Sandi Arnold and Michael Barletta, July 1999.
Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Overview of Reported Nuclear Trafficking Incidents Involving Turkey,*
1993-1999
Overview | Factsheet | Map | Abstracts
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Public reports indicate that Turkey may be a significant transshipment
route for nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union (FSU).
Eighteen nuclear trafficking incidents involving Turkey were reported
between 1993 and 1999. These cases include nuclear material seized in
Turkey, nuclear material interdicted en route to Turkey, and seizure
of nuclear material smuggled by Turkish nationals. These cases vary in
significance from outright frauds involving osmium and “red mercury,”
to some that reportedly involved small quantities of weapons-usable
material. However, to date none of these cases have been
authoritatively confirmed to involve highly enriched uranium or
plutonium.
Turkish officials have denied publicly that any plutonium or highly
enriched uranium has been seized in the country. According to
unconfirmed open-source reports, however, Turkish authorities seized
several grams of plutonium in Bursa, Turkey in 1998, which had been
smuggled from either Kazakhstan or Russia. In another reported
incident, police confiscated 12g of highly enriched uranium in Zurich,
Switzerland on 22 January 1996, and arrested a Turkish national who
was a member of a nuclear smuggling group based in Turkey. The suspect
said the material was destined for Libya. Four days later, Turkish
police arrested the remaining members of this alleged smuggling ring
in Yalova with 1.2kg of uranium (enrichment level not reported) in
their possession. Furthermore, Turkish, Russian, and international
wire services reported that Turkish police seized 750g of weapons-grade
uranium, which had originated in Azerbaijan, in Istanbul in 1994.
Initial press reports of seizures of “weapons-usable material” often
turn out to be inaccurate, however, and none of these reported cases
have been confirmed. Nuclear materials confiscated in Turkey were in
most instances taken to the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training
Center in Istanbul for analysis.
Some preliminary observations can be made about these cases. First,
public reports indicate that all nuclear material smuggled via Turkey
originated in countries of the FSU. As the materials were seized,
their ultimate destination cannot be determined with confidence;
however, three cases reportedly involved material being sought by or
shipped to Iran or Libya. In no case was the reported destination the
government or any other entity in Turkey itself. Second, a number of
these incidents apparently involved “amateurs” who acquired nuclear
materials before identifying potential buyers, and who sought to
peddle material of little or no utility for fabricating nuclear
weapons. Third, the sheer number of cases indicates that Turkey may be
a significant transshipment route for clandestine efforts to buy or
sell nuclear material originating in the FSU. Turkey’s geographic
setting could make it an attractive route for such transactions.
Several countries of proliferation concern – Iran, Iraq, and Syria –
share borders with Turkey. Three countries of the FSU – Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia- likewise have borders with Turkey. In
addition, ongoing commercial exchange between Turkey and Central Asian
countries may provide opportunities for smuggling. However, the
concentration and types of incidents reported in Istanbul, and the
lack of reported incidents on Turkey’s borders with Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, are somewhat surprising. The former offer
grounds to speculate that scam artists may seek buyers in the
“international bazaar” of Istanbul; the latter could indicate that
materials are not shipped across those international borders.
Public reports indicate that Turkish and other international
authorities thwarted each of the nuclear smuggling schemes recounted
in this study. However, other more sophisticated attempts may have
escaped detection. The possibility that proliferation-relevant nuclear
materials may be smuggled via Turkey continues to merit international
attention.
The 18 incidents are listed reverse chronological order.
CNS cannot confirm the veracity of these reports.
Click on date of incident for details and sources.
Material(s) seized Date of Incident Origin of
Material(s) Reported
Destination Location of Seizure Suspects
`A certificate for the purchase of U-235;’ 2.4kg lead container with U-235;
exact quantity of uranium in the container not reported 28 May 1999
Moldova Not reported Dounav Most, Bulgaria (Bulgarian-Turkish Border) One
Turkish national
100g enriched uranium or 5g uranium 2 Feb 1999 Azerbaijan Greece Bursa,
Turkey Four Turkish nationals
4.5kg “nonactive” solid uranium and 6g “active” plutonium 7 Sep 1998 Russia
or Ulba Metallurgy
Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan Not reported Istanbul, Turkey Four
Turkish national, three Kazakh nationals (including a Kazakh army colonel),
and one Azerbaijani national
13 cylinders of uranium marked “UPAT UKA3 M8” 1 Jul 1998 Iran Istanbul,
Turkey Van, Turkey Five Turkish nationals and one Iranian national
850g uranium dioxide 26 May 1997 Not reported Not reported Bursa, Turkey
Four individuals (nationality not reported)
osmium (quantity not reported) 1 Apr 1997 Romania Not reported Turkey Three
individuals (nationality not reported)
509g “raw” uranium 4 Mar 1997 Georgia Not reported Ipsala, Edirne, Turkey
Three Turkish nationals
17g low-enriched uranium Mar 1996 Golcuk, Kocaeli, Turkey Not reported
Antalya, Turkey Eleven individuals (nationality not reported)
20kg uranium Mar 1996 Russia Not reported Antalya, Turkey Five Turkish
nationals
1.2kg uranium or 1.128kg uranium 26 Jan 1996 Georgia Libya Yalova, Turkey
Two Turkish nationals
12g highly enriched uranium 22 Jan 1996 Georgia Libya Zurich, Switzerland
One Turkish national
1.7kg “red mercury” and 1kg “black mercury” 24 May 1995 Not reported Turkey
Constanta, Romania Two Turkish nationals and three Romanian nationals
750g weapons-grade or enriched U-238 19 Oct 1994 Baku, Azerbaijan Turkey
Istanbul, Turkey One Azerbaijani national
12kg uranium 19 Jul 1994 Unspecified country of the FSU Not reported
Istanbul, Turkey Seven Turkish nationals
uranium (quantity not reported) 22 Apr 1994 Not reported Russia Istanbul,
Turkey One Turkish national, one Azerbaijani national, and a Russian
national
4.5kg uranium 27 Nov 1993 Not reported Not reported Bursa, Turkey Three
Georgian nationals
2.5kg uranium enriched to 2.5-3.5 percent U-235 5 Oct 1993 Russia Iran
Gayrettepe, Istanbul, Turkey Four Turkish nationals and four Iranian
nationals (suspected secret service agents)
6kg enriched uranium Mar 1993 Tashkent, Uzbekistan Istanbul, Turkey Not
reported Not reported
* For sources and further details, see Sandi Arnold, “Factsheet on Reported
Nuclear Trafficking Incidents Involving Turkey, 1993-1999,” July 1999,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies.
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Sources and Notes:
The authors sought to eliminate contradictions and clearly false
information, but cannot confirm the veracity of the reports from which
these summaries are drawn. Case selection was based upon the
following three criteria: (1) nuclear material seized in Turkey; (2)
nuclear material en-route to Turkey; or, (3) nuclear material seized
involving a Turkish national.
This chart is based on Turkish-, Russian-, and English-language
open-source reports and information in the International Nuclear
Proliferation Database and the Newly Independent States Nuclear
Trafficking Database of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
Access to these is only available by subscription. For subscription
information click here.
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Sandi Arnold and Michael Barletta, July 1999.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies
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