MUZZLED TENSIONS ACROSS LEBANON?
Written by Harry Hagopian
Newropeans Magazine
April 9 2009
25 March 2008: the Lebanese Council of Ministers unanimously decreed
that this date will henceforth become a Muslim-Christian national
feast day so that members of both faith communities come together
annually around the theme of Together around Mary… Given that both
Muslims and Christians revere Mary in their respective holy books,
albeit in different ways, this feast hopes to draw them together, and
in so doing perhaps focus on what unites rather than what separates
them. There are also plans to export this feast to Egypt, Morocco,
Jordan, Poland, Italy and France next year as an innovative platform
for inter-religious and inter-regional dialogue.
I liked this rather unusual idea, and I pray that that this Marian icon
will manage to become an apolitical – or at least non-politicised –
catalyst providing the foundation for a further coming together of
all Lebanese communities. But the irony – and I suppose ultimately
the strength – of such a project is that it has found its genesis in a
country with so many tectonic confessional plates. It is encouraging
that a resilient Lebanon of ever-decreasing cedars, increasingly
busy these days gearing itself up toward the parliamentary elections
of 7th June, can find the time, space and will to institute this
symbolic feast.
Yet, important as religious symbols are for Lebanon, a more crucial
symbol looms ahead in the shape of the results of the forthcoming
elections. They would elicit the alliances and political forces of
the two respective political coalitions of 8th March and 14th March
and perhaps even trace a trajectory for the future course, development
and possible re-alignments of the whole country as politicians change
camps, consolidate their gains or suffer their losses.
This is why a closer look reveals myriad tensions, uncertainties
and spats underlying political structures. In fact, feuds can
be witnessed during almost every meeting of the Lebanese cabinet
whose current template for governance was drafted by a finite Doha
Agreement and which at times reflects more a sense of disunion than
of union. The two major political blocs busily vie for influence,
with the electoral lists of candidates in different constituencies –
especially in critical ones such as the Metn – proving hard to put
together because everyone pushes their sectarian affiliations at the
expense of the larger good.
Interestingly enough, the Armenian Tashnaq party has now assumed
the role of kingmaker in this mêlée: their seats in Beirut, the
Metn and Zahlé could together tilt the balance of power between the
two coalitions. No wonder then that politicians from both blocs, let
alone from within the same blocs, have feverishly canvassed for their
votes. Armenians, who number around 150,000, would probably sway the
results in the Beirut 1 district (including Achrafieh, Saifi and Rmeil)
where most Christians live today, However, the three Armenian parties
(Tashnaq, Ramgavar and Henchak) who do not always see eye-to-eye
politically should also be prudent with their choices and examine
the consequences of their alliances or any breach of their historical
neutrality and long-standing support for the incumbent presidency.
But the disagreements in the cabinet – whether over the national
annual national budget and the amount to be allocated to the Council
for South, over judicial appointments, over the national dialogue under
the auspices of the president or even over the location of ministerial
offices and telephone wiretapping – are all sapping the strength of
the country and fomenting quite dangerous polarisations amongst its
diverse communities. Lebanon is a tinderbox, and there is always
the fear that a minor event could catapult the whole country into
a major confrontation. Still, perils notwithstanding, nobody seems
capable to take bold visionary decisions or make concessions at this
critical stage without the risk of alienating their constituencies.
Interestingly enough, I realise that a majority of the Lebanese
population of all hues and backgrounds are well-meaning and
hard-working, let alone canny enough to suss out their leaders’
agendas. Yet, their populist hopes are negated not only by the
inveterate ambitions and confessional nature of Lebanese politics, but
also by this bizarre political setup in a Lebanon whereby the majority
and opposition parties are meant to work together consensually. They
sit together around the same cabinet table and participate collectively
in the decisions of government. Yet, their interventions are more
like endless filibusters that simply arrest any decision-making
process. Besides, what aggravates the anomalous situation further is
that the minority parties within government retain their veto on all
decisions through their one-third blocking votes in cabinet. In other
words, any cabinet decision can easily be unmade or frozen. One wonders
how any constructive democratic decision could then be taken as each
side checkmates the other with glib ease. I do not think I have ever
come in my constitutional studies across any system of governance
that places the winning and losing sides together in government.
But let me go back to the elections. Overall, even when factoring into
the equation all those questionable nominations that occur via what
the PSP Druze leader Walid Jumblatt described as "asphalt bulldozers"
(political favours made to gain voters’ support that include paving
roads), the numerical results of the ballots are more or less clear
for the Sunni, Shi’i and Druze constituents. But they fall apart quite
sharply in relation to the constellation of Christian parties. So what
happens with the Christian vote is crucial in defining the future
Christian presence in Lebanon – not only as an essential fabric of
Lebanese history and plurality but also of regional Eastern Christian
presence – and in underlining its future witness. For instance,
despite his repeated assertions to the contrary, I believe that the FPM
movement led by General Michel Aoun who sees himself as the Christian
tsar is losing some ground and seems less likely now to become the
undisputed Christian party in the next parliament – certainly not when
his former ally, the Greek Orthodox Michel el-Murr, claims that he
is no longer with Aoun, and when State Minister Nassib Lahoud busily
consolidates his independent but largely pro-14th March platform.
