War on the Rocks
Making Sense of SADAT, Turkey's Military Company
By Matt Powers
Oct. 8, 2021
Alternately described as “cannon fodder” and “terrorists,” Syrian
fighters working at Turkey’s behest have generated headlines from the
Maghreb to the mountains of Nagorno-Karabakh. As Turkey continues to
employ these proxies in conflicts abroad, it’s important to examine
the close alignment between the administration of President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan and an enigmatic private military company called SADAT
International Defense Consultancy.
Despite a diverse and often provocative body of reporting, SADAT is
best understood as a modern example in the evolution of the privatized
military industry, serving as an indigenous Turkish alternative to
both Western and Russian companies. Appropriately scoping SADAT not
only identifies its strengths and vulnerabilities, but also the
broader risks accompanying Turkey’s employment of mercenaries.
SADAT is a facilitator between Ankara and Syrian proxy fighters,
complementing the efforts of the Turkish military and security
services while affording it opacity and seemingly limitless
protections. This dependency on the state and Erdoğan’s favor,
however, constrains the company’s autonomy and entrepreneurialism.
Moreover, SADAT’s close association with Syrian proxies of varying
discipline, credibility, and volatility could expose Ankara to a
variety of unintended consequences. Understanding these factors is
critical to evaluating the company’s potential role in future security
situations.
Turks, Mercs, and Networks
A number of Turkey watchers have been warning about SADAT and its
controversial founder, Adnan Tanrıverdi, for years. Some have compared
the company to state-sponsored irregular revolutionary armies, like
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while others believe
Turkey’s use of mercenaries harkens back to the Ottoman Empire’s
Janissaries. In 2018, a network analysis of presumed Erdoğan proxies
stated that pseudo-military groups like SADAT “function formally as
security contractors … and informally as secretive armed forces.” And,
as part of a broader study early this year, the conservative Jerusalem
Institute for Strategy and Security stated “SADAT can be considered
the continuation of the pre-Erdoğan period’s ‘deep state’ informal
units.”
There has been a recent boom in Turkey’s private security market and a
trend toward industry indigenization. But SADAT is distinct from
traditional Turkish private security companies, which focus on
executive protection, transportation, and risk assessments. According
to its website, the firm was founded in 2012 and boasts to be “the
first and the only company in Turkey, that internationally provides
consultancy and military training services at the international
defense and interior security sector.” SADAT promotes itself as a
military enterpriser, advertising consultancy services, conventional,
unconventional, and special forces training, and ordinance and
maintenance expertise. However, it does not appear to publicly offer a
direct action or combat arms capability, like the former Executive
Outcomes or the existing Wagner Group. And, while it is assumed most
private military companies are driven by economic motivations, SADAT
is an outlier because of the overt political and religious aspirations
of Tanrıverdi himself.
A retired brigadier general in the Turkish armed forces, Tanrıverdi’s
Islamist views reportedly led to his dismissal from active service in
the late 1990s and are captured in a corporate manifesto marketing
SADAT services alongside indictments of foreign hegemony and Muslim
persecution. Deeming the privatized military industry as “under the
control of Western Capitalism,” the manifesto details SADAT’s
aspiration to be an alternative to the “colonist countries of crusade
mentality.” Its original cadre were retired commissioned and
non-commissioned officers, “who will attach primary importance to the
national interests of such countries and the joint interests of the
World of Islam, [and] who have the profound experience of [the Turkish
Armed Forces].” In the long term, the company will “contribute to the
emergence of the World of Islam as a Super power and to promote an
environment of cooperation in [the] field of Defense and Defense
Industry among Islamic Countries.”
Under the Erdoğan administration, Tanrıverdi has sought to fulfill his
vision. Indeed, both men’s relationship extends back to 1994, when
Tanrıverdi served as a brigade commander in Istanbul during Erdoğan’s
mayorship of the city. Reflecting on that time, Tanrıverdi remarked,
“I found that his achievements in politics and state administration
have clearly the qualities of courage, foresight, consultation, and
determination, which are the most important ones of leadership
qualifications.” But Erdoğan is also a fellow Islamist whose control
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) platform has transitioned
Turkey away from the Kemalist tradition of secularism while embracing
his own version of highly militarized nationalism. Whether it’s
neo-Ottomanism or not, Erdoğan has set Turkey on a foreign policy
course motivated by overtly Islamist themes, a desire for increased
regional influence, and a consistent antagonism to American and
European interests. Thus, it is unsurprising that men like Tanrıverdi
would offer Erdoğan a unique base of support, thereby positioning
SADAT to serve as an extension of regime security and influence.
