Poland Enacts New National Minorities Law, Report Views Minority
Numbers Warsaw Polityka in Polish 30 Apr 05 pp 28-31
[Report by Jan Dziadul: “Republic of the Nine Nations” — first
paragraph published in boldface]
On 1 May, Poland’s national minorities will receive their own
constitution: the “Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the
Regional Language.” It confirms nationality-based privileges,
introduces new ones, and will soothe many flashpoints. But it will
also ignite new ones?since it overlooks the aspirations of the
Silesians and Kashubians.
The Silesians have promised to put up a tough fight for their
rights, this time in Brussels. The Kashubians believe that they do
form a nation, and will argue painstakingly in favor of being treated
like a minority. They maintain that the law looks more towards the
past than towards the present day. The Germans, Ukrainians, and
Belarusians also have their doubts.
In the 2002 general census, 471,000 individuals, in other words 1.5
percent of the Polish Republic’s citizens, declared themselves to be
of a nationality other than Polish. This result is being questioned by
national and ethnic activists, who estimate their strength (very
modestly) at 5 percent of Poland’s 39 billion inhabitants.
The Ukrainians seek the causes for their weak representation in
ongoing Polonization?some would say coerced?which affects them in
particular because they are dispersed as a result of the postwar
resettlement operation.
The Belarusians are afraid of an explicit nationality identity or
of the label “kacap” [an ethnic slur] and do not want to be identified
with what is going on across the eastern border in their kindred
state.
The small numbers of Germans in the census is the result, in their
opinion, of political and PR techniques: namely, the result of the
nonexistent “Silesian nationality,” which drastically reduced the
Germans’ holdings.
The Jews do not know why the census showed that there were only a
bit more than a thousand of them, although they were counting on a
result ten times higher. Everyone pins the blame for the poor results
on the methodology of the census.
If we assume that three times as many of our citizens might have
admitted to having national roots, we still have hardly any minorities
at all. Yet our level of dislike for other nations as revealed by the
CBOS [Public Opinion Research Center] research carried out at the end
of 2004 — if these results can be translated into attitudes towards
nationalities residing in Poland?is astonishingly high. In descending
order, we are not fond of: the Roma/Gypsies (56 percent negative
assessments), Russians (53 percent), Jews (45 percent), Belarusians
(37 percent), Ukrainians (34 percent), Germans (34 percent),
Lithuanians (21 percent), Slovaks (16 percent), and Czechs (14
percent).
The idea of enshrining minority rights in a statutory act was
promoted as far back as in 1990, by Jacek Kuron. Then he fought for
nationality rights for two years. The law took on a conclusive form at
the end of 2004. “By a miracle we managed to finish work, because
during the final stretch such underlying layers of xenophobia
manifested themselves, such great grievances against minorities, that
it seemed that we had come up against insurmountable barriers,” says
Eugeniusz Czykwin from the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance],
parliamentary deputy rapporteur and a representative of the Belarusian
community. He says that for years he has not heard so many negative
opinions about minorities at the Sejm: “If those of us on the
commission had not broken several parliamentary deputies from the
Civic Platform [PO], the law would still be in its infancy,” Czykwin
believes.
Disputed Language
The Polish state had multiethnic roots from the very beginning. In
the prewar Polish Republic (in 1931), as many as 10.5 million of its
some 32 million inhabitants (more than 32 percent) declared themselves
to be of a nationality other than Polish. Minorities, as well as the
so-called “from-round-heres” (those who were unable to identify a
group they belonged to), had a numerical advantage over Poles in close
to one-third of the country’s territory. Nationality-based animosity
was a common event?and it has historical repercussions to this very
day. The war and postwar migrations fundamentally changed the ethnic
proportions. PRL [People’s Republic of Poland] propaganda propounding
the moral and political unity of the Polish nation also had its
effect.
