Eurasia Daily Monitor
Tuesday, January 12, 2010-Volume 7, Issue 7
RUSSIA ADJUSTING REGIME CHANGE POLICY IN GEORGIA
by Vladimir Socor
Reversing Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum, Russia’s emergent policy
toward Georgia is essentially a continuation of war by political
means. Russia’s 2008 war and three-year economic blockade sought to
change Georgia’s Western orientation through regime change in
Tbilisi. By the end of 2009, however, Moscow evidently concluded that
war and blockade had failed to achieve that goal.
With EU monitors on the ground, Russia has lost the option of
orchestrating clashes to justify an attack into Georgia’s
interior. The Georgian radical opposition, while still able to wreak
havoc on Tbilisi, has proven too inept to achieve Russia’s best-case
scenario of regime change through Georgian hands. Although Russia’s
economic blockade has aggravated the global recession’s impact on
Georgia, the government has coped effectively and the country is set
to recover from a 4 percent GDP decline in 2009 to an anticipated 2
percent growth in 2010. Meanwhile, Russia’s military occupation and
diplomatic `recognition’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (to the
accompaniment of ethnic cleansing) has deprived Moscow of any real
levers for influencing Georgia’s foreign policies and domestic
politics.
As a net result, Russia has conquered two Georgian territories
militarily, while alienating Georgia politically and losing the
country strategically. At this point, Russia has rendered itself
irrelevant to Georgia in almost every way except through hostility and
nuisance value. This is the operative meaning of Georgian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze’s statement at last year’s end:
Georgia’s strategy is to `forget about Russia, concentrate on
developing strong ties with the EU and NATO. The less Russia we have,
the better’ (Civil Georgia, December 1).
Recognizing its political failure, Moscow is now embarking on a
policy of regime change through different means. These include:
gradually lifting the economic blockade, as a prerequisite to reaching
out to the Georgian people; using the Orthodox Church as one of the
avenues for such outreach; selecting and promoting a mainstream
opposition figure–currently Zurab Nogaideli–as Russia’s favorite in
Georgia; and allowing vague hints at a possible reintegration of
Georgia under Russian auspices. In its own discourse, the Kremlin more
heavily emphasizes a black-and-white, wedge-drawing contrast between
Georgian authorities and the Georgian people. Moscow acts as if it
does not recognize President Mikheil Saakashvili and his government.
On December 9, President Dmitry Medvedev told journalists that
Russia would be willing to restore direct flights between Georgia and
Russia, re-open the one legally functioning highway between the two
countries, and allow Georgian products again on the Russian market,
all this in short order; and later to negotiate toward visa-free
travel arrangements. He did not mention any pre-conditions to such
steps by Russia.
However, Medvedev rejected the idea of resuming contacts with
Saakashvili or other senior Georgian officials due to `the crime that
was committed’ [in August 2008]. `Our paths have diverged too far and
our views are too far apart=80¦But this does not mean that we must
freeze all other relations [with Georgians]. Our peoples have a
centuries-old friendship, a special history’ (Interfax, December 9).
Medvedev’s statement has set the tone for the adjustment of the
regime-change policy. Top Russian officials have spoken since then in
a similar tenor. It implies resuming and conducting economic and
people-to-people relations outside an inter-state framework, and in
the absence of diplomatic relations. It tells Georgia’s irreconcilable
opposition that Moscow’s own differences with the Georgian government
are also irreconcilable. And it maintains the pretense of
criminalizing Georgia’s legitimate leadership to justify the pursuit
of regime change in Tbilisi.
The Georgian government has welcomed Russia’s declared
willingness to lift the blockade and reactivate economic relations.
Tbilisi, however, wants all relations to be conducted in a legal
inter-state framework. With bilateral diplomatic relations broken
since the 2008 war, Russia and Georgia maintain interest sections in
their Swiss embassies in Tbilisi and Moscow, respectively.
In late December, Moscow and Tbilisi announced that the highway
between Georgia and Russia would soon re-open at the Kazbegi-Upper
Larsi border checkpoint. This is the only highway connection between
Georgia and Russia outside Abkhazia or South Ossetia and it can
therefore be used legally for international traffic. Russia’s closure
of this highway had punished not only Georgia but also Moscow’s ally
Armenia, which had relied on the same highway for the shortest access
to Russia via Georgian territory. Negotiations through Swiss good
offices led to the decision to re-open that highway shortly (Interfax,
December 24).
