Global Politician, NY
April 29 2005
Genocide Factor in Armenia’s Foreign Policy
Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. – 4/30/2005
Among the issues on the Armenian foreign policy agenda, perhaps the
problem of the recognition of the fact of the Genocide and its
condemnation is in many respects the most significant one. It also
has a serious domestic political and all-national meaning (in terms
of functioning of the whole Diaspora-Homeland system), as well as an
important foreign political resonance.
The Genocide Factor as an Item on the Agenda of Armenian Foreign
Policy
The Genocide issue is the only vector of Armenia’s foreign policy,
which reaches far beyond the regional context and enters modern
global politics. The fact that in the past several decades this issue
has been widely debated in political and public circles of many
countries, including world powers, as well as sudden interest towards
that issue by the European Union, go to show our point.
In the past decade, global political processes have been aiming
noticeably at strengthening their moral component, as manifested by
the growing attention to issues, falling under the category of
protection of human rights. In this context, Armenia’s policy of
promoting the universal recognition of the Genocide and its
condemnation as a crime of sweeping and massive violation of the
fundamental right to live of the whole nation, takes the central
stage of significance.
Another distinctive feature of the Genocide issue is that the
intensity level of its foreign political manifestation can basically
be only set by Armenia’s authorities. Here again a fact confirming
our idiom is quite evident: perhaps the only adjustment the new
Armenian leadership made to the foreign policy agenda upon coming to
power in 1998 was the official acknowledgment of the Genocide factor
as a priority issue.
An important characteristic of the recognition issue as a foreign
policy factor is the striking contradiction between its core content
and its perception by Turkey. In effect, this issue is one of the
foreign policy problems that are charged with a high degree of moral
humanity. Armenia, as a state established by the nation victimized by
genocide right after its unacknowledged and unpunished occurrence,
now includes on its foreign policy agenda the question this gravest
crime under the international law be affirmed and condemned by the
genocide perpetrator’s successor-state, as well as and by the
international community.
Turkey, however, is trying, firstly, to downgrade the problem to a
level of bilateral relations, and secondly, to falsify the very
essence of that policy by portraying it as conspiracy built on
hatred, confrontation, even hostility. At the same time, Turkey has
actively been taking steps, increasingly reminiscent of a full-scale
diplomatic offensive, aimed at inflicting her point of view on the
international community.
The above-mentioned features of the Genocide factor point to the
uniqueness of its nature, thus justifying the vitality of its
multilevel study.
The Genocide Factor in Foreign Policy of Armenia: a Diachronistic
Analysis
After passing through several stages, the issue of recognition and
condemnation of the Genocide, as a key all-Armenian issue, initially
concerning mainly the Diaspora and subsequently being embraced (of
course, within the limits set by the authorities) by Soviet Armenia
as well; and a public and political discourse of the past four
decades, has been crystallized into a factor of the foreign policy of
the Republic of Armenia. Let us discuss them all in brief.
In the period, immediately preceding the declaration of independence,
two approaches were outlined. The Armenian National Movement (ANM),
that headed the national democratic liberation movement in Armenia,
had in their platform the point calling for struggle for the
recognition and condemnation of the Genocide. However, at the same
time, it made an attempt at revising postulates traditional of
Armenian public and political school of thought, by introducing the
idea of the genocide issue not standing in the way of normalizing the
Armenian-Turkish relations. The majority of the remaining political
forces centered around Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party (the
Dashnaktsutyun) advocated the “traditional” approach, which hinged
the establishment of normal relations with Turkey upon her
affirmation of the Genocide. Both camps considered that issue in the
context of the bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations.
After coming to power in 1990, the ANM had to compromise and agreed
to incorporate that issue into the Declaration of Independence
(1990), thus booking a spot for it on the Armenian foreign policy
agenda. Afterwards, however, the Party tried to ignore the issue by
giving it a status secondary to the issue of normalizing relations
with Turkey. This policy was then voiced through the concept of
Armenia’s readiness to establish normal relations with Turkey without
any preconditions.
In its turn Turkey, which recognized the Republic of Armenia’s
independence as early as December 1991, had refused to establish
diplomatic relations with her until a number of preconditions has
been met. In so doing, in its attitude towards the young state Turkey
has chosen a rare operational code for modern international
relations, where severance of existing diplomatic relations or
refusal to recognize a newly-established state are more common
practices for similar situations. [1] The choice of that operational
code can be attributed to Turkey’s desire to achieve a strategic
upper-hand in her relations with Armenia, compelling the latter,
which had aspired to normalize her relations with the neighbor, to
accept non-conventional relations with Turkey. [2]
The lack of a diplomatic representation and the resulting narrowing
of reliable channels of information on the political life of the
Turkish state had further weakened the positions of young Armenian
diplomacy.
