WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
January 16, 2009 Friday
WAITING FOR WAR?
by Rusim Mamedov
ANOTHER WAR OVER NAGORNO-KARABAKH IS FEARED IN THE CAUCASUS; The
outbreak of hostilities in the Caucasus this year is possible over
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Dramatic events last August when Russia helped South Ossetia repel
Georgian aggression and recognized it and Abkhazia as sovereign states
fomented expectations of another war in the Caucasus. This time the
outbreak of hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh is feared.
Leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the so called Meindorf
Declaration. Brokered by Moscow in Russia, the document compels them
to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh issue on the basis of internationally
acceptable principles. Several days later, however, President of
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev announced that the Moscow Declaration allowed
for the military solution to the problem. Also importantly, Azerbaijan
boosted its military budget to $2.2 billion i.e. more than tripled it
since 2006. It means that Aliyev’s words are to be taken seriously, at
least as an indication of intentions.
A larger part of the Armenian political establishment and practically
all Nagorno-Karabakh population (solely Armenian, these days) are of
the opinion that the Meindorf Declaration does not recognize the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as a side of the conflict. In other words,
that representatives of this republic denied recognition cannot
realize their interests in full. The Nagorno-Karabakh settlement
formula accepted in Moscow stands for territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan and few Armenians find it acceptable. No wonder skirmishes
and clashes along the line of contact became undeniably more frequent.
It is clear as well that application of the Georgian scenario is
essentially impossible because Armenia all but recognizes
Nagorno-Karabakh de facto while Russia, Armenia’s ally, knows better
than to spoil relations with Azerbaijan, a country more than loyal to
Russia and (also important) predictable. It does not, unfortunately,
rule out the possibility of Azerbaijani-Armenian hostilities.
Political deterioration in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh
itself will make their outbreak a distinct possibility. In this case,
official Yerevan may succumb to the demands of the opposition and
grant Nagorno-Karabakh formal recognition as a sovereign state and a
side in the conflict (emulating what Russia did with regard to
Abkhazia and South Ossetia last year).
Stepan Safarjan, Secretary of the Legacy faction of the Armenian
parliament, is convinced that "… Armenia should put forth the demand
to make Nagorno-Karabakh the principal side in the talks." "Should
Azerbaijan attack Karabakh, it will leave only one course of action
open to Armenia and that spells official recognition," he added.
What side of the fence will Moscow support in another
Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict? What kind of policy will it need in the
Caucasus to promote its own interests? What will NATO and the United
States think of another round of the hostilities? What effect will it
have on Moscow’s relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan?
Granted that the questions are mostly academic and somewhat
provocative at this point, answers to them are needed right now to
spare Moscow being caught unprepared by a sudden outbreak of
Azerbaijani-Armenian hostilities. Moreover, answers are needed without
delay for the Russian military and military-diplomatic circles and
analogous structures in Russia’s allies to try and prevent this turn
of events.
Seeing another round of hostilities, Moscow will have the right to
demand an instant cease-fire and immediate negotiations. Military aid
to Armenia (no matter how covert) from the Russian military base in
Gyumri will hardly be the best course of action. If Russia does not
want to antagonize Baku, Russian troops in Armenia must remain
strictly neutral. The Russian Foreign Ministry in the meantime will
have to concentrate on preventing NATO countries including the United
States from joining the battle. Moscow will do fine demanding to be
allowed to deploy Russian peacekeepers or peacekeepers from
pro-Russian CIS countries on the line of contact.
Source: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 1, January 14 – 20, 2009, p. 3
Translated from Russian