Announcing the decision, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
declared: `The Georgian people are a friendly people to us. We want
authorities that meet the Georgian people’s interests to be
established in Georgia’ (Interfax, December 24). Lavrov’s statement
suggests that Moscow feels entitled to make that determination.
On January 4, Russia’s consumer goods inspectorate announced
that Moscow is willing to lift the embargo on Georgia’s Borjomi
mineral water, a national prestige trademark. The Kremlin has used
this inspectorate (RosPotrebNadzor) repeatedly to implement or lift
economic sanctions on various countries by political criteria. The
agency’s chief, Gennady Onishchenko, had earlier embargoed
Borjomi. Now, however, the same Onishchenko publicly urges Tbilisi to
discuss the procedures of resuming Borjomi exports to Russia
(Interfax, January 4).
On January 8, Georgian Airways (Airzena) was allowed to fly a
charter plane to Moscow for the first time since Russia had closed the
direct air traffic. Several more charter flights are scheduled from
Tbilisi to Moscow and St. Petersburg during January. Deputy Prime
Minister Sergei Ivanov oversaw the preparatory moves on the Russian
side. Ivanov, who had urged attacking Georgia long before 2008 while
defense minister, now says, `the problems of Georgia’s ordinary people
should be treated separately from the problems we have with this
state’ (Interfax, December 23). The Duma’s international affairs
committee chairman Konstantin Kosachev, a habitual assailer of
Georgia, approves and soothingly predicts that `further steps should
follow. There are no obstacles for the air traffic to be normalized’
(Ekho Moskvy, January 4). Negotiations are in progress on regular
flights to resume from February onward (Interfax, Rustavi-2 TV,
January 8, 9).
Russia had imposed the sanctions in 2006. It closed all
railroad, highway, air, and maritime links with Georgia; and it
embargoed Georgian wines, other agricultural products, and mineral
water (all traditional exports to Russia). Moscow allowed airline
flights again in March 2008, but stopped them in August of that year.
Moscow is now preparing to re-open lines of communication with
Georgian society at the levels of business, politics, and various
dimensions of `soft power.’ The twin goals are rebuilding influence in
the country and undercutting the government. Russia seems in a hurry
to start dismantling its useless and counterproductive economic
sanctions against Georgia. At the same time, it makes a show of
refusing to recognize the country’s president and government.
There is no contradiction between removal of sanctions and
demonstrative non-recognition of the authorities, whom Moscow
continues to accuse of `war crimes.’ This two-track policy seeks to
re-connect Russia with parts of Georgian society and gain allies in
the Georgian opposition. It aims to encourage another push for regime
change through snap elections. It prepares to reward political allies
with business opportunities. And it seeks to attract some mainstream
political groups, not just marginals, to side openly with a more
benign-looking Russia. The Kremlin undoubtedly expects Georgia’s
upcoming municipal elections to re-energize the opposition’s demands
for pre-term national elections.
–Vladimir Socor
MOSCOW SHOWCASES NOGAIDELI AS OPPOSITION LEADER IN GEORGIA
by Vladimir Socor
Municipal elections in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities in the
spring will undoubtedly see another round of opposition
demonstrations, with Russia ready for some overt involvement for the
first time. Moscow is openly advertising its support for former Prime
Minister Zurab Nogaideli, leader of the upstart Fair Georgia party, as
Rusia’s favorite opposition leader in Georgia. This marks the
first-ever overt endorsement of a Georgian opposition politician by
Moscow.
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin received Nogaideli in
Moscow on December 23. This was Nogaideli’s third known visit to
Moscow in the last three months. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
and State Secretary Grigory Karasin had received Nogaideli on October
27 and November 24 to `start a [political] dialogue,’ discuss the
`difficult situation in Russian-Georgian relations,’ and `facilitate
contacts between citizens’ (Interfax, Civil Georgia, October 27,
November 24).
