TWO STATES, ONE CAPITAL: A PROPOSAL FOR THE ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Policy Innovations
s/data/000092
April 9 2009
The greatest tragedy of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that
all reasonable parties know the contours of a final settlement,
yet such a settlement is not close at hand. Israel will retain large
settlement blocks close to the 1967 "Green Line" in exchange for an
equivalent amount of uninhabited Israeli land. The smaller, outlying
settlements will be dismantled. Palestinian refugees will be allowed
to return to a future Palestinian state and will be compensated by
the international community for the loss of their land in Israel.
The contentious status of Jerusalem as a capital for Israel and for
a Palestinian state is perhaps the one issue about which there is
little consensus for a specific plan. The Palestinians have long made
known their desire for (East?) Jerusalem to serve as the capital of
a Palestinian state. Israel’s desire to maintain Jerusalem as its
capital is no less strong; to quote the Forward, "Since 1967, every
Israeli government… has vowed that the city will remain the eternal
and indivisible capital of the Jewish people." To that end, Israel
annexed East Jerusalem after the 1967 Six Day War. Arab residents of
East Jerusalem carry Israeli identity cards, allowing them freedom
of movement throughout Israel, along with access to Israeli social
services including education and health care. Israel’s annexation
of East Jerusalem and claim of Jerusalem as its capital has been
disputed internationally and no countries maintain embassies in
Jerusalem (though many did prior to the 1980 passage of UN Security
Council Resolution 478, which called on "States that have established
diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the
Holy City").
There have been a few potential solutions to the Jerusalem question
discussed over the years. In the days before Israeli statehood,
the United Nations considered making Jerusalem an "international
trusteeship" governed by and belonging to the international
community. More recently the Israeli right has considered rezoning East
Jerusalem to include the Palestinian town of Abu Dis, then allowing
the Palestinians to claim (far) East Jerusalem (née Abu Dis) as their
capital. Another somewhat obvious, though politically and logistically
difficult, solution would be to simply divide the city, probably along
the lines of Nicosia (or even Jerusalem circa. 1948-1967 but with the
Old City and other Jewish holy sites retained by Israel). Transferring
sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem is often claimed to be a
red line for Israel, but Israeli prime ministers have alluded to
the possibility of negotiating a solution for Jerusalem. On a rare
occasion, the idea of dual-sovereignty for Jerusalem is brought
up, despite the fact that the very term "dual-sovereignty" is a
contradiction.
I propose a solution that would allow both sides to claim an undivided
Jerusalem as their capital: a customs union for Jerusalem. Under
this plan, entrance to and exit from Jerusalem would be subject to
passport control and customs procedures not dissimilar from what you
would find in an international airport. Entrances from the West Bank
into Jerusalem and exits from Jerusalem into the West Bank would be
controlled by a third party agreeable to both sides with a token
Palestinian presence. The third party would automatically allow
Palestinian passport holders to return to the West Bank, but would
have total control of screening people entering into Jerusalem. The
Palestinians could observe the process to be sure their citizens
are treated fairly, but would not have ultimate authority over the
West Bank-Jerusalem border. The Israeli border police would control
entrances from the rest of Israel into Jerusalem and from Jerusalem
into the rest of Israel.
These checkpoints (and what are passport control and customs crossings
if not checkpoints?) would presumably be less strict for people
entering Jerusalem than for non-Israelis exiting Jerusalem. There would
be no need to wall off the western border, as there is no history of
Israelis mounting terrorist attacks in Jerusalem.
Both Israelis and Palestinians would have freedom of movement within
Jerusalem. But it is important to note that Palestinians could not
automatically enter Israel and Israelis could not automatically
enter the Palestinian state. They would each be subject to the same
procedures as at any international border crossing. This arrangement
has the added benefit of an additional layer of security screening
for Palestinians and other foreign nationals exiting Jerusalem. The
separation barrier that Israel has constructed around much of East
Jerusalem would actually make this process easier by making it more
difficult to avoid customs and border control. Obvious locations
for crossings from the West Bank would include Routes 1, 60, 404,
and 417. Permanent border crossings could be made much larger, more
efficient, and faster than the current system of Israeli checkpoints,
something more akin to the U.S.-Canadian border crossing on I-87.
Inside Jerusalem, Israel would cede sovereign control and
responsibility for East Jerusalem along a border that roughly follows
the 1949 armistice line, with alterations made for the demographic
realities on the ground. Israel would retain sovereignty over Mount
Scopus, the Mount of Olives, Jewish majority neighborhoods in East
Jerusalem, and the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, including the
Western Wall tunnels, and the status quo would prevail on the Temple
Mount. The Armenian and Christian Quarters could vote on which state to
join. The Palestinians would then be fully responsible for the mundane
aspects of sovereignty, such as garbage collection, policing, and
road maintenance. The division between East and West, Palestinian and
Israeli sovereignty, would be visible and well marked, but not guarded
or blocked. This aspect of the plan finds precedent in Articles 20 and
22 of the Schengen Borders Agreement, which eliminated border checks
and removed "obstacles to fluid traffic flow at road crossing points,"
between the 25 European countries subject to the agreement. These
(non-)border crossings have visible signs marking the border.