Following the attempted coup in 2016, Erdoğan appointed Tanrıverdi his
chief military counselor, effectively granting Tanrıverdi both a
private and government role. Reinforcing security institutions with
trusted agents is characteristic of many autocratic regimes and, by
elevating his public association with Tanrıverdi and his network,
Erdoğan enabled SADAT to bolster the offshore viability of his own
agenda.
An Expanding Presence…
Consider Libya. In summer 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense’s lead
inspector general released its quarterly report to Congress on
counter-terrorism operations in the U.S. Africa Command theater. Its
findings included an assessment of the eroding security situation in
Libya, following the Turkish military intervention to reinforce the
ailing Government of National Accord (GNA). With Turkish-supported
mercenaries being one of the key destabilizers, it notes, “U.S. Africa
Command estimated that several dozen military trainers from a Turkish
private military company, [SADAT], were deployed to Tripoli to train
both GNA-aligned militias and Syrian fighters. Sadat maintains
supervision and payment of the estimated 5,000 pro-GNA Syrian fighters
in Libya.”
Yet, the company’s roots in the country actually extend back to at
least 2013, as evidenced by a photo of Tanrıverdi shaking hands with a
Libyan military officer while holding a plaque depicting the Ottoman
coat of arms. Though these connections may have shaped Erdoğan’s
decision to deploy forces, they also reflect a baser capability:
first-mover advantage. By establishing brand recognition, customer
loyalty, and/or early purchase of services, SADAT has the potential to
enter conflict markets and set conditions for follow-on Turkish
actions. Prior to Libya, the company was routinely dogged by
allegations it was training Syrian proxies on behalf of Turkey,
charges it refuted. Regardless, the company’s explicit involvement in
North Africa, alongside Syrian proxies, confirmed that the company was
prepared to be a regional, expeditionary private military company.
In 2020, Tanrıverdi is believed to have signaled a greater role for
SADAT in Africa when he noted Turkey’s success in signing several
defense cooperation agreements with African states to train their
troops. He’s also advocated for Turkey to create a private military
contractor — akin to Blackwater or Wagner — for dedicated foreign
operations, capable of providing a force more useful than the Turkish
military in select situations. Understandably, the company’s actions
in Libya, the increasing Turkish military footprint in Africa, and
Tanrıverdi’s aspirations justify concerns that Erdoğan is using SADAT
as one means to export military force abroad.
SADAT’s reputation has also led it to be implicated in other regional
conflicts. In October 2020, news outlets detailed the deployment of
Syrian fighters to support Ankara’s interests in Azerbaijan.
Ostensibly serving under generous contract terms with the promises of
doing benign guard duty for a private Turkish security company, these
proxies were quickly embroiled in fighting on the ground in the
contested Nagorno-Karabakh region. Reports allege Syrian fighters
suffered anywhere from dozens to hundreds of casualties. In November
2020, the U.N. Working Group on the use of mercenaries affirmed these
reports, including “Turkey’s large-scale recruitment and transfer of
Syrian men to Azerbaijan through armed factions, some of which are
affiliated with the Syrian National Army.” While correlation is not
causation, the similarity in Turkey’s deployment of Syrian mercenaries
to both Libya and Azerbaijan prompted allegations of SADAT’s role in
the conflict. Despite the company’s denial of involvement and a lack
of a direct evidence to the contrary, an Armenian investigative group
(using Russian reporting) stated the company used its own planes to
transport fighters. Another media asserted “SADAT … might have played
a role in the recruitment operations,” although the original source it
quoted merely claimed “It seems likely that the recruitment is being
carried out by a Turkish private security company that is also
involved in shipping Syrians to fight in Libya.”
