The contorted lines of railways and gas pipes across the South Caucasus bear the imprint of a torrid history. Whether breakaway republics from Georgia or the Azerbaijan-Armenian dispute, frozen conflicts have forced nations to move against geography’s imperatives. But if this has damaged one country above others, it is Armenia – a nation whose diaspora twice outnumber it.

Over 80% of the former Soviet republic’s borders have been closed for more than 30 years, stunting its economic development.But the reason for this fiscal debility has recently disappeared.

As the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia and neighboring Azerbaijan descended into conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,  a mountainous region within the latter’s borders but with a mixed population. Azerbaijan suffered serious territorial losses – nearly a fifth of its country. In response, along with ally Turkey, it closed its border with Armenia. But a rerun of the conflict last year reversed most of Azerbaijan’s past losses – and with it, the justification for Armenia’s economic isolation.

Tensions remain high. Borders are yet to be renormalized, leaving the situation as before: a slither of border with Iran to the South (along difficult mountain roads), and one with Georgia to the North (itself not a well-connected country).With few natural resources, the geopolitics has posed major problems for Armenia’s development since independence. Many of its young now emigrate when they can.

This could all now change with economic reintegration. The November ceasefire agreement committed both countries to reopen the transport lines that existed between them in Soviet days. The most obvious place to begin is the reestablishment of a 1946 train line that ran parallel to Armenia’s southern border with Iran.

It would be easy to sell to both domestic audiences, many of whom see one’s gain coming only at the other’s expense. The line would connect Armenia into the regional train network, reestablish a rail freight line with Iran at the transit town Julfa, and most importantly, gain a prized part in the so-called middle corridor – the fastest freight line stretching from China to Europe through Turkey and Central Asia, bringing the benefit of wider trade, transit fees, and foreign investment.

For Azerbaijan, it would connect its mainland to its exclave Nakhchivan. Reachable now only through lengthy circumnavigation, it is the world’s largest landlocked exclave and holds special significance in Azerbaijani culture. Consequently, the Armenian government has been talking tough on whether to restore the link, hoping to win concessions. Yerevan has said the November 9 peace accord does not imply the opening of a corridor from Azerbaijan through Armenia to Nakhichevan. But term nine of the agreement states:“The Republic of Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.”

Yerevan may be overplaying its hand.The government is right to identify the high value Azerbaijan places on reconnecting with Nakhchivan. However, taking an uncooperative stance may push Azerbaijan to consider building a fresh line on the Iranian side of the border. Allowing this to happen would be a catastrophic miscalculation by the Armenian administration, condemning its economy to isolation for decades to come.

We know which route is preferable for Azerbaijan. For one, the cost of the line through Armenia is cheaper. Though most of the rail line has been looted, tunnels and track ballast remain to run a new one through and upon. Establishing a new line through Iran would require expensive work to clear the path; not to mention the logistical difficulties posed by American sanctions on Tehran. But these costs pale in comparison to the symbolic importance of linking Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan once again.

That is why the Armenian government must cooperate now, or risk being left behind. Leaders have failed to compromise before. Following the first war,the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, warned there was a choice when it came to the Karabakh problem: war or peace? The first would be the result of a maximalist Armenian position on the disputed territory: not giving up an inch of land, despite it breaching international law; then achieving recognition of Karabakh’s independence or merging with Armenia.The second would be a compromise on the issue where both Armenia and Azerbaijan came to a political settlement: some form of autonomy which preserved the rights of Armenians in Karabakh as a part of sovereign Azerbaijan.

Yet many leaders at the time maintained a maximalist position whilst pretending peace would last indefinitely. Meanwhile, Armenia’s economy suffered in isolation, as Azerbaijan’s grew exponentially from its rich natural resources. Azerbaijan was never going to accept the status quo on Karabakh; unable to enter its internationally recognized territory, with over 800,000 internally displaced persons wishing to return to their homes. If compromise was not found, war was the only other path.

Ter-Petrosyan’s words were not heeded. Uncompromising stances led to the breakdown of a peaceful and diplomatic solution. The resulting loss of most of Karabakh last year was greater than what could have been negotiated.

Now again, the government argues from a false sense of strength that Armenia can go without regional integration and still thrive economically. But this will only hinder generations to come, as the decisions on those before have for the young today. Many will continue to leave the country.

As the recent war demonstrated, nobody will come running to Armenia’s aid over Karabakh. It must instead rely on itself. Missing out on regional integration will only weaken the country. The question now is whether Yerevan will pursue peace with prosperity or peace without prosperity.