A representative of the Internal Affairs and Administration
Ministry who took part in the work at the Sejm says that he could
clearly sense the old fears among parliamentary deputies. Bad memories
were revived. Even after the law was passed, Jerzy Czerwinski, a
parliamentary deputy from the Catholic-National Movement [RKN] from
the Opole region, still thought that it was unnecessary: “Because
minority rights are very well protected in Poland even without it,” he
reiterates. He also sought to restrict minority privileges in terms of
supplementary languages in public offices, geographical names, and
schooling. Jacek Kuron at one time proposed that a second language be
established in gminas [the lowest level of Polish territorial
administration, smaller than powiats] where no less than 8 percent of
the population declared themselves to belong to a different national
group. This criterion applied to 48 gminas in the country. Then the
bar was raised to 20 percent?which reduced the number of gminas
inhabited by nationalities to 42. In the autumn of last year, the Sejm
voted to institute a 50 percent threshold, which would have granted
statutory rights to only five gminas in Poland: one Lithuanian one and
four Belarusian ones. None of the gminas resided in by Germans would
have been able to benefit from privileges (this is because the local
population was divided into Germans and Silesians). After the Senate
made amendments, parliament ultimately adopted a 20-percent threshold,
and so we have 42 gminas with nationalities (see map below).
Border Lines
As concerns the Germans, symbols remain a bone of
contention. Tensions have been sparked not simply by monuments
commemorating the death of the German soldiers from a given village
(this is a tradition of Catholic and protestant parishes in these
lands), but rather by the Nazi motifs placed on them?for example, the
name Hitlersee on a monument in Szczedrzyk: “There has been surprising
stubbornness to the retain names imparted by the Third Reich, even
though German activists knew full well that such practices are banned
in Germany itself,” says Professor Danuta Berlinska, a sociologist
from Opole University. When this law comes into force, it should solve
this touchy issue?it forbids minorities from referring to names from
the years 1933-1945, which were imparted by the Third Reich or by the
USSR. But a large number of German names that might appear after 1 May
could spark new conflicts. As might the introduction of German as a
“supplementary language” in public offices.
Sometimes what gets people’s goat boils down to very detailed
issues, for example concerning German soldiers. The Germans write on
their plaques that these soldiers “fell” [a term entailing an
honorable death in Polish], while we refuse them this right and want
soldiers in Nazi uniforms to be identified as “victims” of the
war. This issue has repercussions with the civil rights ombudsman’s
office, for example: “I understand that people oppose soldiers of an
aggressor army being made equivalent to those who defended
independence,” believes Tomasz Gellert, chief of the division for
protecting the rights of foreigners and national minorities. “But the
way the world is, soldiers are treated as having fallen in battle,
regardless of what they were fighting for and whether they wanted to
take part in this war or not.”
Wartime history also constantly casts a shadow over
Polish-Ukrainian relations as well: “We are talking about the
respectful commemoration of the victims of the borderland conflict, as
we call it,” says Miron Kertyczak, president of the Union of
Ukrainians in Poland. To put things explicitly, this is about
commemorating the soldiers of the UPA [Ukrainian Insurrection Army]:
“This raises controversy; we do not receive consent for our proposed
wording on monuments.” He believes an breakthrough is imminent,
however. “If the issue of the Lyczakowski Cemetery in Lvov is settled
in line with Warsaw’s thinking, then the ice will be broken for us
too.”
But if chairman Kertyczak were to evaluate the state of
Polish-Ukrainian relations, he would give them a B grade. The
Ukrainians have accepted apologies for their postwar resettlement,
received modest compensation for their sojourn at the labor camp in
Jaworzno (for them this was a deportation camp, where 161 Ukrainians
died). “We consider the issue closed, although we were not successful
in securing compensation under the regulations that apply to victims
of repression,” the chairman says. “But we have our own education,
publishers, we are building churches?there are no major complaints
here.”
The good assessment is undoubtedly affected by the fact that
attitudes towards Ukrainians are changing before our very eyes. In the
CBOS research investigating likes and dislikes, Ukrainians were for
years among the most disliked nationalities: 65 percent of Poles gave
them a negative evaluation in 1993, and this ratio remained around the
level of 50-60 percent for years. In 2003, more than half of Poles
still felt dislike for them. In the surveys taken before the end of
last year, the rate dropped to 34 percent: “This is the effect of the
orange revolution,” Kertyczak says. “Poles’ support for the events in
Kiev meant that in our mutual relations we have moved beyond the elite
circle,” he goes on to say. Ordinary people saw ordinary people,
rather than Ukrainian devils. “We began to return to internal
emigration, to admit to our Ukrainian roots,” the leader of Ukrainians
explains. “If a census were held today, we would make a much better
showing.”
