The geopolitical Great Game: Turkey and Russia moving closer
By F. William Engdahl
Online Journal Contributing Writer
Feb 27, 2009, 00:44
Despite the problems of the ruble and the weak oil price in recent
months for the Russian economy, the Russian government is pursuing a
very active foreign policy strategy. Its elements focus on countering
the continuing NATO encirclement policy of Washington, with often
clever diplomatic initiatives on its Eurasian periphery.
Taking advantage of the cool relations between Washington and longtime
NATO ally, Turkey, Moscow has now invited Turkish President Abdullah
Gul to a four-day state visit to discuss a wide array of economic and
political cooperation issues.
In addition to opening to Turkey, a vital transit route for natural gas
to western Europe, Russia is also working to firm an economic space
with Belarus and other former Soviet republics to firm its alliances.
Moscow delivered a major blow to the US military encirclement strategy
in Central Asia when it succeeded earlier this month in convincing
Kyrgystan, with the help of major financial aid, to cancel US military
airbase rights at Manas, also a major blow to US escalation plans in
Afghanistan.
In short, Moscow is demonstrating it is far from out of the new Great
Game for influence over Eurasia.
Warmer Turkish relations
The Government of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan has shown increasing
impatience with not only Washington policies in the Middle East, but
also the refusal of the European Union to seriously consider Turkey’s
bid to join the EU. In the situation, it’s natural that Turkey would
seek some counterweight to what had been, since the Cold War,
overwhelming US influence in Turkish politics. Russia’s Putin and
Medvedev have no problem opening such a dialogue, much to Washington’s
dismay.
Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a four-day visit to the Russian
Federation, from February 12 to 15, where he met with Russian president
Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and also travelled to
Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where he discussed joint investments.
Gul was accompanied by his state minister responsible for foreign
trade, and minister of energy, as well as a large delegation of Turkish
businessmen. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan joined the delegation.
Visit to Tatarstan
The fact that Gul’s Moscow visit also included a stop in Tatarstan, the
largest autonomous republic in the Russian Federation, whose population
mainly consists of Muslim Tatar Turks, is a sign how much relations
between Ankara and Moscow have improved in recent months, as Turkey has
cooled to Washington’s foreign policy. In previous years, Moscow was
convinced that Turkey was trying to establish Pan-Turanism in the
Caucasus and Central Asia and inside the Russian Federation, a huge
concern in Moscow. Today clearly Turkish relations with Turk entities
inside the Russian Federation are not considered suspicious as they
were once, confirming a new mood of mutual trust.
Russia elevated Gul’s trip from the previously announced status of an
`official visit’ to a `state visit,’ the highest level of state
protocol, indicating the value Moscow now attaches to Turkey. Gul and
Medvedev signed a joint declaration announcing their commitment to
deepening mutual friendship and multi-dimensional cooperation. The
declaration mirrors a previous `Joint Declaration on the
Intensification of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership,’ signed
during a 2004 visit by then-President Putin.
Turkish-Russian economic ties have greatly expanded over the past
decade, with trade volume reaching $32 billion in 2008, making Russia
Turkey’s number one partner. Given this background, bilateral economic
ties were a major item on Gul’s agenda and both leaders expressed their
satisfaction with the growing commerce between their countries.
Cooperation in energy is the major area. Turkey’s gas and oil imports
from Russia account for most of the trade volume. Russian press reports
indicate that the two sides are interested in improving cooperation in
energy transportation lines carrying Russian gas to European markets
through Turkey, the project known as Blue Stream-2. Previously Ankara
had been cool to the proposal. The recent completion of the Russian
Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea increased Turkey’s
dependence on Russian natural gas from 66 percent up to 80 percent.
Furthermore, Russia is beginning to see Turkey as a transit country for
its energy resources rather than simply an export market, the
significance of Blue Stream 2.
