TURKEY CAN BEGIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS FOLLOWING RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOLS, BUT IT WILL NOT OPEN BORDERS: RUSSIAN POLITICAL EXPERT
Today
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Oct 20 2009
Azerbaijan
Day.Az interview with Russian political scientist, head of the
Political Forecasting Center for the Study of Post-Soviets Alexander
Karavayev.
Day.Az: Turkey and Armenia signed protocols on the normalization of
relations. What impact the possible opening of borders can have on
general condition in the region?
Alexander Karavayev: It will certainly have a good impact on Armenia
as its economy will receive a new impetus to development. This is
obvious. As for Georgia and Azerbaijan, Georgia almost does not play
any role. If we talk about politics, here the Armenian-Azerbaijani
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has significance.
One can speak of three scenarios of further development of the events.
The first is positive. Under this scenario, the opening of borders
between Armenia and Turkey will be somehow synchronized with the
progress in withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan. That is, if the promises given to Azerbaijan
by Turkey and by those countries who have been sponsors of this
process are realized. Despite the fact that countries that Hillary
Clinton and Sergei Lavrov represent did not directly state anything,
I am sure that the U.S. has given promise to Baku that there is no
reason for concern and that the interests of Azerbaijan will be taken
into consideration in the Karabakh conflict. This is the scenario
that would completely satisfy Azerbaijan.
The second scenario is possible in the event that Turkey will fail to
negotiate with Armenia on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and one of
the protocol items in this case will fail. The protocols include two
paragraphs:opening of borders and establishing diplomatic relations.
So, Turkey can begin diplomatic relations after the signing and
ratification of the protocols, but the borders will not be opened.
In this case, Turkey is not in danger of losing face before the public
and Azerbaijan. In other words, if Turkey takes a step towards Armenia
(protocol signing, ratification), but Armenia does not make a response
step in the Karabakh issue, the further development of relations
will be too complicated. That is, there will be diplomatic relations,
but the normal political interaction, as with other countries, will
not happen.
The third scenario is the most negative, in particular, for
Azerbaijan. The protocols are signed, ratified, and they are followed
by opening of borders. In this case, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
will have to be resolved outside the context of Armenian-Turkish
relations. This means that the Karabakh settlement will be postponed
again in a long folder. It is clear that Azerbaijani elite will
react quite strongly and as a result, anti-Turkish, anti-American
and anti-Russian sentiments can grow in Azerbaijan.
Q: What factors may prevent ratification of the protocols in the
Turkish Parliament?
A: I would say that ruling party is able to ratify the protocols in
parliament. However, the question arises – with what ratification will
be followed in Turkey? Equally important is how strongly sentiments
of opposition will grow. There are many questions which is quite
difficult to answer now. In my opinion, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a
rigid politician responsible for his actions and words.
He knows what he is doing and what steps should be taken in case of
aggravation of situation in Turkey. It is possible that external
forces pushed for these steps, but again, he is not one of those
politicians who are easily manipulated.
Q: There were much talks and opinion that the signing of the protocols
will be followed by a speedy resolution to the Karabakh conflict. What
are your views in this respect?
A: If we assume that the settlement of the conflict is withdrawal
of Armenian forces from occupied regions around Nagorno Karabakh,
one can consider this in the category of months. However, it is
clear that the conflict will not end after withdrawal of Armenian
troops. The main point here is the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The
withdrawal can begin at least from a number of areas, for example,
from those areas that are not so principal for Armenians.
It is premature to say that Armenia will make further concessions after
the first withdrawal of its troops from the occupied territories. In
my opinion, to control these areas from the military point of view
is not so fundamental. First of all, I mean those areas that do not
connect Nagorno Karabakh with Armenia. Armenia may be willing to make
some concessions, but this does not mean that it wants to resolve
the conflict on the basis of Madrid Principles to the end.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