This sort of division would be difficult in its technical aspects,
but not impossible or unprecedented. Residents would pay their
taxes to their respective governments, but the city would be a
free trade zone with no tariffs for goods crossing between West and
East Jerusalem. Joint agreements on policing, the ability to pursue
criminals across the East-West Jerusalem border for example, could
be negotiated just as they are between adjoining American cities
and states.
Differences in Israeli and Palestinian law may complicate these
matters, as laws might be somewhat more different between the Israelis
and Palestinians than they are between New York and New Jersey. This
situation is precisely why the border between East and West Jerusalem
must be clearly marked, just as it is within the Schengen Group. I
also propose that the legal status quo remain in place for all of
Jerusalem for a period of at least ten years.
Utility arrangements between sovereign states are also possible. For
example, the United States and Canada share power grids and use
the same telephone exchange system. Over time, one might expect
(hope?) that a variety of joint Israeli-Palestinian ventures, both
governmental and private-sector, would develop, just as we have seen
in the Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Egyptian "Qualified Industrial
Zones."
It is important to note that under this plan Jerusalem would not be
an "international city" or even a "bi-national city." Technically,
it would function as two separate cities that abut each other. It
would be a "free city," fully open to Israeli and Palestinian passport
holders and to whomever is granted a visa by either state. Regardless
of residence in East or West, Jewish and Arab Israeli citizens would
vote in Israeli elections, and Arab Muslims who are not Israeli
citizens would vote in Palestinian elections. Druze, Christians,
Samaritans, and other groups would vote strictly based on residency.
There are likely to be at least two major objections to this
proposal. On the Israeli side, there will be extreme reluctance
to concede sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem to the
Palestinians. Indeed Nir Barkat, the mayor of Jerusalem, recently
reiterated his desire to maintain Israeli sovereignty over the entirety
of Jerusalem. As sympathetic as I am to his desires, I believe that
this is the only way for Jerusalem to both remain undivided and to
be recognized internationally as the capital of Israel. There is
little to gain politically or strategically from continued Israeli
control of East Jerusalem other than a marginal increase in safety
from attack. By placing entrance into East Jerusalem from the West
Bank in the hands of a third party, the security threat is greatly
reduced; the lifting of responsibility for the administration of
East Jerusalem could be a cost-saving measure; and, as shown below,
there are long-term demographic benefits as well.
The other major objection will come from the Arab residents of
East Jerusalem, who have historically, and quietly, supported East
Jerusalem remaining part of Israel. They do not want to give up the
Israeli identity cards that grant them access to Israeli medical care,
schools, and other social services. This issue is difficult, but I
propose that all Arab residents of East Jerusalem with Israeli identity
cards be allowed to keep those cards, even as they gain Palestinian
passports. Those Palestinian Jerusalemites born after this agreement
is signed would not have access to Israeli social services or be
granted Israeli identity cards; they would be Palestinian passport
holders with the same rights as any other Palestinian in Jerusalem.
To make this plan work would require a considerable investment by
the international community. To start, it would require that those
states that recognize Israel move their embassies to Jerusalem (which
for many states can be done rather cheaply by changing the signs from
consulate to embassy). As part of this agreement, the international
community should agree that no single embassy could handle relations
with both states. Though this is common practice for smaller states
all over the world, in this context it is too politically charged to
be tenable in this situation. States that can afford it should be
encouraged to maintain consulates in both Tel Aviv and Ramallah to
handle situations and issues that arise outside of the customs union.
This plan also requires the ongoing commitment of armed personnel to
staff customs and border control on the West Bank-Jerusalem border. It
requires financial and technical support to complete some of the
technical aspects of untangling Israeli and Palestinian sovereignty,
and to adjudicate disputes. The international community’s financial
support for projects that benefit the Palestinians seems to know no
limits and I do not believe it would be difficult to secure support
for this plan if both sides signed on. The staffing issues are more
difficult. The customs and border control should be staffed by states
that have a commitment to peace between Israel and the Palestinians, as
well as a fear of Islamic extremism and terrorism in their own states:
Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey are obvious choices. Other international
positions should be staffed by states that have little stake in the
conflict and are not publicly perceived to be hopelessly biased
toward either side. Those states seem to be few and far between,
but I might suggest Fiji, which has a great deal of experience in
peacekeeping missions in the Middle East and maintains good relations
with both sides.
It is important both to the Israeli and to the Jewish psyche that
Jerusalem remains the eternal undivided capital of Israel. It is also
important to Palestinian national pride that Jerusalem be the capital
of a future Palestinian state. This proposal provides a workable
plan that allows both sides to claim an undivided Jerusalem as their
capital, while avoiding the dual-sovereignty contradiction. Israel
would gain both international recognition of Jerusalem as its national
capital, and an increase in the Jewish majority of the state when the
Israeli residency of the East Jerusalem Arabs expires at the end of
the current generation. The Palestinians would gain both Jerusalem as
their capital as well as access to jobs and the economic benefit of
free trade with West Jerusalem. It is a plan that will almost certainly
not fully satisfy anyone, but will enrage only the extremists on both
sides. If enough interest is shown, a future iteration of this proposal
will provide further details on the locations of the border, and on
the logistical challenges of managing two separate but interconnected
municipalities.