Stepanakert-Pristina Transit

Lragir, Armenia
Feb 18 2008

STEPANAKERT-PRISTINA TRANSIT

Kosovo declared independence, and the declaration was televised live
by the world-famous TV channels. In fact, any case of
self-determination is gratifying, but it is also sad that no
world-famous TV channel showed the declaration of independence of
Karabakh live or non-live. In addition, most countries of the world
will soon start recognizing the independence of Kosovo, whereas no
country has recognized the independence of Karabakh officially. On
the one hand, it seems unfair at first sight, but a little deeper
observation reveals a logical development. Therefore, it is
worthwhile discussing what Karabakh has done for the international
recognition of its independence and what Kosovo has done.

Kosovo, for instance, has never connected its actions with Albania.
The leadership of Kosovo has never given up its position in the
international peace process and has never allowed Albania to
represent it. In other words, everything was done for Kosovo to
remain a conflict side. The same is not about Nagorno-Karabakh the
government of which has turned into a body whose foreign political
function is confined to all-Armenian fundraising events through
gradual and consistent effort. In other words, the government of
Karabakh has been functioning as a ministry of Diaspora. And perhaps
it is not accidental that the ex-president of Karabakh Arkady
Ghukasyan is believed to be the main contender for the position of
minister of Diaspora to be set up in Armenia.

The NKR president Bako Sahakyan seems to be carrying on Arkady
Ghukasyan’s policy. Half a year has passed since Bako Sahakyan’s
election but he has not made at least half a visible step towards
restoring Karabakh as a subject. In this context, it is pointless to
consider Kosovo as a precedent. At least because if the precedent
were the problem, East Timor might as well be one. Meanwhile, real
politics is guided by interests rather than precedents. This is
simple truth, which is known widely. Consequently, if the interest of
the international political centers required so, they would not seek
for a precedent to resolve the Karabakh issue.

The problem is in whose interests the recognition of the independence
of Karabakh is. Judging by the process that is underway, if the
independence of Karabakh stemmed from someone’s interests, then only
in terms of long-term prospects. In other words, in a short-term
perspective no world political center seems interested in recognizing
the independence of Karabakh. Moreover, there is a big danger that
the dynamics of the region will cause the expediency of recognition
for the world to depart rather than bring it closer. Meanwhile,
Karabakh should start setting up relations with the world from
Armenia. It is time that Karabakh tried to regain the status of a
subject and replace Armenia in the process. It is not desirable to
imagine that Armenia might be against that Karabakh were a subject,
in other words, oppose to the restoration of this status of Karabakh.
Unfortunately, the new government of Karabakh is making no efforts in
this direction yet. However, the Armenian government can fill in this
gap, for its part encouraging this process.

It is also possible that the new government of Karabakh is waiting
for the outcome of the presidential election in Armenia and
completion of the recurrent cycle of formation of government. It
might be logical to some extent. However, if afterwards no efforts
are made to make Karabakh a subject in the talks, the new governments
of Armenia and Karabakh will have wasted all the logical
explanations.

HAKOB BADALYAN