PINR – The Power and Interest News Report
Feb 7 2005
“Moscow’s Political Tactics Alienating its Near Abroad”
Russia has seen its influence in the Caucasus — and the rest of the
former Soviet Union — wane significantly since the November 2003
Rose Revolution in Georgia. Although economics play a part in the
drive to become closer to the United States and the European Union,
Moscow largely blames post-revolution Georgia for the Orange
Revolution in the Ukraine and its perceived loss of influence there.
While Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko were in Strasburg for a Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly (P.A.C.E.) meeting, Russian President Vladimir
Putin made no secret of meeting separatist leaders in Moscow,
including the newly elected president of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh and
the defeated Ukrainian presidential candidate Victor Yanukovych.
Russian policies have become increasingly anti-Georgian since
Saakashvili came to power, which regional experts feel is Moscow’s
response to Saakashvili’s decidedly Western bent. But its decision to
punish Georgia and other opposition leaders in the former republics
may be working against long-term Russian interests.
Abkhazia
The first major blow to Russia’s influence in its own background was
not the election in the Ukraine but the October elections in Abkhazia
[See: “Russia’s Slippery Foothold in Abkhazia Becomes a Slide”].
Abkhazia is officially a part of Georgia, but gained de facto
independence from Tbilisi after Georgia lost control of the republic
following a war in the mid 1990s, a fact that is largely credited to
Russian interference. The ruling regime in Abkhazia is supported by
Russia. Russian peacekeepers monitor its borders with Georgia, the
Russian ruble is the local currency and any economic development is
limited to Russian investors. Moscow also pays Abkhaz pensions and
has widely issued Russian passports throughout the Abkhaz population.
Candidate Raul Khajimba actively campaigned on a pro-Russian
platform, promising an increase in investments from Russia and
stronger relations with Moscow. Sergei Bagapsh, known in the Russian
media as the opposition candidate, also pledged to foster greater
ties with Russia. Neither candidate spoke favorably of Georgia or the
possibility of improving Abkhaz-Georgian relations. Tbilisi distanced
itself from the whole election; only Russia recognizes Abkhazian
independence and, therefore, the election. The Russian media was the
only source of international coverage. Despite support from the
Kremlin and other Russian politicians, Khajimba officially lost the
election on October 3, an event that nearly resulted in civil war
when he refused to accept the Central Election Committees final count
in favor of Bagapsh. Events came to a head in December, when Bagapsh
refused to give up plans for his inauguration.
In response to the unexpected turmoil in a republic fully dependent
on Russian support, Russia closed its borders and cut off trade with
Abkhazia, in effect squashing the main source of income for most
Abkhaz, the citrus trade. While that show of strength helped
convenience Bagapsh to bow to Russian pressures, it also underscored
what analysts say caused his victory in the first place. The only
real difference between the two candidates was Bagapsh’s calls for a
truly independent Abkhazia, recognized by the international
community. In its current state, both Tbilisi and Sukhumi refuse to
have relations and Georgia refuses to allow any trade to Abkhazia to
cross its borders, even to the extent that Saakashvili ordered
Turkish boats heading to Abkhazia bombed over the summer. That limits
Sukhumi to relations with Moscow. While it is unlikely that any
country in the international community will recognize Abkhazian
independence, Bagapsh’s strong stance in that direction was perceived
as a threat to the current status quo.
Thanks to the immediate embargo on Abkhazian goods, Moscow was able
to convenience Bagapsh to accept a compromise between the two former
rivals. Days before the planned inauguration, Bagapsh agreed to a
revote and ran with Khajimba as his vice presidential candidate.
Under the current agreement, Khajimba wields an unusually large
amount of power, including a reported 40 percent of the state budget.
Since his election on January 12, Bagapsh has stepped up rhetoric
against Georgia and made open overtures to strengthen Abkhaz-Russian
ties. Moscow was able to reel the wayside republic back in, but it
took a last ditch show of strength to do it.
