WILL THE UNRECOGNIZED REPUBLICS BE RECOGNIZED?
Eurasian Home Analytical Resource
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March 19 2008
Russia
Dmitry MEDOEV, Plenipotentiary Representative of South Ossetia
in Russia
It is good that a lot of MPs, experts and journalists were present at
the hearings on Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria held in the
State Duma of the Russian Federation on March 13. This indicates that
the subject is of great interest. That’s why the parliament hearings
will go on.
I would like to say that the discussion was official. Its official name
is "On the state of settlement of the conflicts in the territory of
the CIS and on appeal to the Russian Federation about recognition
of independence of the republics South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Transnistria".
I would like to start with the settlement process. Unfortunately,
the Georgian-Ossetian settlement process reached a deadlock. Quite a
few agreements, protocols, which had been signed in the course of the
settlement process, were frozen. Consultations and meetings are not
held any more. The only format is the Joint Control Commission that
organized those meetings and that was established in 1992 according
to the Sochi agreements. All the talks participants believe that this
format was efficient. But after 2003, when new people came into power
in Georgia, problems have arisen in the negotiations process. Now it
is the Georgian authorities that are to blame for the negotiations’
reaching an impasse.
All in all, 50 protocols were signed within the framework of the
Joint Control Commission. The protocols were in line with the Sochi
agreements. In the main the negotiations were held on three main
issues: cessation of hostilities, demilitarization of the conflict
zone, return of the refugees and the economic rehabilitation in
the conflict zone. The legal groundwork had been carried out. The
process was based on the agreements between the Russian and Georgian
governments dated 1993 and 2000. Unfortunately, later Georgia withdrew
its signatures.
Those agreements provided for implementation of a whole number of the
projects on the economic recovery, return of refugees to the conflict
zone, etc. It was calculated that the damage, which had been caused to
South Ossetia during the conflict, cost more that 40 billion rubles
as of 1992. Russia undertook to give South Ossetia economic aid of
one third of that amount, and Georgia agreed to cover two thirds.
Georgia complied with no clause of this agreement. Russia met its
commitments and continues to do so.
Since last December till the hearings in the Parliament the situation
in South Ossetia has deteriorated dramatically – provocations,
explosions and kidnappings have taken place. Against that background
Georgia is being militarized. Along the entire border of South Ossetia
the fortifications are constructed. The Georgian party sas that it
is unwilling to carry on negotiations, and that there is a need to
revise the format of the Joint Control Commission.
Under the circumstances the Kosovo precedent speeded up the process
connected with South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. The parliament
hearings are natural development of that process. The Speakers of
Abkhazia and Transnistria’s Parliaments and the Vice-Speaker of South
Ossetia’s Parliament addressed the hearings.
The addresses contained the reasons for raising the question of the
republics’ independence. The appeal for recognition of independence
of South Ossetia, which had earlier been filed with the State Duma,
was also voiced.
In our view, it was a very acute discussion that will continue. This
is the beginning of the process of recognition of the republics. The
recognition as such is not an end in itself. We know many recognized
states that de facto are not full-fledged ones. We must focus on
maintenance of peace in South Ossetia, economic upsurge, establishment
of close economic relations with Russia, creation of new jobs and
strengthening of defense since Georgia’s threat still exists.
South Ossetia will continue fighting for its recognition. The hearings
showed that Russia offered sufficient potential for doing that. The
Russian community and political elite are in principle ready to take
new steps and face new developments.
It would be reasonable to discuss the issues of Russia’s cooperation
with the three republics at the Commissions of Defense, Security and
at the other core Commissions specializing in the economy and the
humanitarian ties.
As a result of such activities Russia is going to shape its principles
of developing the relations with the three republics.
Guram GUMBA, Head of the Commission on Inter-Parliamentary and Foreign
Relations of the Abkhaz Parliament For over 15 years now Abkhazia has
hoped to establish the intergovernmental relations with Russia. But
we believe that those appeals didn’t receive proper attention from
the Russian government officials.
The parliament hearings have made a double impression on me. On the
one hand, Russia’s position towards Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
remains unchanged. But I has been reassured by the fact that a lot of
MPs, public figures, experts and political scientists came out for the
establishment of the intergovernmental relations with the republics.
I would like to note that the people’s aspiration for independence
results from the domestic processes that have taken place in the
republics for decades, rather than to their attitude towards Georgia.
Currently we expect that Russia will work out a clear position on
Abkhazia and the entire South Caucasus. We do not want the relations
with Russia to depend on the relations between Russia and Georgia.
Those are different things.
What are we going to do? We regard Russia not only as a guarantor
of the Abkhaz people’s security but also as a guarantor of the state
independence and sovereignty of Abkhazia. In the future we are going
to enhance cooperation with the other countries to make our vision
of the situation clear.
You know that because of the information blockade Georgia’s standpoint
dominates on the international arena. We have to do very much to make
the world community accept the Abkhazian vision of the situation.
Sergei ARUTYUNOV, Head of the Caucasus Department of Institute of
Ethnic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Corresponding Member
of the Russian Academy of Sciences The current events are not a
conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia or between Russia and
Georgia. This is a conflict between Russia and the USA, the Western
bloc that is getting more consolidated owing to the change of the
situation in Europe.
More and more often France accepts the decisions made by NATO. The
bloc’s Eastern members the are more loyal to the USA than to the EU.
We got used to treating all the unrecognized territories in the
post-Soviet space "in a single package". So, many were surprised not to
find Nagorno-Karabakh on the list. But these cases cannot be reduced
all to the same pattern because they actually are quite different. If
to use the typology, Abkhazia is the most specific republic, it can
be set off against the other three ones.