Likewise, in Afghanistan, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
reported in July that Turkish intelligence and Syrian faction leaders
reached a deal to transfer Syrian fighters to Afghanistan under
official private security company contracts. With the Taliban’s
seizure of the state and NATO’s withdrawal of forces, Turkey
subsequently scrapped its plans to take over security for the Kabul
airport. It’s not a stretch, however, to assume SADAT could have
played a supporting role under more favorable conditions.
…With Exceptions
In sum, SADAT’s actions abroad — both proven and purported — seemingly
demonstrate sufficient private military capabilities to warrant
concern. However, some of the company’s underlying strengths also
reveal vulnerabilities that may curb SADAT’s potential.
The company’s opaque profile is one perceived advantage, affording
SADAT greater flexibility in how it pursues objectives. For example,
reports of an “unnamed Turkish security company” in Nagorno-Karabakh
follow a pattern of accusations that SADAT masks recruitment and
training through front companies and local partners. Paradoxically,
Tanrıverdi denies SADAT’s involvement in foreign conflicts and
training Syrian proxies, while boasting of the company’s early efforts
in Libya and its potential to serve in new client states.
The company’s opaque nature makes it hard to accurately assess its
relationship with other elements of Turkey’s security services. In
Syria, the company supposedly helped recruit, quickly train and
provide logistical support for proxy fighters — but the significance
of SADAT’s role compared to other Turkish agencies involved is
unclear. In Libya, SADAT facilitated operations with Syrian mercenary
recruitment, training, and potentially transportation — but only after
Turkey had overtly committed military forces in support of the
Government of National Accord. Moreover, beyond simply supporting
Turkish military and proxy forces, there is likely a nexus between
SADAT and Turkey’s national intelligence organization. Despite
Tanrıverdi’s attempts to distance the company from the intelligence
service, his son — and SADAT’s current CEO — publicly admitted the
company coordinates with Turkish intelligence, in addition to the
Ministry of Defense and Foreign Ministry, when considering requests
from potential clients.
The company’s protections within Turkey is another perceived
advantage. Internationally, Turkey is not a party to agreements or
codes of conduct seeking to regulate mercenaries. These include 1949’s
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, specifically
Article 47; 1989’s International Convention Against the Recruitment,
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (the U.N. Mercenary
Convention); 2008’s Montreux Document; and the growing International
Code of Conduct Association. Domestically, SADAT stresses its
compliance with Turkish national security laws as its activities
technically fall outside the scope of acceptable defense industry
production. More important, however, is Tanrıverdi’s personal
relationship with Erdoğan, whose authority lends an air of legitimacy
to the group while likely shielding it from attribution and legal
scrutiny. A recent case in point: Sensational accusations of SADAT’s
role in equipping al-Nusra Front terrorists spurred attempts by
Turkish parliamentarians to investigate SADAT. These attempts failed,
though, due to rejection by the AKP and Erdoğan’s political allies.
Unilateral patronage and protection create dependency, though, eroding
the company’s autonomy and its vision. The company seeks to assess
“the threats against the countries it serves, by considering the
geopolitical status of such countries, and organizes the Armed Forces
of the same with the aim to ensure the national defense by meeting the
most efficient and contemporary needs.” Yet, by and large, SADAT’s
publicly known operational history in other countries has been solely
in support of Ankara’s objectives, not independent of, or even
parallel to, it. With close ties to the military and potentially the
intelligence service, can future clients trust SADAT to act as a
legitimate broker in their interests if not unequivocally aligned with
Turkey?
Tanrıverdi’s relationship to Erdoğan also creates potential political
complications for the company. There are dark allegations that SADAT
deployed a network of armed affiliates onto the streets in support of
the administration during the attempted coup and, with Tanrıverdi’s
subsequent ascension into Erdoğan’s inner circle, these unresolved
charges have provided consistent fuel for critics of both the company
and its founder. Furthermore, Tanrıverdi’s outspoken religious beliefs
have inflamed tensions with Israel and have drawn unnecessary
attention to the company, ultimately forcing him to resign from his
security advisor position. And this all comes at a time when Erdoğan
is trying to carefully court retired senior military officials’
support while countering their own ambitions when contrary to his
agenda.
