The Armenians of Georgia: A New Flashpoint in the Caucasus?
Caucasian Review of International Affairs (CRIA)
CU Issue 50
October 12, 2009
CAUCASUS UPDATE
In this section, we publish the weekly analysis of the major events
taking place in the Caucasus and beyond. The Caucasus Update is
written by our Editorial Assistant Alexander Jackson.
As Turkey and Armenia prepare to open their mutual border and begin a
thaw in their relationship, there are fears that a recent spat between
Tbilisi and Yerevan could heighten regional tensions once again.
In early September, Armenia’s President Serzh Sarkisian set out plans
to improve the situation of Georgia’s ethnic Armenians. He called for
the preservation of Armenian national monuments in Georgia,
registering the Armenian Apostolic Church and ` most importantly `
recognising Armenian as an official language in Georgia.
The series of measures followed a visit by Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili to Yerevan in June, when Georgia’s Armenians formally
called on President Sarkisian to raise their demands – for greater
cultural and political rights – with President Saakashvili (RFE/RL,
June 18). Not wishing to antagonise a vital ally when the `Turkish
thaw’ still seemed distant, President Sarkisian quietly ignored the
demands. Indeed, he actually praised the Georgian leader for his
efforts at improving the social and economic welfare of Javakheti, a
region mostly populated by ethnic Armenians in southern Georgia
(RFE/RL, June 25).
The package of measures which President Sarkisian proposed in
September therefore came as something of a surprise to
Tbilisi. Georgian officials reacted with scorn ` State Minister for
Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili remarked that he was `very glad that
Armenian language is the only state language in Armenia’, but that it
would not be adopted in Georgia (Georgia Times, September 3).
Analysts have linked the timing of the move to the Turkish thaw. The
imminent opening of the Turkish-Armenian border (if bo
rgia’s position as Armenia’s only easy transport corridor to the West
is at risk. With the option of moving goods west through Turkey,
rather than north-west to Georgia’s coast and then across the Black
Sea, Tbilisi’s vital role as an economic lifeline for Yerevan will be
lost.
This increases Armenia’s bargaining position regarding Georgia, and
particularly the Armenians of Javakheti. The issue has been a matter
of contention for years between the two sides. The Javakheti Armenians
complain that their cultural and political rights are being ignored by
Tbilisi, and frequently appeal to Yerevan for aid. Unwilling to
irritate Georgia, Armenia has so far been muted in its
response. Tbilisi, for its part, fears that any movements towards
`autonomy’ could turn Javakheti into another Abkhazia or South Ossetia
` a rebel region outside the control of the central government. The
Georgian government is fully aware that it rules over a fractured
patchwork of different ethnic groups, all of which could ` in theory `
revolt against Tbilisi’s control.
The Abkhazia/South Ossetia parallel is instructive for another
reason. Georgia, perhaps understandably, sees the hand of Russia
behind every call for autonomy in Javakheti. A large Russian military
base was located in the region until 2007, and Armenia is Russia’s
strongest ally in the South Caucasus. Both factors created suspicion
that Russia is using its regional influence to stir up opposition to
Georgian rule in Javakheti.
There have been numerous protests against Georgia’s rule in
Javakheti. In April 2005, several thousand Armenians protested against
the planned closure of the Russian military base (Central
Asia-Caucasus Analyst, April 6 2005). The base, a Soviet legacy,
brought much-needed employment and economic assistance to the region.
Is Moscow behind protests against Georgian rule? It should not be
ruled out. Georgia has sometimes arrested local Armenian activists,
accusing them of stirring up separatism on behalf of foreign powers,
a, although these could also be trumped-up charges. Georgia can also
dismiss demands to improve the social and economic conditions in the
region, by claiming that every complaint and call for autonomy is a
`Russian plot’.
It is unclear whether the government in Yerevan would attempt to
provoke Georgia on Russia’s behalf. Armenia now needs as many friends
as possible, especially whilst its cold war with Azerbaijan continues,
and will not actively provoke Georgia. Georgian territory remains the
shortest route to Russia, particularly for vital gas pipelines, which
will still be needed for years, until Armenia’s energy needs can be
met by Turkey and Iran.
The real explanation behind Armenia’s criticisms of Georgia is
domestic. With the Armenian diaspora increasingly coming to view
President Sarkisian as a `traitor’ for his rapprochement with Turkey,
he urgently needs to shore up his credentials as an Armenian patriot.
What better way to do so than to issue a low-risk criticism of
Georgia? The package of measures he proposed does not contain
recommendations for improving the region’s economic situation, its
most urgent priority. The measures are cultural ` church, history, and
language, all important signifiers of Armenian identity. Javakheti is
viewed by Armenian nationalists as part of `Greater Armenia’, which
they believe should be united in a single state, so being seen to
support Armenian identity there acts as `compensation’ for peace with
Turkey.
Nonetheless, the issue of Javakheti remains tense. It will only become
more important for Armenian identity as the historical animosity
towards Turkey begins to fade. It could become a lightning rod for
Armenian nationalists, provoking a counter-reaction from Georgia, and
creating a new flashpoint in the Caucasus.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
