The Jamestown Foundation
Wednesday, January 5, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 3
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Yerevan agrees to add troops to Polish force in Iraq
*New Islamic terrorist group emerges in Tajikistan
*As tensions increase with West, Russia must look to China for allies
*New documentary implicates Russia in second attempt to murder Yushchenko
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ARMENIA TO DEPLOY TOKEN CONTINGENT TO IRAQ
On December 24, the Armenian parliament approved a symbolic deployment
of Armenian military personnel as part of the U.S.-led coalition in
Iraq. The vote was 91-23, with one abstention, after a seven-hour
closed session late into the night. A last-hour switch by the
opposition National Unity Party of Artashes Geghamian ensured the wide
margin for passing a deeply unpopular decision, made palatable to the
public by the token size of the troop commitment. The Armenian
Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun, a component of the governing
coalition, voted against the deployment, as did the opposition Justice
bloc.
Technically, the parliament was voting to ratify Armenia’s signature
on the Memorandum of Understanding with Poland — lead country of the
multinational force in south-central Iraq — on the deployment of
Armenian personnel with that force. Armenia is the nineteenth country
to become a party to that Memorandum.
The Defense Ministry has announced that the Armenian contingent is
ready for deployment as of January 5, but has not made public any
specific date for actual deployment. The ministry had adumbrated that
possibility with Washington as well as with the Armenian public since
late 2003, but it has taken more than a year to put it into
practice. The uncertainty and delays have inspired remarks that Poland
might withdraw from Iraq before the Armenians ever arrive, thus
rendering any Armenian deployment moot.
The parliament also approved the Defense Ministry’s concept of sending
46 personnel to Iraq for one year. The group consists of: two
officers, one signals specialist, 30 drivers, ten sappers, and three
medical doctors with civilian specialties. Armenian personnel are not
to participate in combat, but only in humanitarian activities. They
are also barred from any joint actions with Azerbaijani troops in
Iraq. The Armenian group will deploy without equipment, and Yerevan
will only pay the soldiers’ base salaries. Coalition forces in the
theater will provide the equipment, and the United States almost all
the funding for the Armenian group.
Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian is the prime mover behind this
mission, not only in the military but also in the internal political
arena. Sarkisian argues that Armenia cannot afford to stand aside and
risk forfeiting U.S. goodwill at a time when Azerbaijan and Georgia
are present with troops in Iraq (and elsewhere) to support the United
States. Sarkisian’s political statements obliquely suggest that the
Iraq deployment would raise Armenia’s standing in Washington, mitigate
what he terms “discriminatory” treatment there, and earn a title to
more favorable consideration of Armenian interests in the
region. Without publicly alluding to the Karabakh issue in this
context, Sarkisian has hinted that he expects Washington to lean on
Turkey to open the border with Armenia, as one of the possible
quid-pro-quos for the deployment to Iraq (Armenian Public Television,
December 25; Noian Tapan, December 27).
Somewhat more defensively, Prime Minister Andranik Margarian argues,
“Armenia’s presence [in Iraq] is primarily symbolic and for political
purposes” (Haiastani Hanrapetutiun, December 25). The government in
Yerevan rejects any characterization of the mission as a “military
presence,” terming it instead a “humanitarian presence.” This line
reflects concern for the group’s safety in the dangerous environment
of Iraq, as well as seeking to mitigate the domestic political fallout
from the deployment decision. Armenian public opinion surveys are
showing less than 10% approval of the mission and more than 50%
disapproval. Cutting across the political spectrum is the view that
Armenia’s presence alongside the United States would expose Iraq’s
Armenian diaspora community to reprisals from insurgents. That
community, currently estimated at nearly 30,000, is concentrated
almost entirely in the insurgency-plagued Sunni area.
(Mediamax, Armenpress, Noian Tapan, PanArmenian News, December 23-30).
–Vladimir Socor
TAJIKISTAN OFFICIALS FAIL TO APPREHEND KEY MEMBER OF BAYAT
On the night of December 25-26, 2004, law-enforcement officials in
Tajikistan attempted to apprehend a member of the Islamic terrorist
organization Bayat, Ali Aminov, in the village of Chorku, Isfara
district, Sogdy oblast (northern Tajikistan). Law-enforcement agents
had received a tip that Aminov was hiding in his sister’s house. At
approximately 1 am a police task force surrounded the house and
attempted to storm the compound to apprehend the terrorist. However,
the occupants responded with armed resistance and the standoff soon
deteriorated into full-blown armed confrontation. The police task
force retreated under heavy fire and called for backup. A special
forces regiment arrived by 4 am. Upon entering the house, the members
of the special forces team encountered resistance from Aminov’s
relatives. Aminov himself managed to escape through a secret passage
(Vecherny Bishkek, December 29).
