A rapprochement between Yerevan and Baku could go through Ankara, which is actively engaged in stabilizing the Caucasus and in reducing the Russian influence. Nevertheless, long-standing rivalries and inter-ethnic conflicts could prevent the agreement from being reached
The Azerbaijani offensive launched in September 2023 against the self-declared independent Republic of Artsakh brought the region completely under Baku’s control, causing almost the totality of the Armenian ethnicity population to flee, and all Artsakh institutions to be officially dismantled from January 1, 2024. Despite the long standing rivalry, however, the two countries could be at a potential, even if not easy to realize, turning point in their relations that would be crucial for the political stability of the area. Although tensions remain between the parts, the two Presidents – Aliyev and Pashinyan – have recently stated about the importance of building good relations and reaching a peace agreement. In this context, Turkiye, Azerbaijan’s closest ally, plays a key role.
Historical background
Baku and Ankara share historical, cultural and linguistic ties. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Turkiye took the chance for a rapprochement with Azerbaijan, by strengthening diplomatic and military relations. Over the years, the two countries signed four agreements on military cooperation. Ankara helped Baku modernize its security apparatus and actively supported Azerbaijan in aligning with NATO’s standard by providing both military equipment and training for Azerbaijani officers. In particular, the Turkish-made “Bayraktar-2” drones enabled the Azerbaijani army to inflict heavy losses on its Armenian adversary without directly endangering its men.
On the contrary, Turkiye broke off diplomatic relations with Armenia and closed the border with Yerevan in 1993 in response to the First Nagorno-Karabakh war. Although Turkiye was the first country to recognize Armenia’s independence from the USSR, they nevertheless failed to establish relations due to two major issues; First, Turkiye’s refusal to recognize the Armenian massacre of 1915-1919 by Ottoman forces as genocide based on the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide, and second the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, for which Ankara has always declared unconditional support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
In recent years, however, the two countries have made several attempts to normalize their relations. In 2008-2009, they signed normalization protocols in Geneva, mediated by Switzerland, which never got to a ratification and were officially canceled by Armenia in 2018. Despite the unsuccessful outcome, Ankara and Yerevan showed that rapprochement is not impossible. In 2021, following Armenian defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war, the two parts resumed diplomacy. On the 12th of March, Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers met in Antalya, talking about what they called “normalization without preconditions”.
Common interests in the region
Even though territorial disputes remain between Baku and Yerevan over some villages in southern Armenia, and over Azerbaijan’s demand for special status for the Zangezur Corridor, both countries would benefit from mutual cooperation. Azerbaijan would gain direct access to its exclave of Nakhchivan, thus reconnecting with the Nagorno Karabakh region. This would enable Baku to cut off Iran from the route, with which tensions have recently arisen. On the other hand, Armenia would benefit from having a trading partner like Azerbaijan, which would allow the country to expand its trade routes. Considering the difficult economic situation Yerevan is going through, opening the border with its neighbors would allow Armenia to act as a strategic partner for both Baku and Ankara.
From a Turkiye’s perspective, the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between the two countries made it possible for Erdogan’s foreign policy to establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan. Normalization would bring Ankara several advantages; Firstly, it would limit Russia’s already eroded influence in the region, bringing Armenia even closer to NATO and the European Union. Shortly after the Azerbaijani attack in September 2023, French President Emmanuel Macron declared his willingness to supply Yerevan with military equipment in the event of a possible new war, and in December Brussels granted Georgia the status of “candidate country”. These two events clearly show the growing European interest in the region. Secondly, it would represent an outstanding victory for Erdogan’s foreign policy, ending a long-standing dispute and promoting Ankara’s international status as a mediator, which would even boost its EU candidacy.
Nevertheless, a greater role in the path to normalization could be played by the hatred between the populations. Opening the borders would mean that the Armenian citizens come into contact with Azerbaijanis after years of war and ethnic cleansing, eventually resulting in a dangerous situation both for the citizens themselves and for any restored diplomatic relations.
The Turkish rapprochement could also go the same way, as most of the Armenian population still demands for international recognition of the genocide. Although the agreements could formally end the dispute, they could in turn lead to an internal conflict within the Pashinyan government, which is already struggling because of the refusal to mobilize the army to defend the Republic of Artsakh and for the further refusal to grant Armenian citizenship to the refugees.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that the greatest problems for possible cooperation between the three states in the Caucasus lie in the long-standing hatred between the peoples. Even if the presidents reach an agreement on opening the respective borders and trade routes, the people will not forgive the other side so quickly. Good diplomatic relations take years, especially when it comes to inter-ethnic clashes that have resulted in massive killings.