ALL QUIET ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT
Comment by Sergey Markedonov
Russia Profile, Russia
d=International&articleid=a1219848872
Aug 27 2008
Despite Having Been Affected by the Russo-Georgian Squabble, Both
Armenia and Azerbaijan Cautiously Abstain From Taking Sides
The events of the "five-day war" in South Ossetia demonstrated
that countries of the Southern Caucasus largely act according to
their own national interests, and not on the assurances of "eternal
friendships." Thus, both Armenia and Azerbaijan behave in a careful
and calculated manner, realizing that getting involved in the
Russian-Georgian conflict bears a lot of "hidden reefs" which could
prove to be more dangerous than the status-quo that is so despised
by Baku and so cherished by Yerevan.
Georgia’s attempts to "restore the constitutional order" in South
Ossetia and the harsh Russian response have altered the politico-legal
and power configurations in the CIS, and not only in the two "hot
spots." They had a serious impact on the entire ethno-political
situation in Eurasia. In this regard, it is crucial to consider
the consequences of this "security deficit" in the South Caucasus,
especially because in recent weeks, Armenia and Azerbaijan have
remained in the shadows. What lessons were Baku and Yerevan able
to draw, having been brought to a conflicted state by the events in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the "hot August" of 2008?
Let’s consider the horizontal links among the three former Caucasus
republics, all of them now independent states in the South Caucasus
region. Georgia considered Azerbaijan its natural ally. Baku was ready
to reciprocate the sentiment. Let’s recall that the day before the new
escalation in South Ossetia, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
called Azerbaijan no less than the "guarantor of independence" of his
country. Typical theatrics of the Georgian leader aside, we should
recognize a few important points. First, Georgia and Azerbaijan are
members of an organization whose stated goal is to play a peculiar
anti-CIS role–GUAM. After Georgia officially left the CIS, GUAM
remains the sole structure in which Tbilisi can realize its integration
projects (another question is how successfully) within Eurasia.
Secondly, Azerbaijan has always supported the territorial integrity
of Georgia. Unlike Ukraine, Azerbaijan itself lost some 13 percent
of the land that is recognized as its integral part, and hence its
support, along with political reasons, has emotional and psychological
grounds (which in politics, especially in the Caucasus, is extremely
important). Thirdly, there is the economic cooperation. In 2005,
during the energy crisis, it was Azerbaijan that provided gas for
Georgia. "The Georgian people will never forget this," Saakashvili
said in a statement during the groundbreaking opening ceremony for the
Turkish section of the "Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars" railway on July
24 (only two weeks remained before the Tskhinvali tragedy). The two
Caucasian states were also united by two pipelines (oil and gas). Baku
also often served as a profitable and reliable sponsor for Tbilisi.
Unlike Azerbaijan, Georgia never considered Armenia as a strategic
partner and even less as a "guarantor of security." There have been a
lot of sensitive issues in their bilateral relations. These include
the position of Armenians in Georgia (in the Armenian populated
Samtskhe-Javakheti and in Tbilisi itself, considered to be an
important cultural center for all Armenians), and the role of the
Armenian community in the Abkhaz events. During the Georgian-Abkhazian
war of 1992-1993, the Bagramyan battalion fought on the side of the
"aggressive separatists" (as they call them in Tbilisi). There were
far fewer Armenian participants on the Georgian side (largely from
the aforementioned Tbilisi). In present-day Abkhazia, the Armenian
community is represented both in the government and in business,
and is generally loyal to the leadership of the de facto state. The
irritating factors are compounded by the military partnership between
Armenia and the Russian Federation (particularly the military base in
Gyumri, to which, among others, Russian military units from Georgia
were moved). Prior to the withdrawal of the Russian military base from
Akhalkalaki, there were many local ethnic Armenian residents employed
there. Also, Georgia (along with Iran) is Armenia’s window to the
world (because of the land blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan). Hence,
Yerevan does not want to move past certain milestones in its relations
with Tbilisi. Armenia also realizes that its gateway to Russia is
through Georgia, and that is why the dependence on the dynamics of
Russian-Georgian relations is an extremely sore point for Armenia. In
turn, given the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Tbilisi is
more cautious in dealing with the "Armenian question." The Georgian
leadership cannot ignore that, unlike the Abkhazians or Ossetians,
Armenians have strong support in the United States and the EU
(similarly from France).
