AN EXISTENTIAL LEBANESE CHOICE?
by Harry Hagopian
Newropeans Magazine
t/view/8742/1/
Dec 11 2008
France
Over the years, many analysts have lost their political periscopes
in the treacherous sands of Lebanese politics. Today there are four
largely inter-related and major issues at the epicentre of the Lebanese
political discord: the national pan-confessional dialogue under the
auspices of the president of the republic, the future of arms in
the hands of different political groups and militias, the future of
Palestinian refugees and the decisive impetus that Christians will
in all likelihood inject into the forthcoming parliamentary elections
of 2009…
Over the years, many analysts have lost their political periscopes in
the treacherous sands of Lebanese politics. First, there were "civil
wars" for almost fifteen years that tore the country up and set it
aflame. Then, the TaÃ"f Accords ostensibly stepped in to redress the
ornery behaviour of its leaders but ended up curbing the powers of the
president of the republic or its Christian communities and admittedly
placed the country under an Anjar-centred Syrian tutelage. Much later,
the country witnessed the Independence Intifada of 2005 when new
neo-revolutionary values unfurled on the streets and vied with older
realities. But despite all those upheavals, the Cedars of Lebanon have
remained a political conundrum as they have wrestled time and again
with sectarian uncertainties let alone political infidelities. Lebanon
celebrated on 22nd November its much-cherished 65th Independence Day,
but unlike the Israeli-Palestinian or Iraqi conflicts that exhibit a
set of unflinching core issues, one can never presume to predict what
political ghoul would come out of which Lebanese corner at any moment.
Today, I would suggest that there are four largely inter-related and
major issues at the epicentre of the Lebanese political discord. They
consist of the national pan-confessional dialogue under the auspices
of the president of the republic, the future of arms in the hands of
different political groups and militias, the future of Palestinian
refugees both inside and outside their camps and last but not least
the decisive impetus that Christians will in all likelihood inject
into the forthcoming parliamentary elections of 2009.
The national dialogue: in some way, it is a by-product of the Doha
main deal that facilitated the election of a new president and the
formation of a "national unity" cabinet that houses diametrically
opposite standpoints. It was also meant to foster reconciliation
between the warring factions and address the unresolved standoff about
the legitimacy of arms outside the remit of the army. This dialogical
exercise, I believe, would only be a cosmetic exercise that does not
have much chance for real progress but will nonetheless hopefully
keep the peace amongst major players who have committed publicly to
the Doha process. It could also be a catalyst in restraining all
parties from unilateral and bellicose moves that would wrench the
lid off the present insecure calm.
The future of arms that Hizbullah, the Party of God, has in its
possession: this is meant to be a central plank for the national
reconciliation dialogue. However, most seasoned commentators are aware
that this issue cannot be resolved before the parliamentary elections
in the spring of 2009. No way will this party, let alone its allies
or protagonists, surrender their arms whilst they maintain the need
for resistance against an Israel that still occupies small plots of
Lebanese land and exhibits what they consider an expansionist threat
on the country. So much so in fact that the Free Patriotic Movement
leader General Michel Aoun returned from a recent visit to Iran and
presented his blueprint for a national defence strategy that is
based on his 2005 Memorandum of Understanding with Hizbullah. It
called for combining the Resistance and the Lebanese army into a
"community resistance" that would command the loyalty and resources
of the state along with all its institutions and citizens. What this
blueprint for a defence strategy actually imputed is a negation of
the need for UNSC Resolutions 1701 and 1559.
But this blueprint that aims to mobilise all the citizens of the state
could become another dangerous recipe for further civil wars. As the
leader of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Jumblatt counter-argued
in the weekly newsletter al-Anba’a, General Aoun’s proposition would
transform Lebanon into a "constant war field, which topples stability,
torpedoes investment and increases emigration." Taken one step nearer
toward at least one of its logical conclusions, Jumblatt’s viewpoint
translates into the fact that the state is the sole authority, and that
any defence strategy that does not respect the pluralism of the state
cannot be taken into consideration in any future discussions. After
all, was the temporary takeover of the western districts of Beirut
by Hizbullah and Amal elements on the fateful night of 7th May not
a dangerously implicit manifestation of consensus by coercion?