Parliamentary deputy Eugeniusz Czykwin, one of the Belarusian
leaders, gives the state of mutual relations a grade of C+. “We do not
have the kind of historical events haunting us as there are in
relations with the Germans or Ukrainians,” he says. Although there are
wounds here too: “The commanders who operated in these lands after the
war have been rehabilitated,” he explains. They try to make heroes out
of them, when for us they remain terror-mongers, arsonists of our
churches, who wanted to throw Belarusians to the other side of the
border.”
What is going on in Belarus has an impact on the perception of the
Belarusian minority: “The authoritarian government in Minsk definitely
does not improve our position,” Czykwin agrees. The statements by
Aleksandr Lukashenka, such as his recent state of the nation address,
contain very controversial assertions about Belarusian Poles,
Polesians, who allegedly support his regime profoundly. And this, in
turn, has its effect on Belarusians in Poland. Belarusian television
programs, where Polish areas bordering on Belarus are portrayed as a
zone of destitution and ruined collective farms, augment the problem.
A Belarusian identity is not in fashion today. Czykwin is traveling
around the minority gminas in connection with the coming into force of
the minority law. It permits geographical names to be established in
the minority language: “Elderly people are decidedly against this;
they say that they do not want to additionally irritate Poles,” he
reports. “Young people are bolder, but they are dampened by the dark
image of Belarusians as portrayed in Polish media.” The Belarusians’
mood was also affected by the downfall of the SLD, which they have
stuck by for years. “I will only say for myself: my mother associates
Belarusian’s civilizational advance with the PRL,” Czykwin says, but
he also points out that during the first elections Belarusians were on
the side of the Solidarity camp: “We were pushed into the embrace of
the left wing by the Catholicism and nationalism fighting it out
here. There is vast disappointment in the left, but in the forthcoming
elections it will transla te more into a low turnout?Belarusian voters
will not switch to other groups.”
Unknown Nations
The Kashubians, on the other hand, have consistently backed the
Solidarity camp since 1989. The UW [Freedom Union], and then the AWS
[Solidarity Electoral Action] won strong support among them, now there
is every indication that they will cast the most votes for the PO
[Civic Platform]. These sympathies did not help them in attaining the
status of a nation. The issue of their own statehood proved to be an
insurmountable obstacle: “We submitted a compromise request, for us to
be treated as an ethnic minority,” says Artur Jablonski, starosta
[powiat-level administration head] of Puck, chairman of the
Kashubian-Pomeranian Association. The Kashubians have their own
language, literature, and demonstrate clear cultural
distinctiveness. “But there was resistance; we were led to understand
that the commission would not consent to the proliferation of minority
entities. We did not go to battle over it so as not to hamper the
legislative process, because the law would still not have been
passed.” Suspended in a vacuum, the Kashubians nevertheless enjoy all
the benefits awarded to minorities. “And we do our own thing, even
so!” Jablonski adds.
Silesians, on the other hand, with 173,000 individuals the largest
minority in the census, want an explicit expression of this. In
February, the Regional Court in Katowice refused to register the Union
of People of Silesian Nationality. An application to this effect had
first been first submitted in 1996. That case made its way through all
the court levels in Poland, and ended up in 2004 before the Great
Chamber of the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which ruled that
the Polish courts had not violated their rights by refusing to
register the Silesians. The judges in Strasburg did not deal with
whether the Silesians constituted a nation or not, but rather pointed
out that in requesting registration the Silesian activists were
seeking election privileges.
The statutes were amended, but the court rejected them, stating
that only cosmetic changes had been made. “We are considering the
possibility of registering an association on the level of European
structures,” says Andrzej Roczniok, a leader of the new Silesian
national initiative. The Silesians will move heaven and earth to
achieve their goal. “Those in Warsaw will not manage to sweep the
largest minority in the country under the carpet,” he insists. In the
forthcoming elections to the Sejm, some of the Silesians want to run
on the tickets of the German minority, which are privileged in terms
of not having to cross the election threshold.
One can also expect tensions with respect to the Roma
minority. “Last year we received some 30 complaints from Roma,” we
were told by Gellert from the office of the civil rights
ombudsman. “We are attempting to assuage tensions, but it is clearly
evident that we understand them, but they are not trying to understand
us.” The Roma still utilize the topic of discrimination when applying
for asylum abroad.