Indeed, the given dispositions have determined the attitude that
Georgia’s neighbors have toward the "hot August" events. Despite its
commitment to a strategic alliance with Russia, Armenia preferred
to abstain from sudden moves and categorical statements. There are
many reasons for this. There is a reluctance to either clearly align
their actions with the Russians or to spoil their relations with the
West. They are already uneasy in connection with the events of March 1
in Yerevan. It is understandable that Serzh Sargsyan is no Alexander
Lukashenko, to whom the United States and the EU have long ago given
their "blessing" of more freedom in his interpretation of events.
Armenia, which has such a vulnerable place as the Karabakh, was also
not overly interested in anchoring the Nagorno Karabakh Republic
(NKR) and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to Russian-Georgian
relations. Besides, even earlier, both Armenia and the NKR leadership
distanced themselves from an openly pro-Ossetia and pro-Abkhazia
position. This is why representatives of Armenia’s Ministry of Defense
hastened to declare on August 10 that raids on the Georgian airbases
were not being conducted from the Russian base located in Armenia:
"The 102nd military base in the city of Gyumri has no military aircraft
capable of committing acts such as these bombings," they claimed.
The position of Armenia in connection with the heated Russian-Turkish
relations is another sensitive issue. Mild support by Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Erdogan for the Russian Federation’s position is
creating a feeling in Yerevan (as well as in the Armenian Diaspora in
the West) that the two great powers can agree with each other to the
detriment of Armenia (in particular, on the Karabakh issue). Recall
that on August 13 Erdogan stated: "The situation in South Ossetia
gives us cause to review the relationship between our countries,
whose solidarity in this region is of great importance." Here is what
Karapet Kalenchyan, an expert at the Armenian Center for National
and International Studies, wrote on this matter: "Seeing that Russia
is once again entering the South Caucasus, Turkey gives it its full
support in exchange for certain concessions on the part of Russia. What
kind of concessions could these be? Armenians have often worried that
such concessions might be made at the expense of our interests."
Prudence (only in the opposite direction) is also what set apart
Azerbaijan’s position. Representatives of various political parties of
the republic (including the ruling party) were more open in expressing
their positions. According to Mubariz Gurbanly (the ruling "Yeni
Azerbaijan" party), the "Georgian authorities’ actions to restore the
country’s territorial integrity are fully merited. These actions were
undertaken in accordance with the UN Charter." Note that this idea
(the legality of actions to punish separatists) had so far been far
more popular in Azerbaijan than in Georgia. The chairman of the Supreme
Majlis of the "Musavat" (opposition forces) party, Sulhaddin Akper,
stated that Georgia "was forced to conduct the operation against the
separatists in South Ossetia." However, Baku was officially much more
cautious than, for instance, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko
and the Foreign Ministry of his country (which, unlike Azerbaijan,
does not have such serious interests in the region).
The statement by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs from
August 8 in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity (approved by
the Georgian diplomats) contained general statements on the validity
of the Georgian operation under "international law," but was not
further clarified.
Five leaders of states that expressed their solidarity with Georgia
were present at a rally in Tbilisi on August 12. There were leaders
of the three Baltic countries, Poland, and Ukraine, but Ilham Aliyev,
the head of the state which Saakashvili called the "guarantor of
independence" less than a month earlier, was not there. Baku preferred
caution, given their interest in maintaining stable relations with
Russia. Unlike Georgia, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is not based
on a rigid confrontational manner. In Baku, they consider Russia to
be a counterweight to the West (which does not have such unambiguous
relations with Azerbaijan as it does with Georgia). Azerbaijan is also
afraid of being drawn into the "Iran game," where it is destined to
play a role as either a runway or the target of "Tehran’s retaliatory
shot." Hence the desire to appreciate the generally friendly, albeit
difficult, relations with Russia.
The opposition is trying to take advantage of this situation. Isa
Gambar, the leader of the "Musavat" party (who received second place
in the last presidential elections) believes that the official Baku
reaction to the events in South Ossetia is inadequate. But what
level of influence does Isa Gambar, or other opposition figures
(Eldar Namazov or Ali Keremli), enjoy today that he can alter the
position of the president’s team? That is a rhetorical question. Let’s
consider a hypothetical situation. Tomorrow either Gambar or Namazov
replace Ilham Aliyev. I think that they would also strictly separate
rhetoric and realistic politics, guided by the national interests
of Azerbaijan. Note that if such a scenario were to be repeated in
Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku would receive a much tougher reaction from
the West. There would even be talk of the consolidated opinion of the
United States, Russia, and leading EU countries. And that is why the
Azerbaijani police prohibit protests at the Russian embassy in Baku,
and prevents anti-Russian hysteria from sweeping the country.
Sergey Markedonov Ph.D., is the head of the Interethnic Relations
Department at Moscow’s Institute of Political and Military Analysis.