AZERBAIJAN WITHDRAWS FROM IRAQ
By John C. K. Daly
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Nov 14 2008
DC
Five years after a U.S.-led coalition entered Iraq as peacekeepers
after the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein, Azerbaijan has
withdrawn its 151 troops stationed there. Azerbaijan’s troops served
under U.S. command and were deployed to guard a water storage facility
and hydroelectric dam near Haditha in Anbar Province, which supplies
30 percent of Iraq’s electricity production.
The Iraqi embassy in Baku released a statement saying:
"The Azeri peacekeeping contingent was one of the first to help the
Iraqi people and has protected the Haditha hydroelectric plant since
August 15, 2003. Taking into account Azeri peacekeepers’ duties,
it should be noted that their mission was of great importance and an
example of discipline and bravery. The Iraqi people and government
will never forget this noble action. The Iraqi government welcomes
the high-level Azeri military and parliamentary delegation that
has come to attend the solemn departure ceremony held for the Azeri
peacekeepers’ bravery and courage[; it] wishes success to every Azeri
peacekeeper. Let the Azeri peacekeepers who died in Iraq, rest in
peace" (Analiticheskoe i Informatsionnoe Agentsvtvo Finenko i abc.az,
November 12).
Terry Davidson, head of the public relations department of the
U.S. embassy in Baku was similarly fulsome, commenting:
"The U.S.A. highly appreciates Azerbaijan’s contribution to the efforts
to support stability and democratic development in Iraq. Fortunately,
Iraq is now a more peaceful and stable state, and the democratic
leaders of the country understand [their] responsibility for security
issues. This will allow members of the international coalition to
relocate their units to other places. Azerbaijan has been a valuable
member of the coalition and the American people hail the contribution
by your troops. We look forward to them being welcomed at home"
(Informatsionnoe Agentsvtvo Turan, November 10).
The action comes in the wake of President Ilham Aliyev’s submission
of a bill to the Milli Mejlis (Azerbaijan’s parliament) last month
to withdraw the Azeri peacekeepers. The withdrawal was subsequently
approved on November 10 by the parliamentary committee on security
and was forwarded to the plenary meeting of the Milli Mejlis.
The basis for Aliyev’s action was a strict legal interpretation of the
December 18, 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1790, which extended
the Multi-National Force –Iraq (MNF-I) mandate until December 31
().
The Azeri deployment to Iraq was a highly symbolic display of
Baku’s support for U.S. peacekeeping initiatives. After a five-year
deployment, the Azeri peacekeeping contingent suffered its first
casualty on June 27, with the death of Rafael Seyidbala Agaye
(Informatsionnoe Agentsvtvo Trend, June 28).
The deployment in Iraq was only one of a number of low-key Azeri
contributions to peacekeeping operations worldwide since 1997 when
the Azeri Army established a peacekeeping detachment. For example,
Azeri troops have served in Afghanistan since November 2002; and
400 Azeri peacekeepers rotated through Kosovo from 1999 until they
were withdrawn earlier this year after the province unilaterally
declared its independence in February (Kavkazskii uzel, November 12;
Informatsionnoe Agentsvtvo Trend, October 2). Two months ago Azerbaijan
agreed to increase the size of its contingent in Afghanistan (EDM,
September 19).
Baku’s decision to withdraw its peacekeepers from Kosovo underlines a
common theme with its more recent decision about its forces in Iraq–a
scrupulous and precise respect for the letter of international law. It
is an open secret that there have been substantial disagreements
between Baghdad and Washington about a continuing American military
presence beyond the expiration of the UN mandate, and particularly
about the terms of the Status of Armed Forces (SOFA) agreement
currently under negotiation between Iraq and the United States. This
may well have influenced Baku’s decision.
While MNF-I is multinational, its current commander is General
Raymond T. Odierno, who assumed command on September 16 when General
David H. Petraeus took over the United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM). Given that around 93 percent of the MNF-I troops are
from the United States, Washington speaks with the loudest voice
among the coalition forces. Odierno has minced no words regarding
Washington’s unhappiness about the Iraqi government’s foot-dragging
on approving a SOFA draft, saying last week, "We’re working with the
government of Iraq on this, and the bottom line is, if we don’t have
a legal framework, we’re going to have to take a look at what happens"
(UPI, November 4).
The other unspoken concern in Azerbaijan is the new geo-strategic
landscape in the Caucasus after the August military confrontation
between Russia and Georgia. The conflict proved, as if any reminder
were needed, that Moscow retains a keen interest in the issues of
Caspian energy and its transport through the Caucasus. During a recent
interview, when asked whether Russia had influenced Baku’s decision to
withdraw troops from Iraq, Zahid Oruc, a member of the Milli Mejlis’s
standing commission on security and defense, took pains to dismiss
the notion, saying,
"The term of the mandate is finishing, Azerbaijan’s position was clear,
and I think there are no problems here. Moreover, it is unfounded to
suggest that this decision was taken, like some do in their analysis,
in regard to the recent events in the Caucasus, Russia’s new role
in the resolution of regional conflicts. This decision cannot be
considered a rejection of cooperation with the international coalition
and no new trends in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations should be sought"
(, November 11).
What the August Russian-Georgian military confrontation brought home
to Azerbaijan was the necessity to bear in mind Moscow’s concerns
over its future energy projects. Baku has great hopes of developing
new energy export products, particularly the Nabucco natural gas
pipeline, whose funding and construction could be put at risk
by adopting a confrontational stance toward Moscow. Furthermore,
Aliyev’s government has witnessed a diplomatic effort by Moscow to
resolve its difficulties with Armenia, a diplomatic Gordian knot that
has stymied Western efforts for more than a decade.
In the choice between confrontation and commerce, the Azeri government
has clearly chosen the latter. U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman
is heading a delegation to Azerbaijan for the 2008 Energy Summit,
which opens on November 14. Neither the Russian ambassador nor other
Russian officials attended the ministerial conference on November 11
that drew up the agenda and documents to be signed at the gathering
(Farsuna Hidmet Portali, November 13).
If, as Bodman stated before leaving Washington, the U.S. government
is interested in pipelines for "the transport of competitive energy
resources from the Caspian region to meet the needs of markets east,
west, north, and south," then Aliyev might use his diplomatic skills
to remind his guest that those markets include both Russia to the north
and Iran to the south, where Azerbaijan increased its energy shipments
when conflict three months ago blocked its western export options.