WPR By Iyad Dakka Feb. 23, 2022 As the threat of war between Russia and Ukraine looms ever larger, Turkey finds itself between a rock and a hard place. It does not want to antagonize Russia, with which it shares strategically vital interests, but it also needs to show its support for Ukraine and its NATO allies in the face of the greatest threat to European security in the post-Cold War era. This has forced Turkey to walk a finely calibrated diplomatic tightrope over the past month. During his visit to Kyiv on Feb. 3, Turkish President Recep Tayiip Erdogan proclaimed his support for Ukrainian sovereignty, reiterated his opposition to the annexation of Crimea and signed a landmark free trade agreement to signal Turkey’s commitment to the long-term relationship with Ukraine. This was balanced, however, with an offer to defuse the situation by convening a trilateral summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Ankara or Istanbul. Erdogan continues to press this proposal with Putin. The urgency and importance of Erdogan’s diplomatic overtures are understandable. Ankara has sunk its economic teeth into Ukraine and could end up being one of the main economic losers if Russia invades. In 2021, Turkey became the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, with investments in excess of $4 billion. There are currently over 700 Turkish companies operating on the ground. In the past five years, Turkish exports to Ukraine have nearly doubled to $2.6 billion, while imports have risen sharply from $2.8 billion to $4.4 billion. Bilateral cooperation is moving particularly quickly in the defense and aerospace sectors. Since 2019, Kyiv has acquired an estimated dozen Bayraktar drones, Turkey’s flagship military export at the moment. The Ukrainian navy has also ordered two MILGEM Ava-class corvettes, which will be jointly produced on Turkish and Ukrainian soil. The two sides have already signed an agreement to build training and maintenance facilities for Turkish drones in Ukraine, and they have followed this up by signing an agreement for the joint production of next-generation drones that will leverage Turkish avionic and Ukrainian jet-engine technology. Turkey understands full well that regime-change in Ukraine would put these investments and strategic commercial relationships at risk. But despite the flurry of diplomacy, Turkey’s room for maneuverability is somewhat limited, and its diplomatic influence in resolving this crisis is likely to be modest. There are a few reasons for this. First, what Russia ultimately wants from Ukraine can only truly be provided by the United States and major European powers. Washington, Paris, Berlin and London are the only players that can work with Russia to establish a new European security architecture. And Russia is unlikely to provide Ankara any free diplomatic wins when it views Turkey as a peripheral player in this crisis. Reports that Erdogan wanted to mediate have been circulating for almost a month. When asked if it had anything further to add such a potential meeting, the Kremlin seemed rather blasé about the idea, simply stating it had no details to share. One would think that if Russia felt Turkey’s good offices were instrumental to achieving even some of its objectives, this meeting would have already happened. Second, the balance of interests in this crisis overwhelmingly tips toward Russia. Put another way, despite Turkey’s economic interests, Ukraine is not, and will not become, a national security red line for Ankara. By contrast, the Kremlin views a potential NATO-allied Ukraine as an unacceptable outcome that must be prevented at all costs. The cold and hard facts are that Russia will go to war to ensure Ukraine doesn’t ever join NATO, whereas Turkey could live with a Ukraine under Russian domination if it ultimately had to. This is the quiet part that the Turks won’t say out loud anytime soon. Finally, there is a structural imbalance of power in the Black Sea region that heavily favors Moscow. The Turkish fleet in the Black Sea is relatively modest, and this imbalance has further tilted in favor of Russia since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, which allowed Moscow to expand its anti-access/area denial zone in the area. And while Turkey would like its NATO partners and Ukraine to help counterbalance Russian hegemony in the area, Ankara wants this to be managed smartly and carefully. The Turks do not want any regional security deals between Russia and NATO to undermine the 1936 Montreux Convention—a historic treaty that grants Turkey full sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits while governing the flow of merchant and military vessels into the Black Sea. Echoing these concerns at the NATO ministerial meeting last week, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar stated that the Montreux Convention had brought “balance, stability and security in the Black Sea. ... We have explained and continue to explain on every occasion that this is of vital importance.” Of course, none of this means Turkey and Russia will not continue to engage on Ukraine. Despite viewing Ankara as a peripheral diplomatic actor in this crisis, Russia does have things to discuss. For example, it wants the Turks to slow or stop advanced weapons transfers to the Ukrainians, including Bayraktar drones. The Kremlin would also welcome Turkish pressure on NATO from the inside, particularly when it comes to further socializing the West to Russia’s long-term security interests. These things alone will entice the Russians to keep the lines of engagement open with Ankara and will, on the surface at least, ensure that Erdogan is never given a hard “no” when it comes to his offers to mediate. For Turkey, the diplomatic efforts are worth pursuing regardless of their prospects for success. Ankara sees an opportunity to recalibrate its reputation as a stabilizing regional power, after a decade of being accused of reckless militaristic adventurism in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. There is also a domestic play at stake for Erdogan. At a time when the Turkish economy is reeling under the weight of inflation, and with an eye to the 2023 presidential elections, the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, wants to leverage the crisis to bolster Erdogan’s image as a wise and capable leader. Erdogan’s AKP party spokesperson made this clear when he claimed, “The most important countries of the world are able to put forward an approach that can address one side of this crisis. But our president is putting out diplomacy that appeals to both sides of the crisis." But most important, perhaps, is the possibility that Erdogan and Putin might make things work despite all odds. They have, after all, perfected the art of “transactional geopolitics”—the ability to make micro-deals even when they disagree on the big picture. This way of doing business has held up relatively well in various geopolitical theatres, from Syria and Libya to the Caucasus. This potentially explains why Turkey allows its companies to trade with Crimea and Abkhazia, despite its official position in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia, respectively. There’s very little reason to expect that Ukraine will change the name of the game between Ankara and Moscow. * Iyad Dakka is a fellow with the Centre for Modern Turkish Studies at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in Ottawa, Canada.