The first indications of Bayat’s existence (“bayat” means “a vow” in
Arabic) appeared in the press in April 2004, when Tajikistan’s special
services apprehended 20 members of this organization in the Isfara
oblast of northern Tajikistan. The suspects were accused of carrying
out several aggravated criminal acts that were motivated by racial and
religious hatred. The group was charged with the January 2004
assassination of the head of the Baptist community in Isfara, Sergei
Bessarab, as well as torching several mosques that were headed by
imams, whom the terrorists believed had exhibited excessive loyalty to
the ruling regime. According to the Office of the Prosecutor-General
of Tajikistan, the suspects resisted arrest and searches of their
houses, carried out by law-enforcement officials, turned up hidden
arms caches.
Bayat is not affiliated with such outlawed organizations as
Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HUT) or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),
which are better known in the region. Nor does Bayat maintain any
links with the only legally functioning Islamic organization: the
Party of Islamic Revival of Tajikistan. According to some sources, the
Bayat activists are Tajik citizens who previously had fought on the
side of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, and some of them are now
imprisoned at the American military base in Guantanamo, Cuba. A
connection between Bayat and the IMU should not be ruled out, however,
because IMU militants have been known to operate in the Fergana
Valley, and they also fought along side the Afghan Taliban members
(see EDM, May 3, 2004). Currently Bayat is trying to spread its
influence to neighboring countries. Thus, a branch of the Bayat
movement was recently opened in Osh, Kyrgyzstan (Vecherny Bishkek,
December 29).
Isfara is a very special region in Tajikistan. The population there is
more religious than in other regions of the country. In July 2002 the
President of Tajikistan, Imomali Rakhmonov, visited the city of Isfara
and stated that three citizens, who were originally from the Isfara
region and who had fought on the side of Taliban, were being held at
Guantanamo. Furthermore, the Party of Islamic Revival of Tajikistan is
particularly strong in the Isfara region. In the 2000 parliamentary
elections, the majority of this region’s population voted for the
Party of Islamic Revival. Moreover, in the main Islamist enclave —
the village of Chorku — 93% of the votes cast were for the Party of
Islamic Revival (Forum18.org, May 27, 2004). In a sense, Chorku,
albeit to a lesser degree, resembles the Islamist enclave in the
village of Karamakhi in Dagestan, which was destroyed by Russian
troops in 1999. For example, both villages strictly prohibited alcohol
consumption and required women to wear veils while in public. The
centers of public life are mosques, and the imams adjudicate and
resolve all disputes in accordance with the Sharia law.
The Islamist enclave in Isfara region is dangerous also because of its
geographic location. Isfara is located in the Fergana Valley section
of Tajikistan, only a few kilometers from the Uzbek and Kyrgyz parts
of the Fergana Valley. The Valley is widely considered to be one of
the most potentially volatile areas in Central Asia. In 1989
anti-Jewish pogroms took place in Andizhan (Uzbekistan), which led to
the exodus of the Jewish population from that city. That same year,
inter-ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks broke out in
the Uzbek city of Fergana, which resulted in 150 casualties and the
mass exodus of Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan. In 1990 inter-ethnic
clashes between local Uzbeks and Kyrgyz claimed 320 lives in Osh
oblast (Kyrgyzstan). Furthermore, all the leaders and the majority of
the militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are originally
from the Fergana Valley. The addition of another militant group will
hardly calm the region.
–Igor Rotar
RUSSIA AND CHINA: DO OIL AND WEAPONS MAKE A MARRIAGE?
Russo-Chinese relations in 2004 were not all sweetness and light.
Moscow’s destruction of Yukos and preference for a Japanese rather
than a Chinese pipeline in Siberia put severe pressure on Chinese oil
supplies, because Yukos was China’s main Russian oil supplier and
Chinese demand for energy is exploding. Thus shortages or supply
failures seriously injured China’s economy and led to public muttering
about Russia’s unreliability. However, as Russia’s ties to the West
worsened in late 2004, it had no choice but to turn back to China and
find a solution that entailed guaranteeing Beijing more access to
Russian energy supplies.
To overcome their bilateral tensions in energy, the two governments
have arrived at a four-part solution.
First, Russian firms will participate in joint construction of nuclear
power plants with China, and they will build a thermal power plant at
Yimin and Weijiamao (RIA-Novosti December 21).
Second, efforts are underway, apparently with Kazakhstan’s support, to
involve Russian companies in the current project of laying a pipeline
from Kazakhstan to China. There are also discussions about sharing
energy from the Kurmangazy oil field (RIA-Novosti, December 22). This
would create another avenue by which Russian energy supplies could go
to China.