Russia is also eager to play a major part in Turkey’s attempts to
diversify its energy sources. A Russian-led consortium won the tender
for the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant recently, but as
the price offered for electricity was above world prices, the future of
the project, awaiting parliamentary approval, remains unclear. Prior to
Gul’s Moscow trip, the Russian consortium submitted a revised offer,
reducing the price by 30 percent. If this revision is found legal under
the tender rules, the positive mood during Gul’s trip may indicate the
Turkish government is ready to give the go-ahead for the project.
Russia’s market also plays a major role for Turkish overseas
investments and exports. Russia is one of the main customers for
Turkish construction firms and a major destination for Turkish exports.
Similarly, millions of Russian tourists bring significant revenues to
Turkey every year.
Importantly, Turkey and Russia may start to use the Turkish lira and
the Russian ruble in foreign trade, which could increase Turkish
exports to Russia, as well as weakening dependence on dollar mediation.
Post-Cold War tensions reduced
However, the main message of Gul’s visit was the fact of the
development of stronger political ties between the two. Both leaders
repeated the position that, as the two major powers in the area,
cooperation between Russia and Turkey was essential to regional peace
and stability. That marked a dramatic change from the early 1990s,
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Washington encouraged
Ankara to move into historically Ottoman regions of the former Soviet
Union to counter Russia’s influence.
In the 1990s in sharp contrast to the tranquillity of the Cold War era,
talk of regional rivalries, revived `Great Games’ in Eurasia,
confrontations in the Caucasus and Central Asia were common. Turkey was
becoming once more Russia’s natural geopolitical rival as in the 19th
Century. Turkey’s quasi-alliance with Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
until recently led Moscow to view Turkey as a formidable rival. The
regional military balance developed in favor of Turkey in the Black Sea
and the Southern Caucasus. After the disintegration of the USSR, the
Black Sea became a de facto `NATO lake.’ As Russia and Ukraine argued
over the division of the Black Sea fleet and status of Sevastopol, the
Black Sea became an area for NATO’S Partnership for Peace exercises.
By contrast, at the end of the latest Moscow visit, Gul declared,
`Russia and Turkey are neighboring countries that are developing their
relations on the basis of mutual confidence. I hope this visit will in
turn give a new character to our relations.’ Russia praised Turkey’s
diplomatic initiatives in the region.
Medvedev commended Turkey’s actions during the Russian-Georgian war
last summer and Turkey’s subsequent proposal for the establishment of a
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). The Russian
president said the Georgia crisis had shown their ability to deal with
such problems on their own without the involvement of outside powers,
meaning Washington. Turkey had proposed the CSCP, bypassing Washington
and not seeking transatlantic consensus on Russia. Since then, Turkey
has indicated its intent to follow a more independent foreign policy.
The Russian aim is to use its economic resources to counter the growing
NATO encirclement, made severe by Washington’s decision to place
missile and radar bases in Poland and the Czech Republic aimed at
Moscow. To date, the Obama administration has indicated it will
continue the Bush `missile defense’ policy. Washington also just agreed
to place US Patriot missiles in Poland, clearly not aimed at Germany,
but at Russia.
Following Gul’s visit, some press in Turkey described Turkish-Russian
relations as a `strategic partnership,’ a label traditionally used for
Turkish-American relations. Following Gül’s visit, Medyedev will go to
Turkey to follow up the issues with concrete cooperation proposals. The
Turkish-Russian cooperation is a further indication of how the once
overwhelming US influence in Eurasia has been eroded by the events of
recent US foreign policy in the region.
Washington is waking up to find it confronted with Sir Halford
Mackinder’s `worst nightmare.’ Mackinder, the `father’ of 20th Century
British geopolitics, stressed the importance of Britain (and after
1945, the USA) preventing strategic cooperation among the great powers
of Eurasia.
F. William Engdahl is author of A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil
Politics and the New World Order (Pluto Press), and Seeds of
Destruction: The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation
(). This essay is adapted from a book he has just
completed, titled Full Spectrum Dominance: The Geopolitical Agenda
Behind Washington’s Global Military Buildup (release date estimated
Autumn 2008). He may be contacted through his website,
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
