Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
June 14, 2005, Tuesday
IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS
SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No. 20, June 8-14, 2005, p. 10
by Sergei Minasyan – director of the Regional Security & South
Caucasus Integration Studies Center at the Russian-Armenian (Slavic)
State University
The process of military integration between CIS states has gradually
spread onto three levels: in the framework of the CIS, in the CST
format and on the bilateral basis. Since the very beginning Armenia
and Russia have been the most active and consistent adherents to the
military-political cooperation between CIS states. It turned out by
the late 1990s, that given ultimately opposite goals and tasks in the
security sphere of various CIS states, their military-political
cooperation proved to be inefficient. Simultaneously, certainty was
growing in Russia (…) that the future of this system could only be
in the framework of the CST and bilateral military-political contacts
between Russia and CST member countries.
Decisions passed at the Collective Security Council summit in Yerevan
(May 2001) proved to be a milestone event in the development of
military integration inside the CST, including consolidation of
Armenian-Russian military-political contacts. Attained was an
agreement on forming a regional bilateral group of forces in the
Caucasian direction. This combined group was supposed to include
units of the 102nd Russian Base in Armenia and units of the 5th Corps
of the Armenian Army. (…)
Summing up results of the present-day state and prospects of the
Armenian-Russian cooperation for development of military-political
integration in the post-Soviet defense area, it should be noted that
joint staff command and field exercises are held annually, which
unite all CSTO states and are conducted on a bilateral basis, for
instance the annual Russian-Armenian exercises at the Armavir
training ground.
A great deal of intergovernmental or interdepartmental treaties and
agreements concluded in 1992, makes the basis for the bilateral
Russian-Armenian military-political cooperation. The major part of
those treaties concerned division of military property of the former
Soviet Army units, stationed in Armenia, as well as the status of the
Russian Armed Forces in the republic. Under these agreements, Armenia
received the arms and military equipment of the 164th Mechanized
Infantry Division (MID) and the 15th MID, formerly parts of the 7th
Guard Army of the former Trans-Caucasian Military District, stationed
in Armenia; the 3rd division of the 7th Guard Army – the 127th MID
stationed in Pomri remained under control of Russia and was
transformed into the 102nd Military Base of the Russian Group of
Forces in the Caucasus (GRVZ) in 1995. Units of the former
Trans-Caucasian Border District in Armenia entered the Armenia group
of troops of the Russian Federal Border Service. At the same time,
the sides jointly finance the Russian border guards who protect the
Armenian border on Iran and Turkey. A number of bilateral agreements
reached in 1992-1995, including the Treaty on the Russian military
base in Armenia signed in Moscow on March 16, 1995, set the legal
basis for restructuring Russia’s military presence in Armenia.
However, the so-called “Big Treaty” – the Treaty on friendship,
cooperation and reciprocal defense, concluded on August 27, 1997,
became the major document regulating the bilateral military-political
cooperation.
Thus, the Russian forces stationed in Armenia now (in Gyumri,
Yerevan, and the Erebuni military airfield) include: the Combat
Management Group of the Russian Forces in Armenia, the 102nd Military
Base, the 426th Aviation Group and the 520th Aviation Command. The
Armenia group of the Russian border troops consists of four border
units. Overall, the Russian forces have 74 T-72 tanks, 17 BTR
vehicles, 129 infantry fighting vehicles, 84 artillery systems, 18
MiG-29 fighters, 2 batteries of S-300V antiaircraft missile systems,
a battery of Kub antiaircraft missile systems. Personnel strength
exceeds 3,500.
Military-technical cooperation is the most significant aspect of the
bilateral strategic partnership. In the division of Soviet military
munitions in 1992-1996, Russia handed over a certain amount of arms
and military equipment to Armenia.
No official reports on deliveries of Russia-made weapons to Armenia
have appeared since the second half of the 1990s. As is widely known,
the Russian-Armenian military-technical cooperation (MTC) mainly
includes supplies of spare parts by defense enterprises of both
states, rather than supplies of the finished military products. The
Russian-Armenian MTC has been underway since 1993, and is now being
carried out in the framework of the Interstate Military-Economic
Cooperation Commission between CIS States. The MTC with the Republic
of Armenia was suspended under Russian president’s Decree No. 623-rps
of September 9, 1993, in compliance with the UN Security Council
Resolution No. 853 on Nagorny Karabakh. Armenia wasn’t included into
the list of states to which deliveries of Russia-made military
products were permitted. In this connection, military supplies to
Armenia could solely be performed on the basis of Russian president’s
decisions. Putin signed the decree on terms of resuming supplies of
spare parts for the Russian military industrial complex from
Armenia’s defense enterprises, primarily equipment for the nuclear
powered submarines and S-300 antiaircraft missile systems, only in
December 2000. Only during his latest visit to Armenia in May 2004,
Russian defense minister declared the purchase of two Il-76 military
transports by Armenia and Russia’s assistance in upgrading the
available and purchasing new antiaircraft systems for the Armenian
army.