Nagorno-Karabakh can be contrasted with Transnistria and South Ossetia
that have much more in common.
As regards Kosovo, recognition of its independence is a significant
precedent. Within the last centuries it is the 80-th if not the 200-th
precedent. The first one was that of the self-proclaimed republic
of the United States of America. The second was when the republic
in question cruelly suppressed the breakaway South Confederacy
that expressed the people’s will legally. Later on, there were many
precedents including successful ones like Bangladesh and those cruelly
suppressed like the short-lived Republic of Biafra.
What is the difference? Abkhazia’s population is a nation forming
a state and there are no other territories densely inhabited by
Abkhazians. There is such a situation neither in Transnistria nor in
South Ossetia. In South Ossetia the South Ossetians live together with
the Georgians and two governments (those of Eduard Kokoity and Dmirty
Sanakoev) exist there. The South Ossetians began to settle there,
mainly, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Ossetian
villages were populated by the bought serfs in a large measure. After
the Persian shah’s invasion the Georgian feudal lords lost some
serfs and had too few of them. Ossetia witnessed land shortage and
overpopulation, so minor Ossetian feudal lords were glad to sell
their serfs.
This is history and it is of no fundamental importance unless
you learn that in the Caucasus the historical facts and their
interpretation exert the most powerful influence upon the public
opinion than elsewhere. If force is to be used during the conflict,
the Georgian army with the help of the Georgian population in South
Ossetia will seize the territory easily. Russian forces won’t be able
to help the South Ossetians because they are separated by the Bezengi
Wall. Only the Roksky Tunnel passes through it, but the tunnel can
be easily blocked.
This conflict will result in the fact that about 60 thousand South
Ossetians, the Russian citizens, will go to Russia. Russia will have
to accept 60 thousand new refugees.
The Abkhazians will not leave Abkhazia. If to look at a map, one can
realize that in the event of the conflict in Abkhazia the Georgian
party is doomed to defeat, as has happened before.
This is why Abkhazia has a very good chance of becoming independent.
A different matter is how it will be formalized. I believe that the
Russian authorities are wise enough to understand this historical
tendency and to do their utmost to help Abkhazia in gaining
independence.
Nothing of the kind can be expected in Transnistria or South Ossetia.
So, it will be reasonable for Russia to help Abkhazia become
independent and to prepare legal groundwork for that. The final
solution to the Abkhazian problem will be the recognition of Georgia’s
absolute rights to the Kodor gorge and the Gal district.
Now nobody in Abkhazia would agree with that. For the time being,
few people understand that the compromise is needed. Transnistria
and South Ossetia can reckon on nothing but the well-known status
of the Aland Islands. The territory has extensive autonomy, its own
State Emblem, flag, laws, the Swedish language, but, for all that,
it belongs to Finland.
SERGEI MARKEDONOV, Head of the International Relations Department
of the Institute for Policy and Military Analysis, Russia The stir
caused by the parliament hearings is misplaced. Dozens of such hearings
take place a year, experts partake in the discussion and all of the
resolutions are used as guidance. The State Duma does not take the
foreign-policy decisions.
I do not think that Russia’s position is consistent. Suffice it to
recollect the two recent events. On February 20, 2008 Geneva hosted
the regular round of the Georgian-Russian negotiations on the WTO.
The parties decided that the Georgian customs posts should be on the
Russian-South Ossetian and Russian-Abkhazian frontiers. In some time
Russia said that it would lift the sanctions imposed on Abkhazia,
which became less severe seven years ago.
I am not of the opinion that what we are witnessing now is the conflict
of civilizations, the conflict with the USA and the West.
Above all, these conflicts have their internal dynamics. We better
not forget about the population of those republics.
If to speak about the Kosovo case, this is a matter of identity
and loyalty. If we withdraw the Russian peacemakers from Inguri and
South Ossetia, will the Abkhazians and the South Ossetians be loyal
citizens? No, they will not. This is also true of Nagorno-Karabakh
that should be considered in the same context since it also raises
the question of identity and loyalty. Will the Armenians, who number
100 000 in Nagorno-Karabakh, want to be Azerbaijan’s citizens?
Here Russia’s role, whatever it is, influences nothing. At the end
of 1994 Russia closed the Abkhazian frontier for men of eighteen and
older. Such a situation lasted about four years. Has that made the
Abkhazians more loyal towards Georgia? No, it hasn’t. Then Russia’s
position was double, but this did not make the Abkhazians more loyal.
The factors of the USA, Russia and Kosovo are secondary. Kosovo
started being discussed in the world context in 1998. The UN adopted
the resolutions on Abkhazia in 1992-93. Transnistria became a
self-proclaimed territory in 1990.
The issue of the people’s choice and loyalty is not examined.
It is impossible to solve Abkhazia’s problem without the Abkhazians.
The Abkhazians are entitled to be heard. They do not become the
second-rate people only because they do not want to take a foreign
citizenship. So Russia’s strategy should not boil down to one question
– to recognize or not to recognize. This is a primitivism.
The strategy is as follows. While the status issues are not solved,
there is a need to favor the humanitarian development of those
territories, the integration into the world economy and the world
sociocultural relations. It is necessary to emphasize the interests
of the people who live in those territories. One cannot solve, for
example, the Abkhazian issues through Moscow. The Abkhazians will
stand their ground.
The material is based on Dmitry MEDOEV, Guram GUMBA, Sergei ARUTYUNOV
and Sergei MARKEDONOV’s addresses to the round table "Will the
unrecognized republics be recognized?" in Russian News and Information
Agency RIA Novosti.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
