SIX POSSIBLE TRAPS IN GEORGIA-RUSSIA TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENTS
by Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, March 15, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 51
The Georgian Parliament passed a resolution on March 10 that requires
Russia unconditionally to withdraw its forces from Georgia no later
than January 1, 2006 — unless Moscow reaches agreement with Tbilisi
before May 15, 2005, on a “reasonable timeframe” for the troop
withdrawal (see EDM, March 14).
Georgia will be safer if the troop withdrawal timeframe remains as
defined by the parliamentary resolution, without political conditions
or linkages to other issues. Georgia would, however, run serious
risks if it tries negotiating a complex political agreement with
Russia on troop withdrawal and allow it to become linked to other
issues. In that case, Moscow would again drag out the negotiations
while trying to pressure or lure Tbilisi into signing an agreement
filled with traps and conditionalities.
Based on 14 years of experience in the Baltic states, Moldova, and
Georgia itself, at least six traps can be expected to be laid by Moscow
into the text of a political agreement with Georgia on troop withdrawal
and related agreements. Those traps would be designed to negate the
goal of military withdrawal, ensuring a military presence instead.
1. Legalization
Whatever “reasonable timeframe” is ultimately agreed for troop
withdrawal — 3 years as Tbilisi hopes, 7 years as Moscow demands,
or a compromise — Russia wants the presence of its troops to be
legalized for the duration. If this is done, Moscow will have a
tempting incentive to pressure Georgia to accept prolongation of
the term upon expiry. The Baltic states were aware of this risk
when they refused to legalize the presence of Russian troops on
their territories for any “temporary” or “transitional” period. Such
legalization by Georgia would: a) undermine the irreplaceable argument
of national sovereignty for the ridding the country of Russian troops;
b) enable Russia, under the CFE Treaty and in other contexts, to cite
“host-country consent” by Georgia; c) weaken international sympathy
and support for Georgia’s ultimate goal of terminating Russia’s
now-unlawful military presence; d) retain, instead of removing, a
potential time-bomb of a political-military nature inside the country;
and e) interfere with Georgia’s national goal of integration with
NATO. Like the Baltic states, Georgia must never legalize Russia’s
military presence for any length of time.
2. Re-labeling
Russia hopes to retain the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases and its
Tbilisi general headquarters by re-labeling them “anti-terrorist
centers.” Georgians originally came up with this idea in 2004 in order
to re-start the Russian-blocked negotiations and to provide Moscow
with a face-saving way to withdraw the troops. Tbilisi had envisaged
the formation of one joint Georgian-Russian analytical anti-terrorist
center, under Georgian sovereign control and not located at any
existing military base, to be created in the wake of the garrisons’
departure, and to include several score of Russian officers, without
troops or armaments. Moscow, however, seized Tbilisi’s goodwill gesture
and turned it against Georgia. Last month, Moscow proposed to rename
the existing bases as “anti-terrorist centers” and even to augment
their garrisons; and when Tbilisi refused, Moscow publicly blamed
Tbilisi for blocking the negotiations. Georgia may have outsmarted
itself with that offer in the first place. With anti-terrorism an
international concern for many years to come — and, sometimes, a cover
for any use of coercion — it is easy to envisage Russia demanding
to retain “anti-terrorist centers” in Georgia into the future,
while propagandizing (as it already does) that Georgia tolerates
“international terrorism.” Moscow has grossly abused Georgia’s
face-saving offer. This is not its first use of re-labeling for
cheating. Three years ago, Russia re-labeled its Gudauta military
base as “peacekeeping” and retains it to this day, in breach of its
1999 commitment to have closed down that base by 2001. The lesson
from all this to Tbilisi is that it must require the withdrawal of
Russian troops unambiguously, without the risky and time-wasting
complications of tinkering with their labels. The Baltic states were
successful because their position was never less than straightforward.