In general, Turkey’s policy towards Armenia from the very beginning
can be described as a policy of coercion. That policy is being
articulated with particular clarity in Turkey’s tendency to impose
her own issues on discussion agendas for various non-conventional
contacts.
The shaping of that agenda began as early as in 1991 and already by
the mid 1990s it has been fully formulated, whereby Turkey tried to
compel Armenia to:
– Relinquish its policy of pressing for the affirmation of the
Genocide;
– Officially recognize the inviolability of the Armenian-Turkish
borders border, as established by the 1921 Kars Treaty;
– Make unilateral concessions to Azerbaijan in the Karabakh
settlement.
The Armenian side was interested in developing trade and economic
relations with Turkey as well as using its communications. Later on,
after Turkey closed its land border with Armenia in 1993, a new item
had been added to the agenda: the conditions of opening of the
border. From 1991-1997, Turkey exerted a firm diplomatic pressure on
Armenia, trying to get concessions across the entire range of the
above-mentioned issues. Twice, in 1992 and 1993, Turkey even
threatened to use military force, moving troops closer to the
Armenian border.
In these conditions, Armenia chose defensive tactics, and attempted
to distance itself from the Genocide recognition policy by conceding
the leadership on that issue to the Diaspora.
After coming to power in 1998, the new leadership of the country
amended the foreign policy agenda by placing the abovementioned
problem on top of the state’s most important issues. Meanwhile, the
formula designed by the past leadership, according to which the
Genocide recognition issue should not impede the establishment of
normal relations between Armenia and Turkey, remained intact. So here
we have a unique fusion of the traditional approach with that of the
ANM.
Initially, after the indicated above amendments had been made, the
issue was largely viewed by Armenia within the framework of
Armenian-Turkish relations, and in the context of strengthening ties
with the Diaspora. Later on, though, set off primarily by the
increased efforts to have the issue placed on the agendas of the US
Congress and the French Parliament in 2000, a tendency to view it in
a larger context of the expansion of Armenian’s relations with the
West has emerged.
The Genocide in Armenian Foreign Policy: A Synchronistic Analysis
How does the Genocide factor really come across in the diplomatic
activity of Armenia? We suggest several analysis levels.
1. Bilateral relations
In Armenian-Turkish relations, the problem of the recognition of the
Genocide and the whole set of associated issues have not yet been
seriously discussed by the two sides. This stems from the policy of a
total denial of the very fact of the Genocide, traditionally employed
by Turkish authorities until recently, when Turkey has put forward an
idea of discussing the issue by historians from both countries, being
fully aware that this proposal, which transforms a political problem
into a historical debate, would be unacceptable for Armenia. As
expected, Armenia immediately rejected that suggestion, in her turn
advising the Turkish leadership to expand their familiarity with the
available scientific and historical materials.
In the situation where no direct contacts with Turkey on this issue
exist, in addition to the obvious objective set forth by Armenian
leadership the affirmation of the Genocide and its condemnation by
Turkey – Genocide factor in the Armenian foreign policy, acquires
additional functions of a containment instrument for Turkey’s policy
of coercion against Armenia.
Actually, we have the following picture of diplomatic interactions
between the sides. Turkey, which seeks concessions from Armenia on a
number of issues, using the latter’s unfavorable geographic location
to its advantage, is exerting pressure on her, and as it was noted
above, puts forward preconditions for establishing diplomatic
relations, opening land border, and developing normal trade and
economic contacts with Armenia.
In contrast to the Turkish approach, Armenia proposes two fundamental
principles underlying the concept of her relations with Turkey: the
establishment of normal relations without preconditions, and Turkey’s
readiness to discuss all disputable issues, including those set
forward by Turkey as preconditions.
A conflict between the operational codes of the two approaches to
bilateral relations is apparent. In this situation, the Genocide
factor becomes especially important for Armenia, as the only sphere
allowing for more independent and flexible policy towards Turkey and
counterbalance to the Turkish policy of coercion against Armenia. The
previous Armenian leadership had demonstrated this approach, which,
however, was overall unsuccessful, because it was based on a
“defensive” operational code.
The incumbent authorities have apparently built on the negative
experience of their predecessors, which is why on this issue they
have chosen an “offensive” operation code. Thus Armenia’s options for
resisting and confronting the Turkish coercion policy have increased,
make it possible to neutralize their negative diplomatic
consequences. Armenia’s strong rebuttal to the Turkish proposal to
downgrade the issue of the Genocide recognition from the political
domain to academia discussions was only be possible because of the
“offensive” operational code, which just proves our point.
