The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Perspective Of A Year-Long Deadlock

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: PERSPECTIVE OF A YEAR-LONG DEADLOCK
By Haroutiun Khachatrian In Yerevan

Caucaz.com

Oct 7 2007
Georgia

The recent efforts of mediators and the parties involved in the
Karabakh conflict have failed to result in any progress in the
settlement of one of the oldest ethnic conflicts of the former Soviet
Union. The political situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan may result
in a deadlock in the negotiation process for at least one year.

Conflict Parties

The last three months have probably been one of the least promising
periods in the effort to find a solution to the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Negotiations started shortly after the establishment
of the cease-fire in May 1994. During that process, mediated by the
so-called Minsk group, a special body created by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), several options concerning
principles for the settlement and details of the process were proposed,
but were eventually rejected by one of the sides concerned.

The parties to the conflict are Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh, a self-declared sovereign state, unrecognized by
any other country, including Armenia. The positions of the sides
have remained unchanged; Azerbaijan claims Nagorno-Karabakh to be its
"inalienable part," while the Karabakh authorities claim the region was
joined to Azerbaijan by an illegal decision of Stalin, and present the
result of a referendum held in 1991 as a legal basis of independence of
the Armenian-populated enclave. As for Armenia, it de-facto supports
the position of the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, stating that the
right of the region to self-determination "cannot be denied."

The last time that the parties and the external mediators expressed
optimism over progress in the settlement was June 2006, when the
co-chairs of the Minsk group-USA, Russia and France-announced
principles agreed upon by both sides, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The
Nagorno-Karabakh authorities have not participated in the talks
since 1997. The following steps were envisaged: Azeri refugees from
Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories return to their
homes, after which a referendum is held in Nagorno-Karabakh about the
status of the enclave, the results of which must be recognized by all
parties. During the war, the Karabakh army, supported by Armenia,
occupied seven Azerbaijani regions surrounding the Soviet-era
Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

However, the subsequent meetings of the presidents of Azerbaijan and
Armenia, Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharian, failed to result in a
final agreement. After the last such meeting held in St Petersburg,
Russia, on June 12, apathy seems to be the dominating mood among the
negotiators. Most experts believe that no effective Armenian-Azeri
summits can be organized before the end of the presidential elections
to be held in 2008 in both countries. In particular, in a recent
interview with APA agency, Novruz Mamedov, a high-ranking official on
the staff of the Azerbaijani president, said that a meeting of the
presidents Aliyev and Kocharian is possible during the CIS October
summit in Dushanbe. "But I don’t know what the purpose of such a
meeting may be," Mamedov said.

This means that the enmity between Azerbaijan and Armenia will persist
and, most likely grow. Most alarmingly, killings of people along the
borders, both military personnel and civilians, will continue. Dozens
of deaths occur each year despite the formal cease-fire.

Mediators

During most of the post-war period, three "superpowers," the United
States, France and Russia, have been acting as mediators for the
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A unique feature of this
conflict is that it has thus far been neutral to the interests of
"superpowers." Having many disagreements elsewhere, these three have
so far expressed solidarity in serving as fair brokers, meaning that
they would agree to any solution agreed by the Armenians and Azeris.

This position is in sharp contrast with, for example, the Kosovo
case, where the Western countries call for recognition of Kosovo’s
independence, while Russia is against it. In a recent interview with
the Moscow-based daily Vremia Novestei, US Deputy Assistant Secretary
Matthew Bryza, who is currently the American co-chairman of the Minsk
group, said:

"There exist three major principles, which will influence the talks
around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement: refusal of the use of
force, recognition of the right to territorial integrity of countries
and the right of nations to national self-determination. I think,
in any conflict, let it be in Georgia, Moldova or the Caucasus,
if people are looking for a peaceful solution, it is possible to
find a compromise between those principles … As a mediator,
I cannot determine what status we will have at the end. (…)
Perhaps representatives of the nations will decide in the future
that it would be better for Karabakh to be independent? Or they may
decide that the disputed region must be a part of Azerbaijan with a
high level of independence? However, this is not my task…"

This statement of the American diplomat has not been rejected by
either France or Russia, in line with the previous practice, when
representatives of any of these co-chairs might have made statements
on behalf of all three. Of course, the interview recognizing the
possibility of independence of Karabakh was hailed by the Armenian
side and criticized by the Azeri one.