The Orange Revolution
Despite a much stronger Russian effort during the Ukrainian election
in November, the Russian-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovych could not
defeat opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. Analysts have debated on
what Yushchenko’s victory will really mean for Ukrainian-Russian
relations, but regardless of Yushchenko’s western looking policies,
Ukraine remains a major Russian trading partner. Historically,
religiously and ethnically Russia and Ukraine have close ties. The
new president’s first international trip was to Moscow, albeit
quickly followed by the address at Strasburg.
The real question remains what this growing trend of peaceful
uprisings will mean for the remaining Russian-supported presidents in
other former republics. However insulting Yushchenko’s victory is for
Moscow, in the long run it will only truly adversely affect
Russian-Ukrainian affairs if Putin decides to punish Yushchenko like
he is currently castigating Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili.
The Ukrainian vote for Yushchenko was more a vote against rampant
corruption and the questionable election than a vote against Russia.
Yushchenko has gone out of his way to pacify Russians in the eastern
part of the country, even defending the role of the Russian language
in Ukraine. His drive toward the West is less a statement of
anti-Russian sentiment than as an accepted desire to improve
conditions in his country. But that can change if Russia is not
willing to actively work with Yushchenko.
Yushchenko has roughly a year to prove to his divided country that
Ukraine will benefit from better relations with Western states. If
Russia tries to openly sabotage his effects — like it is in Abkhazia
and Georgia — Putin risks a much more serious backlash during the
upcoming parliamentary elections. By supporting Yushchenko, Russia
can help strengthen Ukraine which will result in a deeper alliance
between the two countries and increase stability in the region. Any
effort by Moscow to further antagonize the country, especially the
western half, could have the opposite effect.
New ethnic discord will only weaken Russia’s chance to increase its
influence in the region as both current leaders and opposition forces
throughout the former Soviet Union are watching Ukrainian
developments closely. If it becomes apparent that Moscow will not
tolerate any action perceived to weaken its influence in the region,
economic and military aid from the West will seem more desirable.
While existing leaders might welcome Russia’s brand of friendship,
the opposition will work more strongly to free their respective
countries from Moscow’s influence if it becomes evident Russia sees
them not as sovereign states but as internal problems.
Russia’s Special Relationship with Georgia
Moscow’s continued interference with ethnic problems within Georgia
has not strengthened its role in the Caucasus. Even before the Rose
Revolution, Russia’s efforts to destabilize the region and bring it
into submission with military force backfired. In 2002, Moscow
accused Tbilisi of harboring terrorists in the lawless Pankisi Gorge
that borders Chechnya. Instead of resulting in an increase of Russian
military personnel to Georgia, the accusations led to stronger ties
between Georgia and the United States and the U.S.-led Train and
Equip Program for the Georgian army. Since Saakashvili came to power,
Georgia has made every effort to strengthen ties with the United
States and Europe.
Russia’s continued support for separatist leaders in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia is meant to deter stability — and therefore foreign
investment — in Georgia. However, in reality Russia’s obvious
interference has helped the Georgian leadership turn to the West for
support and resolution. During his speech in Strasburg, Saakashvili
clearly stated that Russia is not capable of leading Georgia to a
peaceful resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Venetian
Commission’s decision to actively participate in the development of a
peace settlement even further decreases Russia’s influence in its own
near abroad.
Moscow’s newest tactic — vetoing the continuation of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (O.S.C.E.) border
patrol on the Chechen, Ingushetia, and Dagestani borders — has been
more successful. Under its current policy, Russia will guarantee no
international observers will be monitoring the borders by late
spring. When the snow melts, Chechen rebels will have easy passage
into Georgia and — according to Russia — Moscow will have ample
cause to bomb the Pankisi Gorge, or force Georgia into accepting more
Russian peacekeepers inside the Georgian border. Those troops would
be in addition to the soldiers already in place along the borders of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the two Russian army bases in
Batumi and Akhalkalaki.