3. Ratification
Russia will try to require parliamentary or some other type of
ratification of a troop-withdrawal agreement with Georgia. The
experience of Moldova is instructive on this point. In 1994,
then-prime ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Andrei Sangheli signed an
intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Moldova within three years (by October 1997). A Russian-added codicil
stipulated, however, that implementation would be “subject to the
states’ internal procedures,” not further specified. The Kremlin then
interpreted this as requiring parliamentary ratification. Moldova’s
parliament quickly ratified the agreement; but Russia’s Duma never
did. Instead, the Russian government for years thereafter presented
additional conditions just for submitting the agreement to the Duma for
debate, and the Duma piled up additional conditions for examining the
document, with still more conditions for ratifying the agreement, which
it never did. Ultimately, the main condition was Moldova’s acceptance
of Transnistria’s separation with Russian troops in place. As Moldova
could not accept such terms, Russia has since 1997 simply ignored
that agreement. With this experience in mind, Tbilisi must insist on
an executive agreement with Russia on troop withdrawal, fully binding
from the inception, and providing for effective international oversight
(other than by the OSCE) of its implementation.
4. Istanbul formula
Moscow wants to retain the OSCE Istanbul 1999 formula, because it does
not require the closure of the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases. It merely
stipulated, “during the year 2000 the sides will complete negotiations
regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian
military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military
facilities within Georgia.” This formula must finally be cast aside
because Moscow has breached it — along with many other points of the
OSCE Istanbul 1999 agreements — constantly and massively throughout
these years. The Istanbul formula was patently inadequate in the
first place because it failed to stipulate the goals of base closure
and troop withdrawal regarding Batumi, Akhalkalaki, and other Russian
military installations. Any new agreement with Russia must precisely
stipulate the binding obligation to close the bases and installations
and withdraw the troops by a date certain.
5. Georgian obligations
Russia will try to saddle Georgia with obligations to create proper
conditions for the reduction and withdrawal of Russian troops,
facilitate the functioning of bases and movement of personnel, vouch
for a secure environment in the base areas, and so on. Moscow will
formulate some conditions very broadly in order to abuse them later,
but will also advance some very specific conditions that Georgia
might be unable to fulfill in time or at all. Thus, Russia refused to
hand over Gudauta to Georgia — and has since blocked any meaningful
international inspection — on the excuse that Georgia is unable
to provide security in the area, which happens to be controlled by
Russia’s Abkhaz proteges. In Akhalkalaki, Moscow can well orchestrate
demonstrations by local Armenians in favor of retaining the Russian
base, then claim that it could not and would not act against the
will of the local population. Russia has already played this game
for years in Transnistria as an excuse for keeping its troops in
place. With this in mind, Georgia must not accept any obligations
of a kind that Russia or some local clients might prevent Tbilisi
from fulfilling. Tbilisi must also decline to vouchsafe (if only
“temporarily”) for the operation of Russian bases. Such an obligation
would deprive Georgia of leverage later on, in the likely event that
Moscow tries yet again to renege on its troop-withdrawal commitments.
6. Linkages
The Kremlin has managed to tie up the military negotiations
with the negotiations on a new interstate political treaty. As a
precondition to a troop-withdrawal agreement, Moscow now demands
that the political treaty rule out the hosting of third-party troops
and military installations on Georgia’s territory, and generally
constrict Georgia’s independent military cooperation with other
countries. As a further precondition to withdrawal of its troops
(other than the “peacekeepers”), Moscow wants the political treaty
to enshrine a special role for Russia in settling the Abkhazia and
South Ossetia conflicts and protecting the [newly-minted] “Russian
citizens” there. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that
such clauses are necessary in order to persuade the Duma to ratify
an interstate treaty with Georgia, if one is signed. This claim is
implausible in view of the Kremlin’s control of a comfortable majority
in the Duma. For its part, Tbilisi must reject any linkages between
a troop-withdrawal agreement and extraneous political issues. It can
simply offer a commitment that Georgian territory would not be used
by a third party against Russia. However, Georgia’s international
security arrangements and internal constitutional setup do not belong
in a bilateral treaty with Russia. Nor should Georgia legitimize those
“peacekeeping” operations as part of an agreement with Russia.
At this point, Tbilisi must initiate consultations with the three
Baltic states regarding their experience with practical arrangements
for the withdrawal of Russian forces.
Vladimir Socor