Such a stance by the mediators in fact is not surprising, despite
the existing competition of the three countries (including in the
South Caucasus), as they are first of all interested in preserving
peace in the region, in which they have their differing interests
(and not only the oil transit to the West, an obvious major interest
of the Western countries). This is why they always act jointly to
reduce the possibility of the resumption of hostilities.

Azerbaijan has been criticized for taking active steps to enhance its
military potential. In particular, last year President Aliyev declared
his plans to have a military budget equal to the whole state budget of
Armenia. The soaring revenues from oil exports make such a perspective
quite realistic, perhaps within the next year. US Assistant Secretary
Daniel Fried was quoted by the Azeri service of RFE/RL in August 2007
as saying, "War will become a catastrophe for Azerbaijan’s future." In
September 2007, the Armenian Prime Minister Serge Sargsian expressed
his satisfaction in a speech in parliament that Azerbaijan failed to
have its military budget equal one billion dollars, and said that his
government will have a much bigger budget next year and "has taken
additional efforts to preserve military balance."

In the recent period, more international organizations have expressed
their readiness to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the
conflict, although the OSCE is recognized as the principal player
by everyone. Among them is the European Union, whose special
representative, Peter Semneby, has declared his plan to visit
Nagono-Karabakh this fall.

Societies

Perhaps, the most alarming consequence of the continuing "frozen" state
of the conflict is the further enhancing of the "image of enemy" in
the Armenian and Azeri societies. In both sides, media, both official
and private, are in a race to present the opposite side as the worst
people in the world. Huge amounts of money are spent to inform the
"international community" about the murders committed by the opposite
side – the word "genocide" being widely used – about the cultural
sites destroyed, and even about melodies stolen, not to mention the
competition of the scientists, each trying to prove that the opposite
nationality did not exist on the territories they live now.

The outcome of the June 28 trip of a joint delegation is, in this
sense, also alarming. This very sensational event happened shortly
after the failure of the St Petersburg meeting. A joint delegation of
Armenian and Azeri intellectuals made a surprise trip to Stepanakert,
Yerevan and Baku. This event was organized at the initiative of the
ambassadors of the two countries in Moscow, and was unprecedented,
as previously Azerbaijan had prohibited any contact of its citizens
with Armenia, thus extending the economic blockade.

However, initial hopes that this visit may pave the way for at
least decreasing mutual mistrust, have so far been vain. Armenian
society mostly ignored the event, as almost no reaction was caused by
it. And in Azerbaijan, most of the reaction was about the concern that
"concessions would be made to the Armenian aggressors." Additionally,
there seems to be no sign of preparation of any similar meeting in
the future.

This shows that the societies in both countries, are, unfortunately,
more inclined to live in the continuing enmity, than to make efforts
aimed at reconciliation. The Azeris will continue to mark the "Day of
Genocide of Azeris," a holiday established by a presidential decree
of March 1998 claiming that Azeris had been the subject of "genocide"
by Armenians starting as early as 1828. Armenians will continue to
mark the "Sumgait Day" connected to violence of February 1988. This
"anniversary" was not marked in Armenia until early 2000s, and has
thus become a sign of the growing anti-Azeri mood both among the
authorities and in society.

Experts are concerned that cultivating the "image of enemy" in both
societies will make compromises between political leaders even more
difficult in the future. The politicians are likely to become hostages
of their own propaganda.

* Harountiun Khachatrian is editor-in-chief of the Noyan Tapan
Highlights. He is the co-author along with Azeri colleague Ali Abasov
of a book on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict "Karabakh Conflict.

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