Additional Risks
It is also possible that the risks associated with SADAT could
eventually lead Ankara to distance itself from the company. The
Turkish government might rethink its use of proxy groups, or
conversely take over managing them more directly.
What are the risks? First, introducing private military companies into
conflicts with low barriers to entry may not always yield desired
effects. In Libya, the injection of Syrian mercenaries reinforced the
ailing Government of National Accord, but was also met with a
corresponding increase in Wagner mercenaries and Russian military
equipment, aiding both the Government of National Accord’s opposition
and prolonging the conflict. And, despite often being managed by
former military personnel, private military companies and the proxies
they support don’t always possess effective command and control
mechanisms. Coordination between headquarters and advisors can be
misconstrued, ignored, or exceeded by mercenaries or proxies on the
ground. This risks unintended military confrontations with competing
states operating in the same area. Wagner’s disastrous engagement in
eastern Syria in February 2018, when Russian mercenaries miscalculated
the resolve of threatened American military and partner forces,
illustrates this danger.
Second, the recruitment of future proxies rests on the credibility of
private military contractors as militarily effective and disciplined
organizations. Of course, one of the attractive features of these
organizations for clients is their perceived deniability. This
includes select governments, particularly those wary of domestic
concerns about military casualties or unpopular campaigns abroad. But
company reputations defined by mismanagement and high casualties will
likely not endure, undercutting the immediate utility of these groups
for authoritarian regimes. State sponsors must also contend with the
fallout from private military company-associated tragedies. Beyond
temporarily stymieing Russian objectives in Syria, Wagner’s 2018
defeat provoked a small, but unnecessary, domestic distraction prior
to another assured presidential electoral victory for Putin. For
Turkey, its proxies in Syria have been accused by U.N. investigators
of war crimes including hostage-taking, torture, rape, and unlawful
deportation of prisoners back to Turkey.
Third, disenfranchised mercenaries can turn volatile. Reports of
Syrian proxies betrayed by failed Turkish promises not only strain
future recruiting for expeditionary campaigns but can warp volunteers’
underlying motivations and ideologies. Already facing domestic recoil
to over 3.5 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey, Erdoğan can
ill-afford for jaded extremists to cause problems at home. This is
also true, albeit to a lesser extent, for extremists returning to
North American or European states of origin, undercutting Turkey’s
attempts to bolster its image as a credible NATO partner in
counter-terrorism.
An Uncertain Future
SADAT is part of a new race for private military capabilities. As seen
in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, the proliferation of conflicts
with negligible Western engagement may create continued opportunities
for Turkey to employ mercenaries. And, if Turkey’s mixed domestic
appetite for military interventions abroad persists, it is easy to see
the appeal in augmenting Turkish military forces or its partners with
Syrian proxies. But this should not lead Turkey watchers to exaggerate
SADAT’s reach or ignore the constraints it faces.
Despite its Islamic orientation and private military capacity, SADAT’s
narrow operational history and opaque relationship with the Turkish
security services may encumber outreach with wary client states.
Barring a diversification of Turkey’s private military industry,
Western and Russian private military companies will still continue to
offer competitive services to potential clients while Ankara’s sole
patronage (and de facto control) of SADAT will limit the company’s
ability to exercise any true “mercenary” spirit. Additionally, the
performance and conduct of those mercenaries even loosely associated
with SADAT could potentially result in embarrassing failures abroad,
unintentional military escalation, and increased instability at home.
SADAT’s viability, and by extension Erdoğan’s tolerance for the
company, is directly linked to its success in managing these risks.
**
Maj. Matt Powers is an active duty Army officer currently assigned to
the Joint Staff. He has served in various Army and interagency
assignments covering Russian, European, and Eurasian portfolios. He
earned master’s degrees from the Elliott School of International
Affairs at George Washington University and the National Intelligence
University. He would like to thank Col. Doug Jones, Maj. James Kwoun,
and others for their guidance and support in drafting this article.
The views in this article are entirely the author’s and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense, or
the U.S. government.
