Civil Georgia, Georgia
Jan 18 2005
Saakashvili Bitter-Sweet on Council of Europe
Jaba Devdariani / 2005-01-18 13:39:23
Mikheil Saakashvili plans to address the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE) on January 25 to present the new and
comprehensive plan for the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflict
resolution. Georgian president told the reporters on January 17, that
PACE was selected as `the most appropriate venue’ for voicing the
Georgian proposals. Nonetheless, Saakashvili recently brushed aside
the Council of Europe (CoE) criticisms for his administration in what
increasingly becomes a bitter-sweet interaction.
`Now, somebody gives us recommendations – parliamentarians of certain
organizations – and this is good, but it is for us to make the
decision. Similar recommendations were sent to the Baltic States or
Turkey[for a long time] but these countries are normal countries. [To
give these recommendations extremely high significance] is a sign
that some politicians in our country are deeply backwards
provincials,’ such was the reaction of Saakashvili to the opposition
statements that the new government lost support of the only European
organization it is a part of – the CoE.
President referred to the PACE draft recommendation issued late in
December 2004. On a positive side, the document acknowledged the
`unyielding resolve’ of Georgia’s government `to carry out
far-reaching political, legal, social and economic reforms.’ More
notably it deferred fulfillment of the Georgian commitments made
before the accession to the CoE, which includes highly politically
sensitive and logistically complicated return of Meskhetian Turks to
Georgia’s southern, Armenian-populated districts.
On the other side, however, the recommendation leveled strong
criticisms against Saakashvili administration stating `the
post-revolutionary situation should not become an alibi for hasty
decisions and neglect for democratic and human rights standards.’
Specifically, the draft recommendations call on Georgia to revise the
Constitutional changes adopted in February 2004, which according to
CoE’s Venice Commission conclusion, grant excessive powers to the
President. The Venice Commission said the changes were intended to
transform the strong presidential model into semi-presidential one;
however, some of them went beyond the democratically accepted system
where President acts as a mediator and arbiter between the strong
prime-minister and strong parliament. February changes to the
constitution, the Commission argued, has diminished the role of the
parliament vis-à-vis the executive, and entrusted the President with
powers to keep the Cabinet in which the parliament has no confidence.
In yet another conclusion, the Venice Commission has criticized the
Law on Status of Adjara Autonomous Republic, saying it excessively
restricts the autonomy and minimizes the role of the local
legislature.
Saakashvili’s reaction at CoE recommendation is somewhat harsh for
the person who says he aspires for EU membership and displays EU
flags at the government buildings. This reaction has two main
components.
One part is irritation: in curious similarity with the US position,
Saakashvili sees the Europeans as too soft, unable to understand the
degree of real challenges the Georgian government is facing. In
spring 2004, he called then CoE Secretary General Walter Schwimmer, a
`well-paid bureaucrat not interested in people’ for treating Adjarian
leader Aslan Abashidze and Georgian authorities as co-equal sides in
a political dispute and thus ignoring what Saakashvili thought was a
clear position of the Adjarian people against Abashidze
On the other hand, Saakashvili plays purely face-saving game, trying
to present possible compromise as his own decision, and not the one
taken under opposition pressure. The CoE charges on Constitutional
changes and Adjara law are the hardest to accept for Saakashvili,
especially as they were vocally voiced by his current opposition –
some political parties and majority of NGOs – during the discussion
of the draft legislation, even before the Venice Commission
conclusions came through
Overturning the Constitutional changes has political consequences, as
they reflected the precarious power balance between the
`Revolutionary Triad’ – Saakashvili, Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and
Speaker Nino Burjanadze. Some of the CoE proposals – such as the one
calling to transfer the right for appointing the provincial governors
from the President to the Prime Minister – may well trigger the rift
between Saakashvili and his own allies from the National Movement.
As for Adjara, excessively restrictive law was certainly influenced
by the bad experience with Aslan Abashidze, who, based on gaps in
legislation, essentially carved for himself a fiefdom in Adjara
during Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency.
Overall though, the CoE recommendations are not unacceptable for the
current Georgian administration. Some of them, including curbing of
torture in the detention facilities and reform of the prosecution are
well in line with Saakashvili’s declared policies. The CoE gave a
deadline of September 2005 for most of the changes to take place.
Until then, Saakashvili may himself decide to revise some of the
Constitutional provisions, depending on how the political interaction
within the administration would proceed.
`I am sure that government fully understands the seriousness of this
document [CoE recommendations,’ says one of the most prominent
critics of the February 2004 Constitutional amendments, legal expert
David Usupashvili, `thus for me, it is less important whether the
government would admit [to its mistakes] publicly. The main thing is
[for them] to take the criticisms into account and consider them in a
complex task of state-building.’
In the meantime, Saakashvili hopes to overshadow the CoE
recommendation with his peace proposals. But his real performance on
CoE recommendations by September 2005 would largely determine how
realistic Georgia’s EU aspirations are.