Politkom.ru website, Moscow
Oct 21 2008
Russia and Armenia: A psychological easing of tensions
by Sergey Markedonov, candidate of historical sciences, head of the
International Relations Department of the Institute for Political and
Military Analysis
On 20 October 2008 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev visited
Yerevan. At first glance (at least from outward appearances), the
Russian president’s visit is not all that different from the usual
visit of a head of state to the capital of a friendly country. We note
the entirely traditional package of events for a trip to the Armenian
capital: a visit to the Tsitsernakaberd memorial complex dedicated to
the genocide of Armenians during the Ottoman Empire, the ceremonial
opening dedication of Russian Square in Yerevan, the signing of
documents on cooperation (which will be inscribed, of course, into the
overall context of a strategic alliance), and a press conference
summarizing the results. However, the situation surrounding the
Russian leader’s visit is far from routine.
We begin with the purely psychological aspects. Dmitriy Medvedev’s
two-day trip to Yerevan marks his first official visit to Armenia as
the Russian head of state. Since the beginning of this year visits to
Armenia have been made by Viktor Zubkov (who was serving as prime
minister at the time) and State Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov. And
whereas Armenian President Serzh Sarkisyan visited Moscow immediately
following his victory in the presidential election (his visit took
place in late March 2008 and constituted his first foreign trip),
Dmitriy Medvedev’s schedule of trips prior to October did not include
Yerevan. We recall, however, that the Russian Federation president had
already visited Azerbaijan. In the Southern Caucasus, such visits
(like all movement and positive signals towards "the likely strategic
enemy") are perceived with extreme jealousy. Many political figures
and experts in Yerevan have been saying, most often in private, that
the Russian Federation president promised to visit Yerevan as one of
the first on his calendar of visits to CIS capitals. However, his trip
to this country, which Moscow is accustomed to calling a strategic
ally, was only scheduled for October. The Russian head of state
travelled to Baku in early July 2008 within the framework of his
trans-Caspian tour. During the course of this visit, Medvedev made no
secret of his interest in developing bilateral relations with this
Caspian state. "Azerbaijan is our strategic partner in the
Caucasus. We are linked by virtue of an ages-old history and the
special nature of our current partnership, which are helping to
resolve the most diverse problems," Dmitriy Medvedev stated in
Baku. During the course of Medvedev’s July visit, the Declaration on
Friendship and Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation
and Azerbaijan was signed.
Not everything has been simple in the perception of actions by Yerevan
and Moscow following the events of the "five-day war." Russia has
embarked upon recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia but has done nothing to promote the interests of Nagornyy
Karabakh. Moreover, Moscow continues to pursue a special approach with
respect to the NKR [Nagorno Karabakh Republic]. Nagornyy Karabakh was
not included on the list of de facto states that could be viewed as
examples for application of the "Kosovo precedent." The NKR has not
been mentioned in Duma declarations indicating possible conditions for
official legal recognition. There have not been any particular
presidential or government directives with respect to this republic.
However, all this was prior to the establishment of the precedent for
revision of the inter-republic borders, which became interstate
borders at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. After 26
August 2008, the distinct dissatisfaction in Yerevan with the
Kremlin’s "special approach" towards the NKR intensified. Naturally,
we are not talking about publicly expressed dissatisfaction. But who
said that the whole of Armenia’s policy is confined to the complex of
government buildings? Or even to Armenian territory proper? The
opposition, the diaspora, and Karabakh are also factors that cannot be
brushed aside. Such sentiment is reinforced by Moscow’s growing
interest in Azerbaijan. A significant role here was played by the
September visit of Azerbaijani President Ilkham Aliyev to Moscow and
by the elections of the head of state that took place 15 October of
this year in the Caspian republic.
In the opinion of a whole host of experts both in Azerbaijan and in
countries of the West, the presidential elections in Azerbaijan have
turned into a competition among politicians in the Russian Federation
and United States for support of the existing authority. Certain
Armenian information agencies view with alarm the commentary and
statements of Russian officials. The Internet publication "ArmeniaNow"
has examined an interview given by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister
Sergey Lavrov to Rossiyskaya Gazeta in which the minister states
specifically: "Armenia has essentially been blockaded as a result of
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Armenia has tremendous difficulty
communicating with the outside world. It is in the fundamental
interest of the Armenian people that this blockade be removed as
rapidly as possible. There are truly very few geographical and
political solutions." In the view of the Internet publication, "Moscow
did not indulge in such a tone when Robert Kocharyan was president."