Putin brought Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov (who also chairs the
United Russia party’s Supreme Council) and Moscow’s Mayor Yury Luzhkov
into the December 23 meeting with Nogaideli. Ostensibly, the meeting
focused on the recent demolition of a Soviet Army monument in
Georgia’s second-largest city, Kutaisi. Undoubtedly, however,
political action in Georgia in the coming spring was discussed.
According to a Russian government-released transcript (also an
unprecedented signal of support), Nogaideli displayed confidence that
he would come to power in Georgia. Yet he overbid for Russian support
toward that goal: `Our priority is to rebuild the monument in
Kutaisi. We pledge to do so as soon as we come to power.’ He also
denounced President Mikheil Saakashvili to Putin: `Saakashvili intends
to sever the remaining ties between Russia and Georgia’ (Russian
government website, December 23; Jamestown blog, January 7). By this
logic it was Georgia, not Russia’s three-year transport blockade and
trade embargos, that `severed the ties’ even before the 2008
war. Further by this logic, the Georgian leadership `severed the ties’
by orienting the country westward (albeit with Nogaideli’s
contribution while prime minister).
In Putin’s presence, Nogaideli agreed with Gryzlov to draw up a
cooperation agreement between the United Russia and Fair Georgia
parties (Interfax, December 23). Nogaideli’s regular handler Karasin
commented that Moscow has given preference to this opposition
politician because `he is sensible, he looks to the future, he differs
favorably from other Georgian politicians’ (Interfax, ITAR-TASS,
December 24).
The meeting’s roster suggests that Moscow is grooming Nogaideli
as a favored interlocutor on multiple levels: with the Russian
government, the party of power, the foreign ministry, and the Moscow
city government.
Nogaideli is positioning himself and his party as promoting
reconciliation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia through Russia. The
unstated implication is that such a dialogue could eventually lead to
some form of reintegration under Russian auspices, albeit at some cost
to Georgia’s independence. Moscow has encouraged such inferences at
Georgian diaspora conferences, organized in Russia by wealthy Georgian
expatriates. Russian officials do not discourage such inferences when
Nogaideli proposes to open dialogue with the South Ossetian and Abkhaz
authorities. Sukhumi seems uneasy about Moscow’s possible intentions
in this regard. On January 8, Abkhaz `foreign minister’ Sergei Shamba
publicly ruled out a meeting between Nogaideli and Abkhaz `president’
Sergei Bagapsh, which Nogaideli had apparently discussed in Moscow
(Interfax, January 8).
Moscow could boost Nogaideli’s political rating by nudging
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali into dialogue with him, if only symbolically
and limited to resolving individual humanitarian cases. Moscow could
help Nogaideli show at least some minimal results from such dialogue.
Nogaideli served as finance minister (2003-2005) and prime
minister (2005-2007), successfully advancing Georgia’s economic
reforms. He resigned after undergoing open-heart surgery and went on
to increase his already considerable personal wealth in investment
banking. Nogaideli founded his Fair Georgia party in December 2008
and supported the radical opposition’s 2009 regime-change campaign. He
threatened a `revolutionary scenario’ that would overthrow
Saakashvili, whether peacefully or through civil war, unless the
president were `forced’ to call snap elections by fall 2009–i.e., one
year after the preceding elections (Civil Georgia, June 8, 2009).
According to some close acquaintances, Nogaideli predicts that
Russia will play a growing role in Georgia’s internal politics and he
seeks to position himself accordingly, as the Russian-backed
alternative to Saakashvili.
For more than 20 years Moscow has failed to enlist respectable
or effective political allies in Georgia. It could only work through
former KGB figures such as Igor Giorgadze, shadowy businessmen,
political eccentrics in Tbilisi, or Aslan Abashidze’s clan in Batumi.
Russia had no known allies or sympathizers in the 20-odd small groups
that have been pressing since 2007 for regime change outside the
constitutional framework. These groups have proven inept and remain
marginal, although they will probably take to the streets again in the
spring.
With Nogaideli, however, Moscow has picked a mainstream
politician and establishment figure, independently wealthy, with
organizational abilities, and ready to cast his lot with the
Kremlin. Through this example, Moscow probably hopes to peel off a few
more establishment figures and business circles, if the opposition
ignites civil strife again this year.
–Vladimir Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