But this could also backfire. Saakashvili and his administration have
actively been searching for willing replacements to the O.S.C.E.
monitoring group and the E.U. has tentatively expressed interest.
While the E.U.’s monitors are far from certain at this point, any
move to place independent international monitors would work against
Russia. Under the O.S.C.E., Russia had a say and a role in the
monitoring. If it becomes the duty of the E.U. — or a mixture of
observers from various countries — Moscow’s say would be diminished
and its claims that the Georgian government is not strong enough to
protect its own borders would be disproved.
Tbilisi and its allies are also becoming more adamant about the
remaining two Russian army bases in Georgia. In January, Saakashvili
attacked the role of Russian peacekeepers inside Georgian territory.
Georgia has proposed creating joint anti-terrorist centers with
Russia on the current army bases. So far Russia has shown no real
interest, but if it continues alienating itself from the
international community with coercive tactics, Georgia will gain more
support from the international community and could garner the
necessary support to force Russian troops out of the country all
together.
Problems in Armenia
Another potential defeat for Russian influence is waiting in Armenia.
In the past, Armenia has been a bastion of Russian support in the
Caucasus. Russia has long supported the country militarily and
economically — for example, Armenia receives all of its gas from
Russia. While only an estimated 20 percent of Armenia’s exports are
purchased in Russia, a reported two million Armenians live there and
their families at home depend on the financial support they send.
Russia supported Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
Azerbaijan and still stands firmly behind Yerevan during peace talks
about the contested territories. During the civil unrest in Georgia
leading up to the Rose Revolution in 2003, both Russia and Armenia
made public statements about their mutually strong and beneficial
relationship. Russia strengthened its already strong military
presence in Armenia, increased arms sales and even moved some
soldiers from bases in Georgia to Armenia during the protests in
Tbilisi.
Nevertheless, Armenia’s support for Russian influence is not as
strong as it was a year ago. While the opposition was emboldened due
to the success of the Rose Revolution, another important negative
development for Russia came in September 2004, following the
terrorist attacks at Beslan. When Russia closed its borders with
Georgia following the attack, hundreds of Armenian trucks and buses
were stranded for a month, unable to go to either Russia or back to
Armenia. While there are no concrete figures for how much Armenian
businesses lost during that month, Armenians felt slighted by their
ally and insulted at Russia’s reaction to punish them along with the
rest of the Caucasus. That added to dissatisfaction with Russia’s
continued support of President Robert Kocharian, whose victory in
2003 is widely disputed by opposition parties and the public.
Russian diplomats were slow to react to the situation, and statements
from Moscow largely consisted in recommending different routes into
Russia. The United States, however, was not slow to act. Since the
Rose Revolution, Washington has been paying more attention to
Armenia. Sensing a weakness in Russian-Armenian relations over the
past year, America has picked up the pace. A new consulate is planned
for Yerevan which reportedly will be the biggest in the region. In
addition, American-driven aid projects have been on the rise.
A third party could further weaken Russian influence in Armenia.
Yerevan and Iran have held intense talks about a proposed gas
pipeline. While there are no investors yet, the pipeline has the
potential to free Armenia from its current state of dependence on
Russian gas.
Conclusion
Due to shortsighted policies, Russia has already lost considerable
influence in Georgia. Moscow’s erroneous politics in Abkhazia and
Ukraine resulted in embarrassment and more strained relationships
within Russia’s sphere of influence. If Putin does not reverse this
trend, Russia could lose support during the next Armenian elections
and further encourage the currently weak opposition parties in
Central Asia. Although opposition presidents are well aware of the
importance of good relations with Putin, political games force them
to increasingly turn to Europe and the United States for aid and
support in an effort to balance more evenly between Russia and the
West. If Moscow does not start realizing that coercive tactics in its
near abroad are causing a loss of support from these states, it will
continue to see its interests in the region weaken.
Report Drafted By:
Molly Corso
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent
organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide
conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.
PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests
involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may
not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written
permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed to
[email protected].