Officially we are a Republic of nine nations and four ethnic
minorities. On paper, everything checks out, although this doesn’t
include any Vietnamese, Chinese, or individuals from the post-Soviet
republics at all. They will probably ultimately be found, and then we
will have a truer picture of the situation. The problems reported by
minorities still frequently come up against irritation and scorn; we
still consider them to be on the very fringe of the fringe. Although
many people believe that we are dealing here with a statistical error,
or with rare oddities against the wider Polish backdrop, it is
important to show some appreciation for these oddities. For the good
of the majority. And the EU is touchy on this issue.
[Box] Changes in Signs
In mid-March, the voivode of the Podlaskie Voivodship met with the
authorities of the 13 gminas where the regulations of the minority law
can be applied. “The voivode declared his assistance, but it was
astonishing that we did not notice any zeal to exercise the new
regulations in the 12 Belarusian gminas, even those where the minority
is in the clear majority,” says Marek Liberadzki, the viovode’s
officer for national and ethnic minorities. Perhaps our Belarusians
are waiting for some sort of practical models to follow. “We will wait
and see,” Liberadzki comments.
Applications could come in from the Punsk gmina in the voivodship’s
north eastern corner, which is three-quarters dominated by
Lithuanians. “We will begin by changing the signs along the entry and
exit roads to our villages,” says Witold Liszkowski, wojt [village
administration head] of Punsk. The voivode will finance this change;
putting up additional street signs is up to the gmina’s own
authorities. Neither is there any zeal in terms of changing the
orthographic rules for writing surnames. Perhaps they will appear
first in the personal identity cards of young Lithuanians.
“We are approaching this issue very practically,” the wojt
explains. Changing one’s personal identity card requires one to change
all one’s documents, including property records: “It’s a shame to
waste the time and money; what is most important is that we do have
such a right.” And in terms of the supplementary language in public
offices, the act only upholds the existing state of affairs: “All the
employees know Lithuanian, and in contacts with the population it has
for years been the primary language. Official letters are of course
written in the official language, and here probably nothing will
change.” They are issued, after all, in order to function in Poland.
[box] National and Ethnic Minorities
First figure: data from 1931 census?second figure: activists
estimates in 2002 — third figure: data from 2002 census
Belarusians [national minority] — 1 million — 200,000-300,000 —
50,000
Czechs [national minority] — 38,000 — 3,000 — 800
Karaims [ethnic minority] — 1,000 — 200 — 43
Kashubians [neither an ethnic minority nor a national minority] —
200,000 — 300,000-400,000 — 5,100
Lithuanians [national minority]: 8,000 — 20,000-25,000 — 5,800
Lemks [ethnic minority]: 1.2 million — 60,000-70,000 — 5,800
Germans [national minority]: 800,000 — 300,000-500,000 — 153,000
Armenians [national minority]: 6,000 — 5,000-8,000 — 1,100
Roma [ethnic minority]: 50,000 — 20,000-30,000 — 12,700
Russians [national minority] 140,000 — 10,000-15,000 — 6,100
Slovaks [national minority]: not accounted for — 10,000-20,000 — 2,000
Silesians [neither an ethnic minority nor national minority]: (no
figure) — (no figure) — 173,000
Tatars [ethnic minority] — 13,000 — 5,000 — 453
Ukrainians [national minority]: 3 million — 200,000-300,000 — 31,000
Jews [national minority]: 3 million — 8,000-10,000 — 1,100
Poland’s population in total: approx. 32 million — 38
million?approx. 39 million.
[Box] What Does the Law Give Them?
Individuals who belong to the minority have the right to: write
their names and surnames in accordance with the orthographic rules of
their language, to learn the minority language and to freely use it in
public and private life. In gminas where a minority exceeds 20 percent
of the population, its language can be used as a supplementary
language in public offices and used in the names of localities, sites,
and streets (with the exception of those names which were given by the
Third Reich or the USSR in the years 1933-1945). The public
authorities have the obligation to support cultural, publishing, and
educational activities of minorities (including through subsidies).
[The map shows the powiats [the middle level of Polish territorial
administration, larger than gminas, smaller than voivodships] where
national or ethnic minorities are strongly represented: Belarusians,
Lithuanians, Kashubians, and Germans.]