ARMENIA: TER-PETROSIAN RETURNS TO POLITICS WITH A PROMISE OF DEFYING "STATE MACHINERY"
By Haroutiun Khachatrian In Erevan
Caucaz.com
Dec 14 2007
Georgia
Armenia’s presidential elections are scheduled for February 19, 2008.
Two months before the vote, it seems likely that the struggle will
be between the current prime minister, Serge Sargsian, and former
president Levon Ter-Petrosian. Although the ruling Republican Party of
Armenia (RPA) expected a clear victory for their candidate, Sargsian,
Ter-Petrosian’s unexpected return to politics places the possibility
of any landslide victory in doubt.
In mid-September, the situation was quite different. The RPA had won
an overwhelming victory in the May 12 general elections and expected
no difficulties in winning the presidency in 2008. Prime Minister
Sargsian’s chances appeared solid, given his growing "administrative
resources" – more than 60% of the country’s community heads are now
RPA members. On September 21, however, after nine years of complete
silence, Levon Ter-Petrosian gave a public speech and on October 26
he officially announced his decision to enter the presidential race.
Ter-Petrosian, 62, led Armenia from 1990 to 1998 when he left the
post of President of the Republic three years before the end of his
second term. As president, he saw Armenia through independence, early
state-building efforts and a period of sharp economic decline caused by
the breakdown of the USSR. Armenia’s separation pains were aggravated
by the war over Nagorno-Karabakh and difficulties with Azerbaijan
and Turkey. The tough years following independence left a strong
mark in Armenia’s collective memory, and, by the end of his tenure,
Ter-Petrosian had largely lost his huge popularity of the early 1990s.
At first glance, Ter-Petrosian’s return should not have created
serious concerns for the current authorities. The RPA’s control of
the country has been marked by the successes of strong economic growth
and improvements in living conditions for the population.
Nevertheless, Armenia’s top leaders have displayed signs of
nervousness. Why?
A serious political adversary?
When Ter-Petrosian declared his intention to run for the presidency
in front of a crowd of 20,000, he leveled many of the most common
accusations against the current administration, namely high levels
of corruption and economic monopolies protected by and exploited by
top officials. However, the authorities are much more nervous about
the former president’s statements than those of any of the other
candidates. Despite efforts to present Ter-Petrosian as one of many
opposition candidates, RPA supporters appear concerned that the former
President could be a viable rival to Sargsian. Several factors support
this impression.
Ter-Petrosian claims solid political experience and may still be able
to count on a solid reputation both domestically and abroad. His
nine-year absence from political life seems to some extent to have
absolved him of the negative impressions previously associated with
his rule. His years of silence may also be an advantage over other
opposition candidates who have suffered a series of defeats against
President Robert Kocharian and the RPA, damaging their popularity. As
a result, statements by Ter-Petrosian about his former subordinates,
Robert Kocharian (Prime Minister 1997-1998) and Serge Sargsian (Defense
Minister and Minister of National Security 1993-1998) carry more clout.
Many observers say Ter-Petrosian’s strongest weapon is his eloquence.
The rich literary language he uses gives him some advantages over
other politicians and is one factor which has helped him maintain
the attention of audiences as large as 30,000 during public speeches
lasting more than an hour and a half.
Ter-Petrosian’s advantages are counterbalanced by poor media
coverage of his campaign, which is attributable to pressure from
the authorities. Most TV stations cover only rudimentary events in
Ter-Petrosian’s campaign, including high-level meetings with the
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly President Terry Davis
or a special reception with EU ambassadors at the French Embassy
in Yerevan. The media covers other politicians as well, including
opposition figures and parties. These opposition politicians use the
media not only to voice criticism of the authorities, a rhetorical
exercise that has become routine and does not harm anyone, but of
Ter-Petrosian as well.
Ironically, these piecemeal media portrayals are sometimes the
population’s principal source on Ter-Petrosian’s statements, opening
the door to possible misrepresentation. For example, Ter-Petrosian said
on October 26 that the Armenian administration currently resembles a
"pyramid of corruption" with Kocharian and Sargsian at the top, and
declared his intention to dismantle that pyramid. In his speech at
the November 10 RPA congress, Sargsian stated that the Ter-Petrosian
intended to dismantle "the pyramid of our statehood".
Campaign issues: Nagorno-Karabakh and fears of a "color revolution"
The Nagorno-Karabakh issue is one of the foci in the political fight
between Ter-Petrosian and Serge Sargsian. Disagreement on this issue
was the cause for Ter-Petrosian’s resignation in 1998. Claiming then
that Armenia would not be able to develop without rapidly settling the
conflict, he called for concessions to Azerbaijan (known at the time
as the step-by-step approach). However, Robert Kocharian’s ten-year
tenure has been marked by impressive economic growth despite continued
poor relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, an indication that
Ter-Petrosian’s fears were exaggerated. Nevertheless, the first
president has resurrected his previous line about the necessity to
be more flexible both with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Although he has stated no specific intentions, Ter-Petrosian’s
opponents accuse him of planning to "sell Karabakh."
Another issue of interest is the risk of a "color revolution" such
as those that have followed disagreements over election outcomes
in several former Soviet countries. Ter-Petrosian is well aware of
the dangers of destabilization and appears determined to avoid such
a scenario by adopting a moderate stance. As Armenia came close to a
"color revolution" after the 2003 presidential elections, Ter-Petrosian
has proposed changes to the electoral code to reduce the possibility
of voting fraud. He has declared that, if elected, he would co-operate
with the current parliamentary majority, i.e., the RPA, provided that
it proposes another candidate for the premiership.
He has also shown moderation in his statements by avoiding populist
attacks against "oligarchs", calling instead upon the business
community to support him in his struggle against blackmail by the
authorities.
Although the official nomination period for candidates has just ended
with the official nomination of nine candidates, the pre-election
campaign is already in full swing. Sargsian’s team, essentially the
whole state, the media under its control and many supporting smaller
parties, has started to exert pressure on the opposition. For
example, the tax authorities have targeted businessmen and the
GALA television station in Gyumri which support the newly reemerged
candidate. Ter-Petrosian’s Armenian National Movement is relatively
weak, with no resources other than the help of several small parties,
a few newspapers and a core staff.
It remains to be seen whether traveling the country and speaking at
crowded rallies will appeal to electors more than the results of the
administrative and PR tools at Sargsian’s disposal. A relatively novel
phenomenon for Armenia is Ter Petrosian’s reliance on the Internet and
the dissemination of his speeches on DVDs. Will Armenian electors be
responsive to Ter-Petrosian’s self-ascribed role as a fighter against
the state’s machinery? The elections of February 19, 2008 will give
the answer.