The Armenian news media have also been greatly distressed by the words
spoken by Aleksey Ostrovskiy, chairman of the State Duma Committee for
the CIS, with respect to the principle of territorial integrity as a
governing principle of international law. And here again we should
focus attention on the asymmetry of perceptions. That which is
considered insignificant commentary in Moscow (aimed at the Western
audience or comprising a kind of diversionary PR designed to
demonstrate a "constructive position") is perceived in Armenia pretty
much as a concise ideological demarche. In this regard, the distinct
warming of relations between Moscow and Baku is causing alarm in
Yerevan (especially as it relates to Karabakh). The convergence of
positions between Ankara and Moscow is a separate topic. But the fears
and phobias here are less foreboding, if only because Yerevan itself
has undertaken measures to draw closer to Turkey. Nonetheless, fears
of "behind-the-scenes games" and "secret diplomacy" (in the manner of
Ataturk and Lenin) are present in Armenia (there being a historical
basis for such thinking).
There is simply a fear in Armenia that the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia will be paid for (or bought – however you want to
look at it) by "handing over" Karabakh. Modest Kolerov, former head of
the Department of CIS Affairs of the president’s administration, notes
quite correctly that you can only hand over that which you actually
have (and Russia does not have control over the NKR, as is the case
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia), but in Armenia (as in any other
republic of the former USSR) people have a tendency to overestimate
Russia’s resources – as they do the geopolitical machinations which
may not be taking place in reality. Under conditions of the absence of
international support for the policy of recognition of the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow simply cannot
ignore the Azerbaijan factor and must not facilitate the growth of
anti-Russian phobias there. Otherwise, room for manoeuvre in the
Southern Caucasus, already quite limited, will inevitably become
narrower still.
At the same time, it is also true that the Kremlin does not understand
a certain objective, underlying aspect of Yerevan’s actions. Armenia
has refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and has not entered into conflict with neighbouring
Georgia. At a summit meeting of the ODKB [Collective Security Treaty
Organization] on 5 September 2008, Armenia merely acknowledged the
illegitimacy of Tbilisi’s measures of force against South Ossetia. On
the other hand, republic President Serzh Sarkisyan paid a friendly
visit to Tbilisi on 30 September. The Armenian head of state was
awarded a Georgian decoration and received compliments from the
Georgian leader. It seems that many in Moscow believe that Mikhail
Saakashvili’s words addressed to the Armenian president came as a
knife through the heart. Saakashvili stated literally: "We highly
value the position of the Armenian leadership in connection with its
steadfast support of Georgia’s territorial integrity. Like many
countries, like practically all other countries in the world and those
of the immediate region, Armenia has expressed its unambiguous and
unswerving support for the territorial integrity of Georgia, its
unity, and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. I am convinced that
unity with respect to all these issues will remain forever in the
memory not only of our governments, but also of our peoples."
Naturally, representatives of the domestic opposition are striving in
every possible way to present the extremely complex relationship with
Georgia in the context of a change in Armenia’s foreign policy
(seemingly referring to a reorientation on the West). It is entirely
likely that influential Russians are just as unenthusiastic about
Yerevan’s contacts with the European Union, NATO, and the United
States as they are about Armenia’s constructive relations with
Georgia.
However, despite all the complexities in Russian-Armenian relations,
it should be acknowledged that there is a positive dynamic here as
well. More than 1,000 Russian enterprises are operating today in
Armenia. More than 70 Russian oblasts and republics are engaged in
cooperative effort with Armenia, and the trade volume in the past
several months alone has grown by almost 20 per cent. In the meantime,
we cannot attribute the entire complexity of bilateral ties to the
"Procrustean bed" of economic statistics. It is simply that both
Moscow and Yerevan must be more realistic in their assessment of one
another’s motives and reject heightened expectations (so as to avoid
terrible disappointment). Today we must accept as a given the fact
that Moscow does not recognize the independence of the NKR, and
Yerevan will not recognize the independence of the two former Georgian
autonomies. The Kremlin will not decline to cooperate with Baku and
will not make a definitive choice between the two Transcaucasian
states. But neither will Yerevan reject advantageous cooperation with
the West and with Georgia (across whose territory almost two-thirds of
all of Armenia’s foreign trade passes). Finally, the United States is
actually closing its eyes to Armenia’s cooperation with Iran (but what
else can you do given the complicated political geography?). In this
manner, the overriding mission of Dmitriy Medvedev’s visit could be
the clarification of complex aspects of the relationship, the
disavowal of mutual phobias, fears, suspicions, and misunderstandings.
The entirety of such actions may be classified as a unique kind of
psychological easing of tensions.
Over the 17 years that have transpired since the collapse of the USSR,
both countries have gained a great deal from mutually advantageous
cooperation. The main goal today is to shore up these gains,
discarding unnecessary jealousy and emotion and focusing on the true
motives of each partner – and naturally taking into account the
restrictive factors that objectively exist for both the Russian
Federation and Armenia.
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