The future of Palestinian refugees: to start with the tactical
considerations, it is helpful to recall that disarming Palestinian
factions outside the camps was meant to have already been decided
during the first national dialogue in 2006 prior to the war with
Israel in July. So their status strictu sensu is not in my legal
opinion lite pendente anymore. However, political calculations have
prevented implementing its provisions practically on the ground.
Insofar as the Palestinian camps are concerned, it is also important to
recall that the idea of tawtin (or the granting of residency through
Lebanese citizenship to those refugees in the camps across Lebanon)
that would push up the Sunni quota in the country if ever implemented
is a political non-sequitur used by politicians as a ruse to prop
up their own political ends. The Lebanese government, and the PLO as
the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, have already
agreed that no tawtin will occur in Lebanon since such a move would
undermine inter alia the validity under International law of UNSC
194 calling for the right of return [to their homelands].
Indeed, the Palestinian-Lebanese Dialogue Committee (LPDC) works
pan-politically to defuse such malingering chronicles, as well as to
rebuild Nahr el Bared near Tripoli that was destroyed substantially
following the battles between the Lebanese army and the Fatah al
Islam radical movement. It also strives to improve the long-standing
and truly deplorable conditions in some of those camps. Such efforts
must not only be maintained, but also re-doubled seriously, without
opening rifts between the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples that would
be a throwback to the bloody battles three decades ago. Moreover,
the issue of tawtin should not be dragged into the electoral ring by
the Cassandras of Lebanon who believe that purveying bad news would
inevitably strengthen their flanks.
Christian performance in the forthcoming elections: all my contacts
with different Lebanese pundits confirm that the battle for Christian
votes will arguably be the hub of political alliances or lobbies in
the months ahead. The recent Shi’i-Sunni ‘summit’ between Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah and Sa’ad Hariri resulted in a ‘reconciliation’ of sorts with
both leaders excluding any electoral alliance between them. So the
Sunni and Shi’i seats are almost clear pickings in most districts –
with few notable exceptions. Even a putative future meeting between
Walid Jumblatt and Hassan Nasrallah will in my opinion not result
in any electoral pact and therefore cannot alter substantially the
calculus of their respective seats in the next parliament. All this
leaves the Christian candidates to fight it out amongst themselves –
cleaved as they are between the March 8th and 14th coalitions.
But the present dynamics are dangerous as they reflect Christian
tensions inter partes that have not mimicked the corresponding easing
of tensions within Muslim camps. This has led to occasional verbal
attacks against the institutional pillars of Christian society,
namely the Maronite patriarch and even the president. With baffling
alliances so characteristic of Lebanese intra-politics, one way of
engendering support seems to be through the dangerous exhumation of
past demons and animosities. There is real fear as to the outcome of
those votes in view of the way that candidates are being chosen by
the different parties. Indeed, with diametrically opposite political
platforms, strategies and even expectations, I would suggest that the
Christian voter is faced with clear-cut choices that are not solely
binary but also organic in their ramifications on the overall future
of the country.
This is why we keep hearing alarm bells hither and thither, with
dichotomous positions over the impact of the TaÃ"f Accords, and
international alliances and regional influences being exercised by
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Iran, let alone the USA and Europe,
over issues that centre upon freedom, pluralism, religion and
resistance. Indeed, Christian divisions can even be seen at the
micro-level of national governance. Just observe how the small
but influential Armenian parties – namely the Tashnag party – have
heretofore broken their legendary collective neutrality in support
of the presidential powers-to-be and have now forged new cross-party
political alliances.
In fact, this sense of constant political realignments is becoming a
talking point of the forthcoming parliamentary elections as everyone
eyes the stance of President Michel Suleiman. It seems an independent,
middle-of-the-road national parliamentary bloc that has a Christian
ethos and owes its organic allegiance to the president is an idea
that is rapidly gaining currency in the country. In fact, if such a
bloc emerges after the parliamentary elections, it could conceivably
sway the power politics of the country and affect the clout of both
principal coalitions.