Cooperation in the sphere of air defense is a prior sphere of
Russian-Armenian MTC. This proceeds from availability of a serious
threat posed by the Turkish Air Force, to which the limited air
defense system of Armenia cannot resist at its present level without
the aid of Russia. The Air Defense Forces of Armenia have a certain
number of antiaircraft missile systems requiring upgrade, which
cannot be done without the aid of Russia. Besides, confined territory
of Armenia doesn’t allow space for a training ground. Therefore,
involvement in the joint air defense exercises is important for
Armenia. Unlike in other forces, the majority of Armenian air defense
officers are trained at Russian institutions of higher education.
Significant has been integration of automated control systems and
command posts of the Armenian Air & Air Defense Forces with similar
Russian systems, in particular those of the North Caucasian Military
District (SKVO). The joint combat duty of the air and air defense
forces began on April 15, 1999. In case of tension in the region,
this group could be replenished at the expense of the Russian Air
Defense Forces and deployment as extra air defense units of Armenia.
The latest S-300V air defense systems affiliated with the 102nd Base
of Russia joined combat duty in October 2001. This enabled raising
efficiency of control in the airspace above Armenia.
Creation of a joint Russian-Armenian group of forces is a significant
element in the bilateral cooperation. Its creation, the annual joint
exercises conducted at the Armavir training ground and have no
analogs in the post-Soviet area (by their regularity and number of
participants they were the biggest in the former Soviet area until
the start of 2000), and the general level of military cooperation
indicate that at the moment Russia has no as close military-political
cooperation as to Armenia (even with Belarus).
(…) The role of Russia’s military presence in the cause of ensuring
Armenia’s security goes beyond the presence of Russian military bases
on its territory. Comparison of quantitative parameters shows that
even the combined Russian-Armenian forces in Armenia yield
considerably to the armed forces in the neighboring states.
Article 2 of the Protocol on forming and functioning of the forces
and means of the Collective Security System of CSTO member states
says that in case of aggression against any of the sides collective
security groups of a certain region could be involved in repulsing an
aggression in another collective security region at request of a
single or several sides, under articles 4 and 6 of the CST. This
enables a suggestion that in case of an imminent threat of aggression
into Armenia, which is a CSTO member country, Russia will take all
the measures required to strengthen its troops to give the necessary
aid its ally needs to retaliate an aggression.
It is not a secret though that none of the CIS states, but for
Russia, is able to repulse threats autonomously in case of a
large-scale aggression. In similar circumstances the problem of
so-called “nuclear guarantees” on behalf of Russia for ensuring their
national security is of crucial significance for all CSTO member
countries. The main conceptual documents of Russia indicate Russia
resigns to itself the right for use of nuclear weapons in case of
aggression against Russia and its allies. The clauses of Russia’s
military doctrine which concern Russia’s readiness to use nuclear
weapons against the states which don’t have nuclear weapons, “in case
they attack the Russian Federation, the Russian Armed Forces or other
troops, its allies or a state with which it has security commitments,
maintained or supported by such a state, which doesn’t possess
nuclear weapons, jointly or in the availability of alliance
commitments to a state which possesses nuclear weapons,” becomes of
prior significance for CSTO member states, including Armenia.
It should be noted that along with active development of geopolitical
processes in the post-Soviet territory, experts both in Russia and
Armenia are casting doubt on the efficiency and conformity of the
military-political cooperation to their national interests. Russian
military experts maintain that in the context of potential withdrawal
of the Russian military bases from Georgia, the Russian group of
forces in Armenia might be disconnected from Russia operationally and
in the communications sphere, which would create serious problems for
its fighting efficiency and even normal functioning. A recent story
involving the ban for A-50 AWACS planes to fly above the territory of
Georgia to Armenia, which has affected the interaction of the Russian
and Armenian air defense forces, has been an evident example of this.
Moscow is quite cautious for Armenia’s more active attempt of
integration in the EU and NATO, expanding military cooperation
between Armenia and NATO, especially the USA, and is unwilling to
regard these actions as an objective necessity, which is to a great
extent caused by reduced influence of Russia in the region and
Yerevan’s wish to avert jeopardy to its national interests.
On the other hand, opinions are expressed in Armenia that the
Armenia-Russian military cooperation is no more a sufficient
guarantee for the country’s security and alternative security sources
must be sought in the West. Besides, Yerevan is confident that taking
actions in the region, as well as relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey,
and Iran, Moscow doesn’t fully account for economic and political
concerns of its major ally in the South Caucasus. In particular,
Armenia has serious fears regarding the plans of Russia on
large-scale supplies of arms and military equipment to Azerbaijan,
which is perceived by Yerevan as unwillingness of Moscow to account
for threats to security of its CSTO ally.
In spite of these problems, both Armenia and Russia realize that the
achieved level of bilateral military-political cooperation, which has
no analogs in the CIS and envisages quite real leverage for aiding in
crucial situations, is the only solution for both states in the
medium-term outlook. According to many experts, (…) active
Russian-Armenian partnership in the framework of CSTO defense
structures and their bilateral military partnership, which has
sufficient institutional and legal basis, are the major elements of
regional security and stability in the South Caucasus.
ORIGINAL-LANGUAGE: RUSSIAN