NEW REGIONAL PARAMETERS: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF ARMENIAN-TURKISH BORDER OPENING
Anahit Shirinyan
HETQ politics
2009/04/06 | 19:06
Regional and international were abuzz last week regarding potential
developments in negotiations aimed at normalizing relations between
Armenia and Turkey. Public opinion was not only focused on the possible
opening of the border between Armenia and Turkey, closed for the past
fifteen years, an event that would herald a new era in relations
between the neigh boring states, but also what such an eventuality
would mean for regional politics in general.
Such developments could lead to a shift in the existing regional power
balance. These developments are quite contradictory and proceeding
with such speed that they can lead to unforeseen consequences.
Regardless of whether the border is opened within the predicted
timeframe, sometime in April, or not, the issue is on today’s political
agenda. Thus, let us attempt to make some predictions on the matter.
1. The opening of the Armenian-Turkish border will expand Armenia’s
political role in the region. By imparting a number of theoretical
benefits to Armenia, it will afford greater manoeuvrability to
Armenia in its foreign affairs. The border opening will strike a
blow to the number one trump card held by Azerbaijan in the Karabakh
conflict settlement process – to keep Armenia in a blockade since
it still hasn’t agreed to make concessions regarding the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
According to reports circulating in the press, Ankara is attempting to
include a point regarding the Karabakh conflict in the Armenian-Turkish
agreement it is planning but Yerevan is stubbornly showing its
resistance on the issue. Due to a correct exercise of politics Yerevan
truly possesses the possibility to neutralize Baku’s only effective
and essential trump card when it comes to the Karabakh conflict.
2. The opening of the border will spur the further deepening of the
strategic partnership between Tbilisi and Baku. Baku isn’t concealing
its negative reaction to the thaw between Armenia and Turkey and
has recently seen fit to even make direct threats to Ankara. Last
week, for example, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, during a
conversation with a third party, threatened to cut off gas supplies
to Turkey if Ankara went ahead and signed a separate agreement with
Armenia and opened the border without coming to some prearranged
understanding regarding he Nagorno-Karabakh issue. It already has
been widely publicized that President Aliyev will not participate in
the "Civilizations Alliance" forum to be held in Istanbul on April
6-7. This refusal to participate is yet another sign intended to show
Baku’s displeasure regarding unfolding developments.
"If the border is opened before the withdrawal of Armenian troops
from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, it would run counter to
Azerbaijan’s national interests," stated Azerbaijani Foreign Minister
Elmar Mammadyarov.
Georgia is the second country whose interests are opposed to the
opening of the Armenian-Turkish border. After the Georgian-Russian
conflict of August, 2008, analysts have openly started to talk about
the uncertainty surrounding Georgia as a transit country for projects
with a strategic importance directed towards the West.
Now too, western analysts don’t conceal the new possibilities that
the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border might have regarding the
implementing of energy-related projects towards the West.
In addition to the huge economic and political dividends reaped by
Georgia due to the energy supply routes that transverse its territory,
the lion’s share of Armenia’s foreign trade, even that with Turkey,
passes through Georgia. Thus, as stated by Jemal Inaishvili, President
of Georgia’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, "The restoration of a
direct route will definitely impact on Georgia’s economy." Despite the
fact that Inaishvili welcomes the wish of the two nations to establish
normal relations, nevertheless, he believes that, "The restoration of
direct links between Armenia and Turkey will lead to specific economic
losses for Georgia". This will include a visible drop in cargo flows
that will in turn negatively impact on the ports of Batumi and Poti.
Naturally, all this will impel Baku and Tbilisi to seek out
alternative routes of cooperation. Last week in Tbilisi the foreign
ministers of the two nations signed a document regarding joint
political programs. It’s not by chance that reports have recently
surfaced in the Azerbaijani press signalling the continuation of
Georgian-Azerbaijani collaboration. As stated by Fridon Todua, deputy
speaker of the Georgian parliament and chairman of The Parliamentary
Group of Friendship with the Republic of Azerbaijan, in an interview
with Day.Az, "despite the resistance of Armenia, it is impossible
to stop implementation of the project (Baku, Tbilisi, Kars railway),
since it has already started."
