US ANALYST: BOTH THE US AND RUSSIA SHARE VERY SIMILAR VIEWS ON THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
Today
Aug 15 2011
Azerbaijan
Interview with Alex Jackson, an independent analyst on security,
political and economic issues in the Caspian region
Three years have passed since the last war in the South Caucasus and
many local analysts still question the stability in the region and
if there is any possibility of destabilization?
The situation in the South Caucasus remains fragile and uncertain:
the underlying problems facing the region have not been addressed. The
situation between Russia and Georgia remains tense, although for
political reasons neither side is willing to risk a new war. The
tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan is also a serious issue.
However, despite the lack of progress on a political settlement, the
chances of a new war are still very unlikely. So although neither of
the region’s conflict situations are likely to flare up, their root
causes have not been addressed and they remain a threat to long-term
stability and peace.
What are your expectations on the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process
developments?
The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is very difficult to predict. The
situation has endured for seventeen years without a return to
significant fighting, and this is unlikely to occur unless either
Armenia or Azerbaijan take a political decision to abandon the peace
process. This is not a likely scenario. However, the lack of progress
in negotiations is concerning. It seems that both sides are discussing
very precise details of the peace settlement, which has exposed the
tension between the concepts of self-determination and territorial
integrity.
Patience among mediators is growing thin but neither they, nor Baku
nor Yerevan, has enough incentive to walk away from the negotiations
and demand a new negotiating format. For now the status quo remains
the most likely situation.
Another thought on agenda after the Georgian war – should the
South Caucasus countries look for stability and protection in NATO
integration?
The Russia-Georgia war showed the limits of NATO’s interest in the
South Caucasus. The Alliance has no interest in granting membership
to the three states of the region whilst they continue to face a
number of complex security issues, and whilst their armed forces
and political systems are not in line with NATO standards. In any
case the three states have different approaches to NATO: Georgia has
formally applied for membership, Azerbaijan is equivocal, and Armenia
has little or no interest in membership.
However, each country will continue cooperation and integration
with NATO – as well as building good relationships with important
Euro-Atlantic nations, co-operation with NATO enables the South
Caucasian states to improve and modernize their military forces
and doctrines.
Is there a way for Russian and the US to cooperate in the South
Caucasus and preserve the stability in the region?
Whether or not Russia and the US cooperate in the Caucasus depends
on two sets of factors. Firstly, strictly regional factors – for
instance, tension over US support for Georgia before, during and
after the Russia-Georgia war; or US support for energy pipelines
leading through the region which avoid Russian territory. At the
moment there is limited tension over these issues, as the US does
not view the Caucasus as a priority area.
The second set of factors is the wider parameters of the relationship
between Washington and Moscow. During periods when this relationship
is very tense, it is natural that their interaction in the Caucasus
is also tense. Although there are fears that the ‘reset’ between
them is collapsing, relations between them are still cordial, so
co-operation continues. For instance, both the US and Russia share
very similar views on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and work together
quite closely on it.
More generally, do you see any major changes in the South Caucasus
coming?
It seems unlikely that there will be any major changes in the region
this year. The most likely changes to occur would be a renewal of the
Armenia-Turkey thaw: however, despite hopes that Turkey’s government
would pay more attention to the issue after its election victory in
June, this has not occurred. The Armenian government cannot afford
to spend political capital on it as election season approaches.
Indeed, the dialogue between the Armenian government and the
opposition, and the possibility of early elections, is another key
trend to watch. Although it seems that the opposition is too weak
and fractured to challenge the ruling party, Armenian politics is
very fluid, so this could change quickly.