11:06, 20 June 2023
YEREVAN, JUNE 20, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has revealed the moment he realized in 2020 that the only possible option for ending hostilities was to compromise.
Speaking at the parliamentary select committee probing the causes and course of the 2020 Second Karabakh War, Pashinyan said that the fall of Shushi played a crucial role in signing the 9 November 2020 trilateral statement.
He said what mattered was not only the symbolic but also strategic value of Shushi. After the fall of Shushi, Stepanakert would be targeted, the pressure on Martuni would unavoidably become stronger, and there would be a risk of nearly 25,000 Armenian troops being besieged.
The 9 November 2020 ceasefire agreement was the fifth attempt to end the war, Pashinyan said. The first such conversation took place on October 7, when Pashinyan phoned Russian President Vladimir Putin on the latter’s birthday. Putin attached importance to Pashinyan’s willingness to compromise. Putin told Pashinyan that he wants to mediate for a swift end of hostilities.
“I told him that I agreed and asked under what conditions the hostilities would end. Our understanding was that hostilities had to end without preconditions, the sides had to stop at their present positions, followed by talks on which compromise the parties agree to. I said that this option was acceptable for us. I had a second phone call with the Russian President later on that day, and he said that he had talked with the Azerbaijani President, but the latter had told him that he wasn’t ready to go for a ceasefire, meaning he didn't agree to establish ceasefire,” Pashinyan said.
President Putin told Pashinyan that he’d talk with the Azerbaijani President again the next day.
The next day, Putin told Pashinyan that Azerbaijan had a precondition for a ceasefire: it expects Fizuli to be surrendered without a fight, and that Armenian forces must retreat from along the Araks River to the Khuda Aferin reservoir, so that the reservoir stays under Azerbaijani control to be able to take water for irrigation. In addition, the Azerbaijani leadership expected to repatriate Guliyev and Askerov, the two convicts that were serving prison terms in Nagorno Karabakh for kidnapping and murder, and considering the option of returning prisoners itself.
“Furthermore, and end to hostilities wasn’t being declared for this, but simply a humanitarian ceasefire, to organize the burial of the dead, without any condition or obligation on not resuming the fighting afterwards. I said that the preconditions were unacceptable because we agreed with the Russian President that a ceasefire was to be established without preconditions. And moreover, even if I were to agree to the retreat of troops there was no guarantee that Azerbaijan wouldn’t continue its offensive during the retreat. Nevertheless, I displayed some flexibility, recording that a joint use of water from the Khuda Afering reservoir was possible, meaning, I thought that NK could not obstruct Azerbaijani use of water from the reservoir, the condition on the return of Askerov and Guliyev could be discussed if Azerbaijan were to say how many Armenian captives it was ready to return with Russian mediation, the condition on surrendering Fizuli with the banks of Araks without a fight was unacceptable, while the proposal on a humanitarian ceasefire for burying the bodies of the dead was fully acceptable,” Pashinyan said.
Putin told Pashinyan on October 9 that Azerbaijan was ready to establish a ceasefire starting 9-10 October. The foreign ministers of the two sides were invited to Moscow for discussions, and the exchange of captives and bodies of the dead was also supposed to be discussed. Pashinyan said he agreed to the offer.
The Kremlin then published a statement. A statement was then issued after the foreign ministerial meeting. After this statement, Pashinyan ordered the military to maintain the ceasefire. But after little pauses, Azerbaijan launched a more intense attack, bombarding the territory of the former NKAO, Stepanakert, Martakert and assaulting Hadrut.
“Of course, the troops were ordered to take every necessary action to stop the Azerbaijani attack, but simultaneously diplomatic efforts were underway in the direction of the Moscow document on establishing a ceasefire. The deployment of Russian military observers on both sides of the line of contact for monitoring the situation was being considered. But Azerbaijan was constantly avoiding going for such a solution and was intensifying its military operations,” Pashinyan said.
The Armenian PM said he talked with Putin in the following days several times on how to achieve a ceasefire.
“Analyzing the situation in our internal discussions, my conclusion was the following: Azerbaijan won’t agree to a ceasefire until its advance gets thwarted. This was basically the balanced scenario of ending the hostilities. I realized that if such a scenario was impossible, while the situation on the battlefield wasn’t optimistic, the only possible option was the compromised ceasefire. Other variants were not realistic because days were passing since the rather balanced ceasefire statement but it was impossible to establish a ceasefire,” Pashinyan said.