THE FROZEN CONFLICTS START TO THAW
Simon Tisdall
guardian.co.uk
Wednesday 29 April 2009 17.15 BST
Under pressure from Brussels, Europe’s ‘wild east’ is coming in from
the cold – but plenty of obstacles still remain
The EU’s invitation to Belarus to attend a special summit in Prague
next week is the latest sign a spring thaw may be taking hold along
the ragged, fraught frontiers of Europe’s "wild east". The so-called
frozen conflicts that have disfigured the region since the end of
the cold war are beginning to melt at the edges. Under pressure from
Brussels, the ice is starting to shift.
Most significant in strategic and economic terms is the burgeoning
rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, which last week unveiled
a joint road map to normalise relations after almost a century of
hostility. The plan includes re-opening the border closed by Turkey
in 1993 in protest at Armenian support for separatists contesting
Azerbaijan’s control of the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Despite effectively placing its membership bid on hold, the EU is happy
to piggyback on Turkey’s considerable influence in the Caucasus and
the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions for its own purposes. These
include the advancing of common trade, development, security and
human rights agendas and most importantly, perhaps, the securing of
non-Russian controlled energy supply routes from central Asia.
The kiss-and-make-up scenario now de veloping between Ankara and
Yerevan has thus been warmly welcomed in Brussels, and in the
US. Prospectively it makes it easier to draw relatively isolated
Armenia, which has long lived in Moscow’s shadow, closer towards
the western fold. And that in turn dovetails nicely with developing
western ties other post-Soviet republics such as Georgia and Ukraine.
A parallel thaw is underway between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have
begun talks on de-icing Nagorno-Karabakh. Oil-producing Azerbaijan,
on the shores of the Caspian, is a crucial player in terms of future
European energy supply and transit. It pays to keep it happy. Once
again the EU, along with Turkey, has been active in promoting the
nascent peace process. And the EU’s Prague summit will host the next
encounter of the two countries’ presidents.
It’s possible to read too much into another EU-facilitated meeting
of old enemies, held last week between Georgian officials and
representatives of Russia and South Ossetia, the tiny separatist region
that sparked last summer’s Caucasus war. The talks took place in a
tent and afterwards, the Georgians complained the Russians had set
up a "hotline" telephone link but failed to give them the number. All
the same, it was the first such meeting in the conflict zone and the
parties agreed to meet again. That’s progress of sorts.
Recent political upheavals in Moldova, one of the more complex frozen
conflicts, have presented Brus sels with an additional opportunity
to advance its agenda and interests. And this opening coincides in
turn with the EU’s controversial invitation to ostracised Belarus to
attend the Prague summit.
Once condemned as "Europe’s last dictatorship", President Alexander
Lukashenko’s regime has a dismal record of misrule and was previously
blacklisted by Brussels. But by bringing Belarus in from the cold,
the EU is again signalling that engagement, based on enlightened
self-interest, trumps confrontation. Responding positively so far,
Lukashenko has taken to describing his country as a "bridge" between
east and west.
The 27 EU heads-of-government will bestow their blessing on this 21st
century brand of Ostpolitik in Prague when they formally launch a new
"eastern partnership" with six former Soviet bloc states – Belarus,
Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia. But for all the
positive signs, plenty of large and small obstacles remain with
potential to derail the whole enterprise.
Azerbaijan, for example, opposes any Turkey-Armenia rapprochement
while the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is unresolved. This tension, plus
the opposition of ultra-nationalists in all three countries, could
scupper both sets of negotiations. Then there is the wider issue of
how much is just talk and how much the EU can actually deliver, in
terms of financial and developmental aid, security, peace-building
and political reform to countries whose needs are enor mous and
growing. Goodwill may quickly dissipate once the six realise the new
partnership is not a path to EU membership but a substitute for it.
But the biggest unknown remains the attitude of Russia, which already
feels threatened by current trends and retains formidable wrecking
power should it choose to wield it. Whether the issue is South
Ossetia’s "Passport to Pimlico" separatists, Ukraine’s gas pipelines,
Nato exercises in Georgia, the future of Moldova’s Transdniestria
region or Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s geopolitical orientation, Russia
will continue to have a major say in a region it still regards as
within its sphere of influence.
In fact, Russia still seems to think it has a veto. Right now, the
EU is trying to demonstrate that is not the case.