“All the Boots we Received were the Right-Foot Ones”
Kommersant, Russia
Dec 18 2004
Eighty years ago, at the end of 1924, the de-centralization of the
supply system of the Red Army began. The responsibility for the
procurement of food and uniform was transferred onto the shoulders of
regiment commanders, the idea being that this could help to finally
arrange the normal life of the Red Army men. Vlast’s columnist Evgeny
Zhirnov has studied the results of the experiment.
When I served in the army in the second half of the 70-s the army was
viewed as the school of courage. Quite justly so – you needed courage
even for ingestion. For example: cans with goby in tomato sauce,
which were produced some twenty years ago and have already gone bad,
are delivered from some reserve stock, opened up, thrown onto pans,
fried and then poured into millet porridge. It was only cooked
semolina with small fry (boiled soft with scales and giblets) that
could compare to it.
Lapping over the tunic that could be wrapped twice around me (“As if
made just for you!” the master sergeant said tenderly giving out the
uniform) I remembered a joke about overdeveloped socialism: you can
already buy nothing with money whereas nothing is handed out free of
charge yet. However, according to the documents, in the history of
the Russian army normal provision of soldiers has always been an
exception from the rule.
“Red Army Men are Involved in Plundering and Panhandling”
At the time of the Civil War self-provision was the main way of food
procurement in the Red Army – requisition (a euphemism for the
plunder of the population). It took time and effort for the troops to
fall out of this habit after the war.
Photo: RGAKFD/ROSINFORM
To find out how long a Red Army man could do without food and uniform
the commissaries (see the photo) used their favorite method – probing
action.
The report on the condition of the RKKA (Workers’ and Peasants’ Red
Army) for July, 1922 read: “The previous report mentioned the
rowdiness of the Red Army men in the Nikolaev and Kremenchug
provinces, which was manifested in unauthorized requisitions and
plunders. At present this phenomenon is observed in the Podolsk
province.”
As time passed no grave changes took place. The September report of
1922 mentioned: “The provision of the units stationed in the
Samarkand and Fergana regions is dreadful. At times the units
stationed in the Fergana region received one fourth of a pound of
bread a day … All this results in the following: the Red Army men
plunder and panhandle, which extremely exasperates the aboriginal
population of Turkestan that is already quite negative in their
attitude towards the Soviet power.”
However, food was not the only item in demand. In October, reports on
the shortage of uniforms flooded in: “Armenia holds the first place
in terms of lack of winter uniform – they have none whatsoever. Then
it is the Bryansk province (85% shortage), the Kostroma (70%
shortage), Tsaritsyno (50%) and Pskov (40%) provinces. Such phenomena
are manifested to a lesser degree in the Smolensk, Kursk, Tula,
Kaluga provinces, in the Tartar republic, in Kuban, in the Siberia
(the Omsk and Irkutsk provinces), in the Orenburg, Bukeevo, Tyumen
provinces, in the naval units of Arkhangelsk, in the Gomelsk province
and in other places…”
Photo: RGAKFD/ROSINFORM
A Red Army man washed himself in the same water that he had washed
his shirt in (above); he fed himself on what he had managed to
recover from the collective farm peasants in the battle for the
harvest (below).
Once the Red Army was more or less dressed the problems with footwear
were aggravated. The report for April-May, 1923 read: “The shortage
of footwear is especially tangible. It reaches the level of 80% in
the Voronezh province; in the units of Zabaykalye, Severo-Dvinsk,
Vyatka, the Tartar republic – 50%, in the border troops of Georgia –
40%, Fergana – 25%. Units of the Ryazan province (the Red Army men
wear bast shoes), the Irkutsk, Vitebsk, Priamurye, Vologda,
Yaroslavl, Tyumen, Pskov, Kursk, Votsk, Omsk, Mari, Primorsk
provinces and Karelia (21 provinces all in all) need footwear.”
Once they just managed to somehow solve this problem (one of the
regiments “received small-size boots, all of them being the
right-foot ones”) it turned out that the bulk of the food, which was
channeled to the troops, was not of the best quality to put it
mildly: “The 8th division of the Western Military District got 1,107
poods of bad meat. In July and August 15,000 poods of corned beef
were scrapped in the 6th corps of the South-Western Military District
and 1,500 poods in the 3rd Kazan division. Off-test flour and cereals
were distributed in many units of the West Siberian Military
District. Almost in all districts the quality of bread baked is
unsatisfactory as a result of which intestinal diseases are spread.”
