TURKISH OPPOSITION REMAINS SKEPTICAL OF GOVERNMENT’S "ARMENIAN OPENING"
Saban Kardas
Jamestown Foundation
Sept 16 2009
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met the leaders of opposition parties
as part of his attempt to brief them about recent developments in
Turkish foreign policy, and solicit their support for the government’s
"Armenian opening." On August 31, Turkey and Armenia announced the
details of a roadmap for the normalization of bilateral relations. The
parties initialed two protocols regulating the steps to be taken
toward the resolution of contentious issues. To allay concerns among
domestic opposition parties and in Azerbaijan, the Turkish government
emphasized that the final decision would rest with parliament and
that Baku’s views would be taken into account during the parliamentary
approval process (EDM, September 8).
Since accomplishing the objectives of normalization would require
bold steps and political determination on the part of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government, this new initiative is denoted
as the "Armenian opening," echoing the recent Kurdish opening. Given
the necessity of parliamentary approval, the focus of the policy on
Armenia has shifted to the domestic political processes.
Davutoglu, at the urging of Prime Minister of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has
taken time out from his heavy international diplomatic agenda to win
over the opposition parties for the normalization policy. Davutoglu
met Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition Republican
People’s Party (CHP), and the leaders of the Democratic Left Party
(DSP) and the Felicity Party (SP) Numan Kurtulmus and Masum Turker
respectively. However, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader
Devlet Bahceli, who has been the most outspoken critic of the Armenian
opening, refused to meet him. Earlier, Davutoglu met Parliamentary
Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin, and he is scheduled to have additional
meetings with the leaders of parties that received at least 1 percent
of the popular vote in the July 2007 parliamentary elections. He
also met the opposition leaders in May, following his appointment as
foreign minister (Today’s Zaman, September 16).
One common theme emerging from Davutoglu’s contacts is that
the opposition leaders unequivocally state that any progress in
Turkish-Armenian relations needs to be contingent upon the protection
of Azerbaijan’s concerns over Karabakh. In response, Davutoglu sought
to reassure them that normalization with Armenia would not come at
the expense of harming ties with Azerbaijan, and that Baku was being
informed about the progress of Turkish-Armenian talks (Anadolu Ajansi,
September 15).
Another common theme is the skepticism of the opposition parties
toward the contents and the form of the Armenian opening, especially
the involvement of foreign actors. They continue to view the opening
as an agenda imposed upon Turkey by external forces, and believe that
the main benefactor of the process will be Armenia.
For instance, SP’s Kurtulmus maintained that according to popular
perceptions, the process seemed to be driven by Armenia, and that
Turkey appeared to be only a passive player. He asked Davutoglu
to correct this image. He also expressed his reservations about
the committee of historians, and maintained that the committee
would be unlikely to reach a decision disproving Armenian genocide
claims. Kurtulmus also criticized the government’s recognition of
Switzerland as the mediator between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that as
a country that punishes the denial of the "Armenian genocide" claims,
Switzerland could not be considered as impartial in this issue. DSP’s
Turker, also shared similar concerns (Cihan, September 15).
The main opposition leader Baykal raised the most vocal
criticisms. During the joint press brief after meeting with Davutoglu,
Baykal noted that the CHP considered foreign policy issues as "state
policies" that require a national consensus. He added that his party’s
decision to meet Davutoglu was meant to make a contribution to state
policy, and should not be interpreted as representing "support"
for the government’s agenda. He stated his disappointment with
the government’s overall approach to this issue, and reiterated
his earlier position that the normalization agenda is imposed upon
Turkey. "There is a process and a roadmap underway which is beyond
the knowledge of the opposition parties. Now, through these contacts,
the government is not asking ‘Let us discuss Turkey’s interests,
and formulate [the policies] together.’ The government is saying
to us. ‘We are given a roadmap. We decided to implement it; come,
help us realize this roadmap.’ This is not an effort to formulate
a policy. This is an effort to find support for a program that is
already formed," Baykal objected (ANKA, September 15).
Baykal also characterized the two protocols as "traps." He argued
that although the protocols satisfy Armenian concerns by laying out
the details of Turkey’s re-opening of the border, they fall short of
meeting Turkish demands regarding Armenia’s recognition of the Kars
Treaty on defining the Turkish-Armenian border, or the renunciation
of its policy of having its genocide claims recognized worldwide,
and ending its occupation of Karabakh. He expressed concern that
the protocols offered no safeguards against the possibility that
after Turkey opens the border, Armenia might later renege on its
promises. Therefore, he demanded that the government must refuse to
sign the protocols. Baykal also speculated that the government would
sign the protocols with Armenia on October 13 (Hurriyet, September 16).
Both the Turkish and Armenian governments have to tackle domestic
opposition, in addition to the dilemmas of overcoming differences
of opinion and building trust in the bilateral talks. Indeed, the
Turkish-Armenian declarations recognize the challenges of obtaining
broad-based social and political support, and give the parties six
weeks to engage in domestic discussions before the protocols are
forwarded to parliaments for final ratification.
Given the strength of nationalistic sentiments in Turkey, one challenge
for the AKP government has been to present the Armenian opening as a
"national" policy, rather than a parochial agenda promoted by the AKP,
or a project externally imposed upon Turkey. The six-week deadline
has provided an impetus for each government to stimulate debate on
the issue, but as the Turkish case suggests this deadline is too
unrealistic to facilitate any meaningful and genuine democratic
deliberation on a dispute mired in historical memories and current
geopolitical conflicts. Davutoglu’s meetings further show that a new
conflict is looming over the AKP’s foreign policy when the Armenian
opening comes before parliament.