2. “Big policy”
In 1987, the European Parliament passed the resolution on the
“Political Solution to the Armenian Issue,” in which the tragic
events of 1915-1917 on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, which
targeted the Armenian population, are qualified as genocide. The same
Resolution calls upon the European Council to exert pressure on the
Turkish Government in order for it to recognize the Genocide. The
process of placing of the genocide issue on the agenda of the “big
European policy” has clearly begun. Since the 1990s, a similar
process has been noticeable in the United States.
Therefore, the leadership of the newly independent Republic of
Armenia has from the very beginning had an opportunity to extend the
Genocide factor beyond the frameworks of the bilateral
Armenian-Turkish relations and apply it to Armenia’s relationship
with the West, thus trying to acquire an instrument against the
coercion policy exercised by Turkey towards Armenia. However, since
the then Armenian leadership had chosen the “defensive” operational
code in relations with Turkey, they preferred not to do it.
Armenia’s joining the campaign for the international recognition of
the genocide in 2000 has given it a new momentum by having it
integrated in global processes. Having thus adopted the “active”
operational code, our state has at the same time strengthened its
position vis-à-vis Turkey.
In 2004, the above process was given new dimensions when the public
opinion of the EU countries, as voiced by influential intellectuals,
began actively demanding from Turkey, which seeks membership in the
EU, to condemn the dark pages of its history, while leaders of the EU
countries started raising this issue in bilateral negotiations with
the Turks.
On the whole, one can say that the internationalization of the
Genocide factor is being accomplished on two levels. In the realm of
Realpolitik, it is being used by influential political circles in
Europe and the United States for their own gain – as an additional
vehicle to put pressure on Turkey. At the same time, it has already
been adopted by global discourse on the problems of genocide and
other crimes against humanity.
Armenia’s interaction with European countries and the U.S. on the
level of Realpolitik strengthens its overall position in the world
and, particularly, its relations with Turkey. The active
participation in the above discourse enhances Armenia’s authority in
the world.
3. Geostrategic aspect
The Genocide factor has also been influencing the choice of a
Geostrategic direction in which Armenia will develop. It is Russia
that has been traditionally perceived by Armenians as one of the most
consistent allies on this issue. Russia’s recent inclination to
establish closer relations with Turkey, as well as general weakening
of its positions in the world, seem to dash all hopes that Russia
would assist in this matter which had remained some of the Armenian
political elite.
In fact, Armenia today can realistically expect support in having the
genocide recognized and condemned only from the European Union and
the United States, and count on them to keep pressuring Turkey on
that issue. This situation is an additional Geostrategic factor
contributing to the movement of Armenia toward the West.
Perspectives
Operational code, adopted by the incumbent Armenian authorities in
regard of Turkey, assumes that there will be no unilateral
concessions on such a key and wide-scale pan-Armenian issue, as the
Genocide affirmation. Following its introduction into the agenda of
the Armenian policy on Turkey, the room for maneuvering for the
Armenian side seems to have shrunk quite considerably.
On the other hand, the establishment of an appropriate interaction
modus with the Western politics and global political processes makes
Armenia’s position in its bilateral relations with Turkey more
sustainable. For that reason it appears that the path towards further
integration with the West can uncover additional resources required
to successfully counter the coercion policy of Turkey. The official
recognition and condemnation of the fact of the genocide by Turkey
would be the ultimate justification of this operational code.
After the affirmation has been achieved, this question could be moved
from the political realm to the domain of international law thus
preparing ground for raising legal issues of retributions for the
crime of genocide against the Armenian people, perpetrated by the
Ottoman Empire, the successor of which is the present Turkish
Republic.
SOURCES
1. The term was first introduced into international relations studies
by Alexander George, who used it to characterize the ways of action
by policy makers. See A. George. The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected
Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making,
International Studies Quarterly – International Studies Quarterly,
1969, 13:2 (June), p. 1900-222. Used here to characterize a paradigm
of a foreign policy of a state, the genesis of which may be reduced
to one definite action.
2. That is, the multi-layer bilateral relations in the conditions of
absence of diplomatic relations. This scantily explored aspect of
international relations is highlighted in the innovative work: G. R.
Berridge, Talking to Enemy: How States without ‘Diplomatic Relations’
Communicate. New York, 1994.
Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International
Relations at Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He’s also the
Director of the Department of Turkish Studies at Institute of
Oriental Studies, Armenian National Academy of Sciences. In the past,
he served as a Counselor of the Armenian Embassy in Germany and was
the Deputy Director of the Department of Political Analysis for the
Office of the President of Armenia.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress