The urgent need to Westernize the Black Sea region
Ron Asmus, Project Syndicate
Jakarta Post, Indonesia
Sept 7 2004
The bloody end to the schoolhouse hostage crisis in North Ossetia,
and recent clashes in Georgia between government troops and separatist
forces, have put the troubled Black Sea region on the front pages of
newspapers once again. This rising violence is also a wake-up call
for the West, highlighting the need for a new Euro-Atlantic strategy
in a vitally important region that lies at the crossroads of Europe,
Eurasia, and the Middle East.
Indeed, the Black Sea region is the Euro-Atlantic community’s eastern
frontier with the wider Middle East. With Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran
topping the list of strategic challenges facing the West, anchoring
democracy and security in these new borderlands of the Euro-Atlantic
community has become imperative for both the United States and the
EU. Moreover, success here can provide lessons in how to facilitate the
daunting process of reform and modernization in the wider Middle East.
Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” last winter demonstrated that the will to
implement radical reform now exists. For the first time, a country in
the region is matching its aspirations with the concrete steps needed
to become a viable candidate for eventual membership in Euro-Atlantic
institutions. A visitor to Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, now sees the
same level of determination to join the West that existed a decade
ago in the Baltic states.
America and Europe share an interest in the success of these efforts,
particularly as they seek to diversify energy supplies away from
Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf oil. The Black Sea is poised to become
a key conduit for non-OPEC, non-Gulf oil and natural gas flowing
into European markets and beyond. The Black Sea region’s long-term
stability and integration with the West is thus critically important
to the long-term energy security strategy of EU and NATO members.
Anchoring these countries to the West will not be easy. Whether the end
result is better relations or full integration of these countries into
the EU and NATO is an open question. But both organizations need to
reach out to these countries, a process that should be seen as the
next phase in completing the wider Europe.
What should a new bold yet realistic EU and NATO outreach strategy
for the Black Sea region look like? Clearly, the regions countries
are weaker and further behind previous candidates for Western
integration. But the good news is that the EU and NATO are much better
positioned to develop an ambitious strategy than they were vis-…-vis
Central and Eastern Europe a decade ago. If the EU and NATO decide
to launch a bold outreach strategy for the region, they will be able
to draw on existing tools, conceptual talent, and practical experience.
For example, NATO already has three members — Bulgaria, Romania,
and Turkey — bordering the Black Sea. As for the EU, the candidacies
of Romania and Bulgaria need to be concluded successfully, together
with the issue of Turkey’s membership aspirations. An EU that includes
Sofia and Bucharest, and that is on track with Ankara, will be well
positioned to engage the wider region.
The EU also needs to put meat on the bones of its new Neighborhood
Policy, while NATO must apply new mechanisms for strengthening ties
with the region. As opposed to a 100- or 200-meter sprint, both
organizations need to think more in terms of a much longer race,
perhaps a marathon. If countries in the region embrace the idea, a
network of current EU and NATO members could step forward with projects
and assistance aimed at promoting a Black Sea identity and community.
Recent events in Georgia remind us that resolving the region’s “frozen
conflicts” — i.e., those in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, of Transdneistria in Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in
Azerbaijan — must be a priority. In reality, these conflicts are not
frozen; they are festering wounds that breed corruption and organized
crime. They inhibit democratization and incite instability. While
these conflicts involve historical grievances, outside actors —
particularly Russia — contribute to their lack of resolution, which
is essential for successful reform.
So far, neither America nor Europe has made these conflicts a top
priority. Resolving these semi-dormant wars requires stepped-up
political involvement, economic engagement, and a willingness to
provide Western peacekeeping forces and monitors if and when they
are needed.
But the long-term peace and stability needed to advance economic and
political reform in the region will also require either a change in
Russian behavior or a reduction in Russian influence. The experience
of the last decade suggests that a policy of engaging the Kremlin
intensely while protecting fundamental Western interests may be the
best way to proceed.
Developing a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region must
start with the democracies of North America and Europe recognizing
their moral and political stake in the outcome. Projecting stability
and security in these countries is the next logical step in building
a Europe “whole and free” and securing the Euro-Atlantic community’s
eastern frontier with the Middle East. This task will be as important
over the next decade as integrating Central and Eastern Europe into
the West was in the 1990’s.
The writer is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall
Fund was America’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs from 1997-2000.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress