Iran: the new elite
en.fondsk.ru
Ð?rbis Terrarum
02.07.2009
Vladimir YURTAYEV
The early days of summer of 2009 proved quite stormy in the Islamic
Republic of Iran in terms of politics. Almost the entire politically
vocal population of the 70-million strong Iran, that’s 40 million
people, took part in the election of a new president. It is for the
first time in Iran’s history that a fully-fledged election campaign
has been launched in the country, with the main opponents, old rivals
in the struggle for power since the 1980s, namely the incumbent leader
(rahbar) Ali Khamenei and Mir Hossein Mousavi, then Prime Minister of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, had an opportunity to rally their
supporters.
Following his secure win of the presidential election of the 12th of
June 2009, the incumbent president M. Ahmadinejad had a chance of
getting in the lead of a united country after a dynamic election and
his win in the first round. But this failed to prove the case. The
proclaimed loser Mir Hossein Mousavi of the Islamic Revolution `Old
Guards’ urged his supporters to energetically contest the election
returns and to take to the streets. The ensuing clashes in Tehran
resulted in spilt blood and loss of human life on both sides. Judging
by reports in western news media, the standoff was expected to spiral
up, but it has grown clear that a repetition of the 1978 anti-Shah
boat-rocking scenario will fail to become a reality. Back in 1978 the
Islamic revolution in Iran began precisely with mass-scale street
protests during the ceremonies of remembering the victims of the
Shah’s repressions. Today the opposition is still weak and unprepared
to go it too far. Of no minor importance was the determination that
the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps displayed by saying it was
prepared to make short shrift of protests to enforce law and order.
Understandably, just one candidate was to win. It seems strange that
the opposition has elected for their leader someone who is, true, a
political heavyweight, but who’s unable to win from a younger
candidate. But then the decision may well have been due to an
over-assessment by the opposition of their resources and positions in
Iranian society, where western election technologies will still
misfire.
On the 27th of June 2009 M. Ahmadinejad addressed an all-Iranian
meeting of Iran’s judiciary to sum up the first results of the
election and formulate the key points of his new programme. First,
Iran’s president feels that a mass-scale turnout in the election of
the 22d of Hordad 1388 (12th of June 2009, according to the Gregorian
calendar) makes it safe to assume that the recent presidential
election was a referendum during which the people of Iran reiterated
their choice of the Islamic republic as a form of political
power. Secondly, by making this choice the people of Iran `said
liberal democracy was over’. Ahmadinejad believes the West has a
`controlled’ and limited democracy, when the people have their will
mediated by political parties and are not immediately involved in the
election process, whereas in Iran `the people were organizers,
monitors and electors in the election process’, which is evidence of
freedom and democracy.
When elaborating on his programme, Ahamdinejad focused on the notion
of `fairness’ (`adalyat’, which is also used to denote `justice’), the
lack of which is the main reason for `strife in the world’. Iran’s
president feels that a fair treatment of one and all is the solution
for world peace. When addressing foreign reporters in what proved a
most important election meeting on the 25th of May 2009,
M. Ahmadinejad also spoke of `orientation towards God, adherence to f
s, promotion of love and kindness’ and urged the dominant forces to
return in international relations to `fairness and kindness’,
something the entire world was craving. Ahmadinejad said that fairness
that’s been established in Iran is `a harbinger of fairness around the
world’ and pointed out that `ministering to fairness is the highest
form of service of Allah’. It is thus safe to point out that the new
regime has shaped a stable set of ideologemes it addresses both to the
people and government of Iran and the entire world community.
Of basic importance was M. Ahmadinejad’s indication of the
inviolability in Iran of the principle of `velayat-eh fakikh’, that is
rule by a Shia jurist on the basis of fairness, which is a concept of
Imam Khomeini.
On western countries’ reaction to the presidential election in Iran
M. Ahmadinejad said Iranians were surprised that `Mr. Obama interferes
in Iran’s affairs and allows statements that go beyond the bounds of
decency (`adab’). Perhaps, the US president is trying to find a
pretext to prolong or even disavow his pledge of holding direct talks
with the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Barack Obama and
Angela Merkel have spoken in concert to denounce acts of violence in
Iran in the wake of the presidential election in the Islamic
Republic. Obama said he admired the courage displayed by the people of
Iran `in the face of cruelty’, adding that the Untied States would
always support the Iranians’ right to the freedom of choice and
freedom of expression.
So, Iran’s leaders have tested a model of holding presidential
elections, the one that energetically involved the population into the
political process. Just how the opposition will act now will determine
the degree of severity, to which this freedom of expression will be
restricted. In general, the presidential campaign that’s drawn to a
close has shown a higher degree of development of the Iranian
society’s political system, and this will inevitably affect the
election technologies to be used in future. It is safe to claim that
now the Iranians are through a course of training in a higher-level
political struggle, with a growing threat of using the
election-related technologies from the `colour revolution’ arsenals
against the existing political regime.
But then, Iran remains Iran, which was borne out by the election
returns, – we have already pointed out in a forecast on the Website of
the Strategic Culture Foundation on the 5 `Iran’s new president will
be a person who should be M. Ahmadinejad’s coeval. Iran’s incumbent
president has no competitors in this age group’. I personally took as
indicative of whether the presidential election returns would or would
not be recognized as legitimate the congratulations to M. Ahmadinejad
on his re-election for a second term in office that the Catholicos of
All Armenians Karekin II extended on the 27th of June 2009. The
Armenian community in Iran is quite strong, so their recognition of
and support for the election returns means a lot.
Meanwhile things in and around Iran are moving in groove, with the
partisan media are working off what money they got to (what some
quarters thought) spin-doctor a new president, although the previous
one has been re-elected. 200 protesters are presented as if they were
200,000. Almost 13 million people make their home in Tehran, so even
one million is just one sixth of the city’s grown-up population. The
others voted against the protesters. The whole thing boils down to the
following: part of the old revolutionary elite that’s taken possession
of economic profits gave way to the new elite following
M. Ahmadinejad’s win in 2005, an elite that’s emerged on the basis of
the Army and that’s relying on the other part of the old revolutionary
elite, related to rahbar Ali Khamenei. The problem is whether the new
old elite will manage to persuade the opponents not to take all of
their money out of the country or not.
Mass-scale money transfers from Iran came to everyone’s knowledge when
La Stampa reported the news that banks Saderat, Bank-e Melli, Bank-e
Sepah and Melat had begun remitting their clients’ currencies to
Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates.
It is deplorable, of course, if another segment of the formed Iranian
society moves away, but then the Islamic Republic may stand to gain in
the long run, since if all one knows is Islam, there’s nothing they
could compare it with.
One of the US leading foreign p izes up the situation in Iran as
explosive. Z. Brzezinski warns that the situation is likely to be
aggravated in the wake of the disputable presidential election, but
one shouldn’t rule out that the regime will stand out. Anyway, he
says, today Iran is at the start of a deadly crisis. But the West
cannot afford to ignore any regime in Iran. Brzezinski goes on to say
that there are a number of issues that one just has to negotiate with
the current Iranian regime, namely the nuclear programme, regional
security and economy-related problems. Sanctions alone will fail to
keep Iran away from its nuclear programme. Nor does Brzezinski rule
out that Iran’s nuclear weapons might prove conducive to regional
stability. When elaborating on Iran’s future, Brzezinski claims that
the country boasts a social potential to become some time in future
the West’s important partner in the region, and even a partner of
Israel, which supported Iran in the war against Iraq back in the
1980s. If only because, Zbigniew Brzezinski says in conclusion, Iran
is more `pro-western’ than the neighbouring countries.
On the 29th of June 2009 President M. Ahmadinejad told the head of the
national judiciary Ayatollah Hashemi Shahrudi to launch an
investigation into the murder of a young Iranian girl called Neda, who
was shot at and killed by unknown people during a demonstration in
Tehran. The opposition tried to use the murder as a banner of their
struggle. President said the political defeat should not separate
Iranians form one another, since all of them were under his protection
as their country’s citizens.
It is obvious that keeping the situation stable in Iran is of
paramount importance. Meanwhile some new scenarios for Iran’s
destruction start looming, the ones that have to do with the weakening
of the proper Persian component of the Iranian elite as a result of
emigration or its physical destruction. Russia has long-term interests
in Central Eurasia and it needs peace in the region to advance
them. The situation perfectly suits Russia and Iran to promote their
interaction at all levels, while Russian businesses are prepared to
carry out joint large-scale economic projects as indicated in the
framework of strategic partnership proposals. But the expediency of
separating economics from politics in Russian-Iranian relations should
not mean ignoring change in Iran’s foreign policy concepts, as well as
the promotion in practical terms of the `diplomacy of fairness and
dialogue’.