However, such an emergent movement could damage General Aoun’s
electoral self-anointed position as sole Lebanese Christian
leader. After all, the former deputy prime minister and Metn
powerbroker Michel al-Murr has withdrawn from his bloc, a move
that could tip the balance in the Metn and impact the neighbouring
Kesrouan – alongside any probable Armenian shifts in their own
electoral platforms. No wonder then that Syrian channels are trying
to prevent such fragmentation by bolstering General Aoun’s standing
with Lebanese Christian constituents and proclaiming him "leader of
Christians in the Orient" with an "historic mission" and an "objective,
national Lebanese personality" who harbours "a strategic insight that
understands Arab and regional powers."
Another major underlying focus in all those alliances is the definition
of the role Syria ought to play in Lebanon. There is a battle being
waged between those supportive of an active role, and those who reject
it, and Syria itself is heavily involved in spinning the outcome. All
this explains somewhat the reason why an almost surreal episode played
out on Syrian New TV quite recently, with the televised confessions
of alleged Fatah al-Islam members attempting to discredit the March
14th coalition in the person of Sa’ad Hariri’s Sunni Al-Mustaqbal
(Future) party by associating it with terrorism. But this ill-advised
and frankly unpolished strategy seems to have yielded no concrete
results. I understand that the prosecuting judge of the International
Tribunal mandated by UNSC 1701 to look into the assassination of
former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri and 21 others on February 14 2005,
as well as a string of subsequent political murders, is close to
submitting his report to the UN Security Council.
Mind you, logic would dictate that such allegedly "terrorist members"
in Syrian custody should be handed over to the Lebanese authorities
investigating those murders. After all, the ‘security coordination’
mooted between Lebanon and Syria following an earlier visit to
Damascus by the Lebanese Interior Minister Ziad Baroud should fulfil
its coordinating role within a clear judicial remit, or else the
whole concept of ‘coordination’ becomes an Orwellian concept that
would bear a less edifying intent.
However, all polarisations, reservations and even fears surrounding
the pending judgment of the tribunal should not stunt the progress
of the much-touted diplomatic relations between Lebanon and
Syria. Whether half the Lebanese populace likes it or not, Syria is
one of the most critical players in Lebanon and the Arab World. Its
larger global geo-strategic interests will not allow it to eclipse
entirely – certainly not at the present time. The establishment
of embassies between Lebanon and Syria before end-year is therefore
quintessential. However, for such progress not to be merely ephemeral,
it is important to proceed equally with the demarcation and proper
control of borders. And given that Syria opposes such demarcation
starting from the litigious zone of the Shaba’a Farms, I suggest
initiating the process from the north, followed by a revision by a
parliamentary commission of previous bilateral accords, and an enquiry
by the International Red Cross into Lebanese citizens in Syrian gaols.
Lebanon today is perched precariously between life and death,
facing success and failure in co-equal dimensions. It is therefore
vital for it to enter into a necessary accommodation with Syria that
would introduce an element of stability into the region let alone
into Lebanon itself but would definitively not jeopardise Lebanese
territorial integrity or sovereignty. I admit candidly that this is a
difficult balance in view of the different political variables at play,
and I can observe how twisted French foreign diplomacy has become of
late as President Nicolas Sarkozy tries to square the political circle
by strengthening Lebanon as an independent state whilst re-introducing
Syria onto the international scene and re-engaging with its regional
responsibilities. But the fact remains that any other skewed outcome
would mean that the parliamentary elections could well take place,
but they will fail to unravel the Gordian knot that is undermining
Lebanon and its hardy citizens.
Perhaps what might be helpful is the introduction of a quality of
change that respects the National Pact guaranteeing the coexistence
of all communities in Lebanon, whilst also not shying away from the
onus of renegotiating the structure of power in Lebanon. Without being
a naïve theoretician, I judge that the president of the republic,
alongside the UN as guarantor, could provide such a political egress
from this standoff. But for such a development to germinate in the
country, political leaders must desist from thinking or acting like
militia or clan leaders anymore and metamorphose into statesmen
who use the appropriate tools to build up government capacity and
nation-building in a bottom-up process that reflects the real global
architecture of our common future.
Openly put, Lebanon requires an existential choice that would take
it forward. Otherwise, what I fear we will witness in this period of
electioneering – and also thereafter when the votes have been counted
and the stalemates have re-surfaced in different formats and numbers
– is not only a status quo ante but a much more perilous and radical
heightening of tensions that could result in a screeching collision
of the bullet with the ballot box.
–Boundary_(ID_v9NKR3XG1iGWIfv9ypHHXQ)–