Apart from that “the absence of blankets results in the quick wear of
overcoats, which are used instead of blankets”.
“Red Army Men have to Sleep on the Bare Ground.”
The unending circle of supply problems was explained not only by the
difficult economic situation in the country. The supply branch
officials of various ranks made good money on the practice of the
emergency stopping of gaps. For example, in 1922 in the North
Caucasus Military District the case of a high-raking supply official
was investigated – deputy commissioner on haying Ivan Rakityansky.
Rakityansky was charged with the episodes, which had little in common
with haying – striking patently unprofitable deals with private
dealers for the supply of textiles, sacks, salt and wire. Apart from
that he was charged with receiving bribes for the deliveries of meat
and with extorting mediatory interest for certain goods ordered for
the Red Army units from abroad.
Photo: RGAKFD/ROSINFORM
However, in defending himself the commissary was most persistent and
consistent. For some reason the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection
failed to determine the average level of prices on salt, sacks and
other items at the time the deals were made. It refused to evaluate
the damage done to the treasury. As for the representative of
Vneshtorg who had been the object of Rakityansky’s extortion (the
latter wanted 5% interest from the volume of deliveries), at
confrontation he confirmed the words of the commissary: “He mentioned
the 5% in a joking tone nine months ago when it was fashionable to
talk about commission in a private setting – just like it is
fashionable to talk about bribes now.”
Still GPU was going to transfer the case to the military tribunal.
Rakityanky’s standard of living apparently did not correspond to his
salary. This was quite sufficient for the verdict of guilty. However,
there was one little thing. A military man could not be tried without
the agreement of his command. It was suppliers like Rakityansky that
he was subordinated to. His report with the request to cease the
court persecution against him received a positive resolution.
For the same reason other commissaries remained unattainable for the
retributive sword of the party. GPU reported in the Central
Committee: “In a number of cases it is the absence of experienced and
reliable managers that is the reason for the grave condition of the
units. This is ascertained through informative materials,
investigations held by the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection and by
the command. At times in the units of the 3rd division of the
Detached Cavalry Brigade business managers were replaced 4-6 times a
year. Often the military-economic department does not recall the
managers who are on trial.”
Photo: RGAKFD/ROSINFORM
The model Red Army was always half a bowl ahead of the real one.
As for the commissaries, they continued to expand the sphere of their
activity. At the end of 1923 the army bakeries were transferred to
cost accounting. Right away there began mass thefts of flour. To
conceal the misappropriation they baked bread with various
admixtures. When it was buckwheat or weeds it was half the trouble.
Often they added sand. The money allocated for the remodeling of
barracks and for the purchase of firewood was stolen as actively.
Beginning with the middle of 1924 practically everywhere the Red Army
men received over-seasoned or bad fish instead of meat.
When the troops went to summer camps it turned out that there was an
array of problems there as well. “The camp conditions are
dissatisfactory,” read the report for July, 1924. “The tents are old,
they leak, there is impermissible overcrowding (up to 15 men in each
tent). Since many Red Army men lack bedding they have to sleep right
on the ground. The supply and the boiling of water is established
poorly.”
The next month the report on the state of the army read: “It is the
culpable attitude of the administrative bodies towards the cause of
the army supply that is the reason for the dissatisfactory supply of
the units. The Turkestan Front and the Western District stand out in
this respect. On the order of the head of the Turkfront’s
military-economic department they accepted the meat, which was bad
and had been scrapped earlier. The head of the supply of Turkfront
agreed to the delivery of vegetables on the conditions, which were
unprofitable for the treasury. This happened because the staff had
received the bribe of 1000 rubles from the suppliers. The front’s
supply bodies received 70,000 poods of oats that were no good and
that had been recognized as dissatisfactory. In the Western Front
there have been cases of negligence towards grain. Thousands of poods
of grain had rotted and were still delivered to units. In Vyazemskiy
grocery store 4,000 poods of rye are infected with vermin. Bad hay
was delivered to the Leningrad district. In many military units the
food prepared is tasteless, often dangerous for health, frequently
prepared in non-sanitary conditions.”