In addition, the outspoken patriarch of the Maronite Church has also
been admonishing the parties to be cautious and the voters to be wise
with their choices. On 16th March, this ageing and increasingly less
relevant church leader warned that "voters must know who they will
be choosing to defend their basic rights… They must not forget the
proverb, ‘whoever buys you shall sell you.’" But the influence of
the church has been in steady decline and Maronite politicians are
increasingly breaking ranks with it. As such, it will be interesting
to observe how the ballot box will address intra-Christian rivalries
and transubstantiate the results of the elections into hard facts
that can then be exercised peaceably on the ground.
As important, and arguably more decisive than the parliamentary
elections, is the proceedings of the forthcoming Special Tribunal for
Lebanon that will convene in The Hague to examine the assassination
in 2005 of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri – father of House
Majority Leader Saad Hariri. The four generals in custody suspected
of involvement in this assassination are meant to be transferred
to the court in The Hague soon so their innocence or guilt is
determined by the panel of judges. A Memorandum of Understanding
between Lebanon and the Special Tribunal coordinates the flow of
communication between both sides. In a rare interview recently,
Daniel Bellemare, the Canadian general prosecutor for the Special
Tribunal, told the Canadian television programme Envoyé Special that
"no phantoms planted the bomb to assassinate Hariri. There were real
people behind the bombs, and we are capable of finding them." As such,
the repercussions of this trial – barring any violence – could be
quite acute, more so since Rafik Hariri’s murder and of a host of
other bombings and assassinations is what put in motion much of the
developments in Lebanon over the past four telling years.
When one speaks of Lebanon, of elections and tribunals, one
cannot overlook the Syrian influence that has overshadowed this
country since the TaÃ"f Agreement (Document of National Accord)
of 1989. Despite all the recent international moves to transform
Lebanon and Syria into independent states with normal diplomatic
relations, the Syrian regime should strive to improve the situation
further by facilitating the process of disengagement between the two
countries. Although ambassadors have been exchanged for the first
time in the history of Syro-Lebanese relations (Michel el-Khoury for
Lebanon, and Ali Abdel Karim Ali for Syria), scant effort has been
deployed to date to resolve the thorny issues of border demarcation,
Lebanese detainees in Syrian custody, and the disputed territory of
the Sheba’a Farms. Only today, at the 21st Arab Summit in Qatar, the
Syrian president postulated mechanisms on how to manage intra-Arab
disagreements but did not define on how to solve them. So many
pundits await the next set of Syrian moves as they will not only
impact Lebanon but also the geopolitics of the wider region. However,
it is clear that the constancy, sharpness and shrewdness of Syrian
foreign policy are now yielding dividends. After all, Syria is being
courted by France, the USA and Saudi Arabia – which had opposed it
vociferously in the past – and has also resumed its role as maker or
breaker of deals. What happens in the future is relevant, since the
Syrian stance could heavily affect not only Lebanese independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and prosperity, but also other
regional factors including Iran, Palestine and to some lesser extent
in Iraq.
For two weeks, the Lebanese parliament approved a draft law to allow
voting rights to 18-year-olds. If the government approves this draft
law within the statutory period of four months, it will enable the
younger generations to vote in the 2010 municipal elections. Although
some key players are concerned that this measure could well create
a demographic power imbalance in the country, I still regard it is
a positive step and hope that Nabih Berri’s Parliament and Fouad
Siniora’s Government would act in concert – and in the same vein –
when tackling other pending issues too. Perhaps Lebanese politicians
would heed President Suleiman’s recommendation for the establishment of
a Senate according to Article 7 of the TaÃ"f Accord – later integrated
as Article 22 into the Lebanese Constitution. The TaÃ"f Accord had
envisioned a bicameral government, with parliament elected on a
non-sectarian basis and sectarian representation being relegated to
the second chamber.
In my contacts with Lebanese colleagues and friends, I am constantly
amazed by the flexible and enterprising nature of the Lebanese
character. Despite bloody wars and a surfeit of doom and gloom – so
much so that many younger generations are still traumatised by it –
the Lebanese psyche remains quite robust and its entrepreneurship
manages to re-build the country after each calamity. Just look at how
the Central Bank of Lebanon is managing to sustain the stability of the
financial market when richer countries are almost up against the wall
as they heap billions into creating uncertain fiscal stimulus packages.
Today, despite my self-confessed pessoptimism, I would argue that
the Lebanese file stands a chance for building a peaceful national
compact so long as good will and good faith join hands to serve the
interest of the Lebanese people and their public institutions. But
would realism in Lebanon help set its spirit free, or would it muzzle
itself with more tensions?