3. The opening of the border will spur the deepening of cooperation
between Baku and Moscow. Baku, in its relations with its strategic
partner, will try to compensate for the "crisis" through new
arrangements with Moscow. Russia has been trying to woo Baku for a
long time, forcing Azerbaijan to give up on new projects aimed at
Western energy independence. And on March 27, a mutual understanding
agreement was signed between Azprom and Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company
that calls for the long-term supply of gas at market prices.
At the same time a telephone conversation took place between Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev and Azerbaijani President Aliyev on April
3. According to official reports, the two leaders discussed the
G-20 Summit, the global economic crisis and other issues of mutual
concern. Azerbaijani news outlets, however, report that issues related
to the Karabakh conflict was also touched on in the conversation.
4. The opening of the Armenian-Turkish border will also strengthen
Washington’s position in the South Caucasus. In particular,
Washington’s active role of late in the normalization of
Armenian-Turkish relations has laid the groundwork for this. While
it is a fact that Washington has long abandoned implementing its
political agenda in the post-Soviet arena via Ankara, preferring to do
so directly, new developments can restore this erstwhile significance
of Turkey in the eyes of Washington.
In the words of Matthew Bryza, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia would
"create a new and positive dynamic" in relations across the region,
"as well as in developing the economic and transport links we have
been pursuing ever since the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
The United Sates is pretty limited when it comes to exerting direct
influence over Armenia. What prevents it from doing so is the
Russian political, military and economic presence in Armenia. In
the event that the border is opened, Washington will be given the
possibility to expand its influence in Armenia to a certain degree
via Ankara. Moreover, by coming forth as the primary mediator in
the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, the United States
automatically gets to hold a more active playing card in the Karabakh
conflict settlement, the next logical step in the progression of
these relations.
To this must be added the fact that Turkish-American cooperation in the
South Caucasus will also assist in the rebuilding of mutual confidence
between the two nations, yielding possibilities of cooperation in
other matters as well, i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan.
5. At the same time, the border opening will assist the development of
Russian-Turkish relations. Turkey, which has traditionally competed
with Russia for dominance in the region, is still buoyed by the
same tradition but has taken into account the Russian factor in the
post-Soviet territories. Thus, future cooperation between Ankara and
Moscow is inevitable, particularly in terms of Armenia. In reality,
the possibilities of Russian-Turkish cooperation are even greater
when the "Armenian link" comes into the picture. Glaring testimony
of this was the agreement reached last year that called for the sale
of Armenian electricity to Turkey. It’s another question as to what
extent the interests of the "link" will be taken into account.
6. The opening of the border will lead to the necessity of greater
scope and specificity of the Armenian-Iranian partnership. There has
been no official reaction from Tehran regarding recent Armenian-Turkish
developments. It is clear nonetheless that Tehran has remained on the
sideline of regional processes ever since the developments subsequent
to last year’s war between Georgia and Russia. As strange as it may
seem, Armenian-Iranian cooperation will assume greater significance
after the border is opened between Armenia and Turkey. Armenia has
traditionally viewed Iran as a counterweight to Turkey and in this
matter it can even play a more effective role than Russia.
While true that the Iran-Armenia railway agreement reached on April
4 can’t be viewed in this context as a long-range step, nevertheless,
regardless of the suspicions as to its economic viability, the project
can assume important political significance in the near future. Thus,
Yerevan will obtain greater flexibility in terms of foreign policy
with the deepening of cooperation with Iran. What remains is to ensure
the actual implementation of Armenian-Iranian joint projects.
The opening of the border between Armenia and Turkey can thus
lead to genuine changes for the region as a whole. A situation
can be created in which everyone is cooperating with everyone else
and where each player is doing so with the aim of protecting its
national interests. Armenia can emerge as the main "hero" in all
these developments and, as a result, it can be confronted with new
challenges as well as possibilities. The greatest benefit from this
new situation will only be culled due to a specifically well-crafted
political policy that is flexible at the same time.