
certainly serves a purpose insofar as it is a follow-up on an idea
floated by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif during an interview
with CNN on February 1 that the EU foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell
could assume the role of coordinator and create a mechanism to
choreograph the steps to be taken simultaneously by both the Iranian
and US sides to achieve JCPOA reinstatement.
Informal meeting
By Saturday, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, the
country’s chief nuclear negotiator, was on record saying that Tehran
too was considering the proposition from Brussels and would “respond
to this proposal [on an informal meeting] in the future.”
Now, it is easy to see that the retraction on the “snapback sanctions”
and the removal of restrictions on Iranian diplomats are necessary
prerequisites of a US-Iranian engagement.
Meanwhile, on Friday, Biden said at the virtual Munich Security
Conference that the US is driven to “re-engage in negotiations” to
revive the JCPOA. He added a positive note: “We need transparency and
communication to minimize the rise of strategic misunderstanding or
mistakes.”
On Sunday, White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan said
the US has started talks with Iran over the return of at least five
American hostages Tehran is holding. “We have begun to communicate
with the Iranians on this issue,” Sullivan said.
Also on Sunday, Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, met with officials in Tehran to try to maintain his
inspectors’ ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program. After the
talks, a joint statement was issued, which suggests that “a temporary
bilateral technical understanding” has been reached for a three-month
period to continue necessary verification and monitoring activities.
But the deal also calls for less access for IAEA inspectors and no
more snap inspections. That is to say, Iran is sticking to its stance
that unless the US lifts its sanctions, it will soon abandon the
Additional Protocol of the JCPOA, but is only partially curbing the
inspectors’ activity at this point.
Broadly, both the US and Iran are slowly but steadily edging back to
the negotiating table. Both want the other party to go first, and
neither would allow perceptions of weakness to form or that they’re
acting under pressure. It’s a delicate tango where both are also
compromising while appearing to do otherwise.
Newspapers on Sunday carried sensational reports quoting a
national-security source that the US is considering sanctions relief
for Iran as a first step toward reviving the 2015 nuclear deal. If so,
Washington is about to make the first move on the expectation that
Tehran would reciprocate with some significant compromises.
A difficult path for Biden
“Sanctions relief is definitely coming, not today or tomorrow but it
is coming,” the UK’s Sunday Times quoted its source.
But the catch is that Iran can return to the JCPOA by ceasing to
enrich uranium over the limit set by the deal, exporting most of its
stockpile, and warehousing banned centrifuges, whereas the Biden
administration has a far more difficult path to traverse by way of
untangling scores of Trump-era financial, economic, trade, targeted
personal and business sanctions and lift those that violate the JCPOA.
One possibility is that the Biden administration may move in this
direction after the “diplomatic conversation” that the EU
foreign-policy chief is facilitating. In Tehran’s estimation, the
lifting of US sanctions is now a foregone conclusion, only a matter of
time. There is much optimism that the White House will not allow any
interference by the United States’ regional allies.
A commentary published by Iran’s official Islamic Republic News Agency
(IRNA) draws satisfaction that President Biden “gave a cold shoulder”
to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and has not forgotten the
latter’s defiant behavior toward then president Barack Obama by
attending a congressional hearing in Washington without being invited
by the administration and criticizing the administration’s
negotiations with Iran.
It had “angered the then vice-President Joe Biden, who shouted that no
authority in Israel has the right to humiliate the US president.
Netanyahu has been advised to avoid direct confrontation with the
Biden administration.”
Again, there is talk that the White House intends to release a
redacted version of the Central Intelligence Agency report on the
brutal killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the consulate in
Istanbul in 2018. If the report holds that the Saudi crown prince is
culpable for the murder, it will rock US-Saudi relations.
Biden has made his aversion toward the Crown Prince Mohammad bin
Salman known by letting it be known that he will only interact with
King Salman.
Clearly, there is a profound sense of unease in Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates over the Biden administration’s decision to
engage with Iran. Conceivably, Tehran senses that a historic moment is
at hand marking the end of the United States’ decades-old strategy to
encircle Iran with an alliance of the Gulf Arab states and Israel.
As the situation around Iran begins to transform through the coming
weeks and months, West Asian politics and the regional security
scenario will change beyond recognition. The Western powers are for
the first time talking about the imperative need of reconciliation
between and among the regional states of the Persian Gulf instead of
fueling the regional rifts and capitalizing on them.
In their statement of February 18, the US and E3 “expressed their
joint determination to work toward de-escalating tensions in the Gulf
region.” By force of circumstances, the Western powers are
appropriating an idea that Russia and China have been expounding all
along.