Photo: RGAKFD/ROSINFORM
“The Party Staff Tries to Avoid Appointments to Administrative
Offices”
The way out from the exclusive circle of intendancy’s stealing looked
attractive. The military department decided to transfer the
contractual work to the regiment level. In this way the commanders
who faced their soldiers every day would be in charge of the money
allocated for the supply. This new de-centralized system was called
independent procurement.
“In the course of transfer to the new system of supply,” the report
for December, 1924 read, “the units had to face the old question of
staffing the administrative apparatus. The issue has become most
topical under the present circumstances. As was mentioned in the
previous materials, the practical skills of the old staff of the
administrative apparatus (these were bureaucrats who often had
deliberate criminal attitude towards the work) do not correspond to
the demands of the new system. The party staff attracted into the
administrative apparatus is even less prepared for this kind of work
and tries to avoid responsible positions in the administrative block.
All of the above-said is confirmed by the practice of independent
procurement. Thus the 2d territorial division of the Western Military
District has signed an agreement for the supply of vegetables, which
will be more expensive than vegetables at the market because of the
distance of deliverance. In the 10th Cavalry Division of the Moscow
Military District the lard bought from a private dealer turned out to
be bad. Every week the North Caucasus Military District receives
information on the poor quality of meat. For example, there was a
case in the 13th division when the prepared food contained intestines
with excrement. At first the 27th division of the Western Military
District signed an agreement with the Smolensk meat packing plant.
Photo: RGAKFD/ROSINFORM
The plant supplied good quality meat. However, under the pressure
exerted by the district suppliers the division was compelled to break
this agreement and sign another one with the front commission of
assistance to war invalids. At prices higher than the market ones
this commission supplied lean stringy meat with bruises, which the
Red Army men refused to eat. There are many examples of the kind.”
Such examples continued to multiply in the new year (1925) because
the number of administrative workers who had real money on hand
increased by dozens of times. In some cases Red Army commanders
became accomplices of the commissaries. Then the reserves of whole
regiments were stolen.
In general though the calculation of the army command turned out to
be correct. Having grasped the point of the matter the majority of
regiment commanders brought the independent procurement to the
necessary level (as it was said back then). In the summer of 1925 for
the first time since the introduction of the Soviet power the report
on the condition of the army read: “The de-centralization of the
supply of the Red Army has by and large brought positive results. The
quality of provision has significantly improved, the deficiencies of
supply have been almost overcome.”
It was only big military suppliers that were dissatisfied. They kept
twisting commanders’ arms trying to make them sign agreements with
the organizations in the jurisdiction of the intendancies. At the
same time as a rule the agreements were not observed and the number
of those eager to have anything to do with the central supply bodies
kept decreasing.
Photo: RGAKFD/ROSINFORM
The experiment with the practice of independent procurement could be
a success and could become the norm. Had it not been for the skill of
the high-ranking suppliers and for the inflation. By the beginning of
1926 the prices on food and uniform, which the commanders could now
order independently, increased. As for the financing, it remained on
the previous level – apparently not without the effort on the part of
the chief commissaries. Commanders of regiments and their
administrative workers began transferring money from one item of
expenditure to another, they were confused and became the objects of
investigation. They were not tried but the desire to work on
agreements and supplies was completely gone.
With time the practice of centralized supply was restored. However,
stealing did not disappear. It continued throughout the thirties and
during the time of the Great Patriotic War. As the former head of the
food supply service of the Soviet Army shared, “during the time of
the war we had cases of thefts and cases when food was not entered
into books however nobody was tried by the tribunal at the front”.
There were problems with the quality of food as well. However, the
command found a reliable way of solving them. For example, in 1942 a
private letter of the Special Department of the North-Western Front
read: “The Special Department of the 144th detached brigade arrested
Red Army man Volkov P.A.
Photo: RGAKFD/ROSINFORM
Even temporary deliverance from the wrong-size boots resulted in an
uncontrollable flush of vis vitae with the Red Army men.
In a conversation with soldiers he ran down the quality of food and
spoke of shortcomings in the organization of nutrition in the unit.
Despite the fact that this was the only instance of Volkov leading
such conversations and that he was characterized positively by the
command, the Special Department charged him with counter-revolution
propaganda, the prosecutor confirmed this absurd accusation and the
military tribunal sentenced Volkov to death.”
Volkov was lucky and his sentence was canceled. However, most likely
from that point on none of those serving with him plucked up the
courage to discuss commissaries.
by Evgeny Zhirnov
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