Third, because no pipeline is currently available, Russian railroads
will transport up to 30 million tons of energy to China by 2007,
beginning with 10 million tons in 2005. While the railroads could
handle freight up to 50 million tons, that is their maximum, and a
pipeline would have to be built to carry annual amounts of 50 million
tons or more. This railway shipment program thus represents a
tripling of current oil shipments to China by 2007, from the existing
level of 10 million tons annually (Itar-Tass, December 24).
Finally, Russian President Vladimir Putin has indicated that the China
National Petroleum Company (CNPC) might be invited to take part in the
production of Yuganskneftgaz, which was the main production unit of
Yukos. Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko has indicated that
CNPC might gain as much as a 20% ownership of the new company that is
to be owned and managed by Gazprom. Beijing would thus be able to
recoup the energy that was going to China before Yukos was destroyed
(Kremlin.ru, December 21; Reuters, December 30).
While the Yukos affair has incurred much criticism abroad and will
reduce the efficiency of Russia’s energy companies, soliciting Chinese
participation represents an effort to mollify Beijing and give the
deal a patina of legitimacy. Ironically, it represents a major policy
reversal from 2002, when xenophobic protests derailed earlier Chinese
efforts to buy into Slavneft. Thus, this deal also signifies Russian
efforts to come to terms with the rise in Chinese economic power that
clearly fueled huge anxieties in the Kremlin.
But the rapprochement with Beijing goes beyond energy supplies to
encompass defense issues as well. Russia and China will hold
bilateral army exercises in China during 2005 that will apparently
test the new Russian weapons that are also going to China
(Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, December 17). These exercises
will be “quite large” and involve not only large numbers of ground
forces but also state-of-the-art weapons, navy, air, long-range
aviation, and submarine forces to provide interaction with Chinese
forces (Itar-Tass, December 27). These exercises, particularly on the
planned scale, are unprecedented and mark an expansion of both Russian
and Chinese military diplomacy to encompass greater interaction among
their militaries.
Russian arms sales to China faltered in 2004 because China demanded
only the most advanced weapons while Russia insisted on the extension
of existing contracts for the supply of weapons (RIA-Novosti, December
20). This dispute prompted China to press harder for the termination
of the EU embargo , but with only limited success. While the
possibility of renewed EU arms sales to China must alarm Russian arms
dealers who cannot survive without selling China weapons systems,
China still must rely on the Russian market for now because of the
strong American opposition and threats to the EU if it lifted
sanctions (Russian Business Monitor, December 22; Vedomosti, December
20; RIA-Novosti, December 20; NTV, November 8, 2004). Thus during
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov’s visit to China in December,
agreements were hammered out upgrading the scope of Russian arms sales
to China. These agreements include delivery of Su-30MK2 fighters and
licensing the assembly in China of Sukhoi-27SK aircraft for the
Chinese Navy (Itar-Tass, December 13). Thus in 2005 Russia will sell
24 more Su-30 planes to China (Itar-Tass, December 13; Russian
Business Monitor, December 22). Other big deals involving Ilyushin-76
Candid transport planes, Ilyushin-78 Midas aerial tankers, and engines
for China’s Super 7 and Super 8 planes are also being discussed
(Interfax-AVN Military News Agency, December 24).
Paradoxically, these deals reveal the existing tensions in
Sino-Russian relations as well as the efforts to overcome them. China
wants state-of-the-art weapons that Russia, for obvious reasons, is
not prepared to sell, but Beijing still cannot generate sufficient
leverage to push Moscow to sell those weapons. However, in the energy
sector Beijing can induce Russia to live up to existing contracts,
sell energy to China, and even invite it into some form of equity
ownership in Russian energy firms. This may not be the ideal solution
for China, but it shows that while Chinese economic power is clearly
growing, it still cannot compel Russia to comply with Chinese demands
in defense economics. Nor is it entirely clear that this energy deal
will eventually work out to China’s benefit, given the atavistic fears
of Chinese economic power in Moscow. While Russo-Chinese relations
may have reached “unprecedented heights,” according to Presidents
Putin and Hu Jintao, closer examination suggests that the mountain
that both sides are still climbing remains a rocky one.
–Lionel Martin
DETAILS EMERGE OF SECOND RUSSIAN PLOT TO ASSASSINATE YUSHCHENKO
As Viktor Yushchenko prepares for his inauguration as Ukraine’s third
president, he knows that Ukraine-Russia relations will be one of the
most difficult issues he faces. The Economist (December 29) advised
Yushchenko, “to kiss and make up with Russia and Vladimir Putin, who
backed Mr. Yanukovych and has thus been humiliated by his defeat.”
Such reconciliation will be far easier said than done. Russia is
reportedly behind two attempts on Yushchenko’s life, one through
poisoning and a second with a bomb. Yushchenko alluded to the latter
plot when he said, “Those who wanted to blow myself up did not
undertake it, because they came too close and could have blown
themselves up” (Ukrayinska pravda, December 16).
