Why Turkey Became More Active In South Caucasus

WHY TURKEY BECAME MORE ACTIVE IN SOUTH CAUCASUS
Rovshan Ibrahimov, Head of the International Relations Department, Gafgaz University, Baku

Eurasian Home Analytical Resource
October 1, 2008
Russia

A new situation has emerged in South Caucasus after Russia’s military
operation in South Ossetia. The balance of powers in regional conflicts
has changed. Russia not only dislodged the Georgian forces from South
Ossetia but also recognized the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. As a result, the approach of the other countries to the
region started to change too.

During the conflict between Russia and Georgia Turkey took an active
position becoming a mediator between the parties. Prime Minister of
Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited both Moscow and Tbilisi.

Recep Erdogan proposed drawing up the Caucasian Security Pact. Russia,
Georgia, Azerbaijan and indirectly Armenia supported this initiative.

For all that, this project lacks concrete proposals and is hard
to implement. Its realization is improbable due to Russo-Georgian
confrontation and Azerbaijan and Armenia’s reluctance to step up
cooperation to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Nevertheless, on September 6, President of Turkey Abdullah Gul visited
Yerevan on the invitation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to the
Armenia-Turkey football match. In Armenia great importance was attached
to this visit. It is necessary for Armenia to solve the isolation
problem. The temporary problems with freightage from Georgia during
the Russian-Georgian war resulted in the fuel shortage in Armenia.

The visit of Turkish President Abdullah Gul was planned before the
Russo-Georgian conflict but after Turkey and Armenia had got into
the same group of the world football championship.

In the 1970s U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took the similar
steps to improve the relations with China. When the American ping-pong
team went to China, the countries established diplomatic relations
sometimes called ‘Ping Pong Diplomacy’.

Why has Turkey become more active in South Caucasus? Till now Turkey
has maintained the relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia, but not
with Armenia. The projects of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are evidence of interaction
between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The laying of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars
railroad would strengthen the cooperation between those two countries.

Georgia plays a key role in the realization of those projects. The
major South Caucasian roads go via its territory. It is significant
that President of Turkey Abdullah Gul backed the creation of the
regional economic alliance between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia cannot participate in such regional projects because of
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its territorial claims on Azerbaijan’s
territory. Azerbaijan and Turkey say that Armenian border will be
opened only if Armenia gives up Nagorno-Karabakh.

Director of the Institute of History of the National Academy of
Sciences of Armenia Ashot Melkonyan said that the isolation made
Armenia lose $500 million annually. However, even now that the Armenian
border is closed, trade between Armenia and Turkey exceeds dozens
of million dollars. Goods from Armenia to Turkey and vice versa are
supplied through the third countries, mainly through Georgia.

The other problem is that Armenia and the Armenian diaspora demand
that Turkey recognize the 1915 events in Ottoman Empire as genocide
against the Armenians.

Those factors influenced the foreign policy pursued by Turkey in
South Caucasus. But in summer 2008 the foreign policy changed. Why?

Then the governing Justice and Development Party made the political
situation stable. Justice and Development Party presidential candidate
Abdullah Gul had the best chance of being elected president from the
National Assembly. However, he was not elected the first time. Only
when the early parliamentary elections in Turkey were held the Justice
and Development Party established its record taking 47% of the vote
and Abdullah Gul was elected president.

On March 14, 2008 Turkey’s chief prosecutorAbdurrahman Yalcinkaya
asked the Constitutional Court to banthe partyalleging that it poses
a threat to Turkey’s secular regime. But the constitutional court
turned down the appeal.

Having solved the domestic problems, the Turkish authorities can
switch over to the foreign policy.

The second reason is Turkey hopes that if its relations with Armenia
improve, Armenia will drop the demand that Turkey recognize genocide
of the Armenians, in particular since solution to the problems with
Armenia is one of the conditions for Turkey’s joining the EU.

The 1915 events are the main stumbling block in the relations between
Armenia and Turkey. Here the Armenian authorities’ influence is just
nominal and the Armenian diaspora plays a predominant role. Yerevan
has no leverage over its diaspora – quite the contrary. What is more,
the Armenians are going to observe the centenary of the events in 2015.

That means Turkey is far from carrying out its foreign-policy
priorities because it has no long-term strategy towards the
region. While in the 1990s this could be accounted for by rapid change
of the coalition governments, the lack of priorities under the Justice
and Development Party is explained by the fact that the foreign-policy
strategy of the new government pays too little attention to South
Caucasus and Central Asia.