While details of the poisoning are better known, evidence of the bomb
threat has only just come to light in a documentary on Channel Five, a
Ukrainian television station sympathetic to Yushchenko. Details aired
in the weekly “Zakryta Zona” (Closed Zone) documentary, under the
suitable title “Terrorists” (5tv.com.ua/pr_archiv/136/0/265/).
During last year’s election campaign a still-unexplained bomb
detonated in Kyiv, killing one person and injuring dozens more. The
Kuchma government blamed the Ukrainian People’s Party (UNP), a member
of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc, for the attack. Explosives were also
planted during searches of the offices of opposition youth groups. The
Security Service (SBU) and Interior Ministry (MVS) have now admitted
that charges of “terrorism” against the UNP and youth groups were
false (Ukrayinska pravda, December 16; razom.org.ua, December 23).
According to Channel Five, the real terrorists were the authorities,
conspiring with the Russian security services (FSB). It would be naive
to believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin was unaware of the
plot. An illicitly transcribed telephone conversation, cited at length
in the “Zakryta Zona” documentary, between a Ukrainian informant and
an FSB officer showed how the Russian authorities were fully aware of
the dirty tricks being used by Russian political advisors working for
Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. The “advisors,” such as
Gleb Pavlovsky and Marat Gelman, worked with Yanukovych’s shadow
campaign headquarters, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Andriy
Kluyev. Presidential administration head and Social Democratic United
Party (SDPUo) leader Viktor Medvedchuk served as Gelman and
Pavlovsky’s principal contact. The taped conversation reveals that
Gelman and Pavlovsky considered assassination to be a legitimate
campaign strategy. The FSB officer on the tape specifically discusses
the poisoning of Yushchenko.
The bomb attempt may have been conceived after the poison failed to
kill Yushchenko before election day. Plans for the bomb attack were
discovered when a spetsnaz unit of the State Defense Service (DSO) was
sent to investigate a burglar alarm. The alarm went off near one of
the three offices used by the Yushchenko campaign. The DSO noticed a
car with Russian license plates and asked the two occupants for their
documents. After a check of their Russian and Ukrainian passports
revealed them to be false, a search of the car’s trunk found three
kilos of plastic explosives, enough to destroy everything within a
500-meter radius.
Both passengers were arrested and a subsequent investigation unmasked
them as Mikhail M. Shugay and Marat B. Moskvitin, Russian citizens
from the Moscow region. Their only contact in Moscow had been a
certain “Surguchov” who had hired them in September for the bombing
operation against Yushchenko and his ally, Yulia Tymoshenko. The
terrorists were to receive $50,000 after the bomb plot was
completed. After smuggling the explosives through the
Russian-Ukrainian border, both FSB operatives set up a safe house in
the village of Dudarkiv, 15 kilometers from Kyiv. A search of these
premises found pistols, radio equipment, and bomb-making instructions.
The plot thickens with additional taped telephone conversations played
in the “Zakryta Zona” documentary. These conversations were made by
the SBU during the elections and handed over to Yushchenko after round
two. Kluyev is heard discussing with unknown individuals the
whereabouts of Yushchenko’s office and where the leadership of the
Yushchenko camp meets. The documentary’s producers believe that
Kluyev sought this intelligence to pass on to the Russian
assassination team, so that bombs could be placed to murder not only
Yushchenko, but also other members of his team, such as Tymoshenko.
Increasing evidence points to Russian involvement in Yushchenko’s
poisoning. In December Yushchenko’s doctors in Vienna concluded that
he had, in fact, been poisoned by TCDD, the most toxic form of
dioxin. His dioxin level was 6,000 times higher than normal and the
second highest recorded in history. Alexander V. Litvinenko, who
served in the KGB and the FSB before defecting to the United Kingdom,
has revealed that the FSB has a secret laboratory in Moscow that
specializes in poisons. A former dissident scientist now living in the
United States, Vil S. Mirzayanov, reported that this institute studied
dioxins while developing defoliants for the military. (TCDD was a
component of Agent Orange.) SBU defector Valeriy Krawchenko also
pointed to this FSB laboratory as the likely source of the dioxin that
poisoned Yushchenko (New York Times, December 15).
Yushchenko has alleged that the poisoning took place during a
September 5, 2004, dinner at the home of then-deputy SBU chairman
Volodymyr Satsyuk, a member of the SDPUo. This again reveals the
involvement of Medvedchuk and Russian political advisors working for
Yanukovych. Not surprisingly, Satsyuk and Kluyev have hurriedly
abandoned their government positions to return to parliament, where
they enjoy immunity.
Russia’s involvement in two terrorist attacks in Ukraine, a poisoning
and bombing, make a mockery of Putin’s alleged commitment to work
alongside the United States in the international war on terrorism.
–Taras Kuzio
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