MURPHY’S LAW: A COSSACK TOO FAR
Strategy Page
Feb 3 2015
February 3, 2015: In eastern Ukraine (Donbas) most of the Russian
backed rebels are actually disorganized, discouraged and not all that
effective. Interrogations of captured rebels indicate that there are
many different factions, some of them not even from Ukraine. The most
colorful of these foreigners are the “Cossack” units from southern
Russia. The Cossacks are very nationalist, aggressive, persistent,
independent minded and really keen on rebuilding the Russian empire
(which is what Cossacks were invented for centuries ago). Actually
the Cossacks attract a wide array or rebellious Russians and many
of those in the Donbas are not keen on taking orders from anyone. So
one reason for sending more Russian troops in is to try and get the
Cossacks to do what Russia, not Cossack leaders, want. That’s not
the only problems the Russians are having with these guys. Cossacks
are a number of things, including righteous. Although poorly treated
by the communists, the Cossacks are believers in collectivism and
tend to be very hostile to corrupt leaders they come across. This
has caused problems in Russia and again in Donbas because some of
the local separatist rebel leaders are, for want of a better term,
quite corrupt. Cossacks accuse these leaders of stealing Russian
aid and taking care of themselves and their armed followers rather
that sticking with the goal of an independent Donbas or incorporation
into Russia. What is feared is the troublesome and righteous Cossacks
triggering a civil war among the rebels.
The Cossacks were welcome arrivals when they showed up in 2014, because
the original local Donbas rebels quickly lost their enthusiasm when
their uprising triggered a nationalistic fervor throughout Ukraine and
inspired Ukrainian troops and armed volunteers to fight a lot harder
than the rebels expected. Russia, which sponsored and encouraged the
rebels from the start soon found that the only way they could take
territory was to send in Russian troops and heavy weapons (tanks,
artillery, rocket launchers, missiles). The special operations units
(Spetsnaz) were the best for this because these guys knew how to
pretend (that they were Ukrainian rebels) and were very effective
fighters. But there not enough of them available and regular Russian
troops (which are mainly conscripts) had to be sent in as well,
especially for support (transport and supply) functions. Soon it was
Russian troops leading in any offensives with the local rebels and
other volunteers (like the Cossacks and such from Russia) handling
occupation of newly conquered territory. These imported rebels and
conscript troops did not do much to hide who they were and where they
were from.
Elsewhere in Russia the Cossacks have been less trouble and more
useful. The Cossacks are also being used to try and replace all
the Russian inhabitants of the Caucasus who have been driven out by
nationalist rebels and Islamic terrorists. Russia had, over the last
two centuries, encouraged ethnic Russians to settle in the Caucasus
in order to help maintain Russian control of an often-hostile native
population. With the collapse of the empire (the Soviet Union) in
1991 there was no money left to subsidize the ethnic Russians in the
Caucasus. That, as much as the anti-Russian attitudes of the natives,
prompted most Russians to leave. Now the Russian government is using
an old solution to get more ethnic Russians back into the Caucasus;
it’s sending in the Cossacks.
The Cossack people are ethnic Russians with a distinct language and
culture (not quite Russian) and strong ties to the Russian Orthodox
Church. There are about seven million Cossacks in Russia, Ukraine,
and other portions of the former Soviet Union. Their involvement
in Russian wars goes back centuries. During Tsarist times, Cossacks
formed special cavalry units in the Imperial Russian Army, as well
serving as instruments of state repression. The Russian Empire had a
special arrangement with the Cossacks whereby, in exchange for frontier
land, greater political autonomy, and special social status, Cossacks
contributed military forces, providing their own horses, weapons,
and equipment. Unique, exclusively Cossack military formations have
been a staple of Russian history in one way or another for many,
many centuries. Cossacks were also notorious for their willingness
to do the czar’s dirty work, especially in the Caucasus.
Opinions on the actual military value of Cossack units is widely
divided, as are opinions of the Cossacks themselves. At many points
in Russian military history the Cossacks proved themselves to be
determined and fierce, sometimes to the point of recklessness,
warriors, and there are examples of entire Cossack units fighting
to the death against impossible odds. During the Napoleonic Wars
and the French invasion of Russia in 1812 Cossack units, mostly as
light cavalry, operated extremely effectively as scouts and raiders,
harassing the retreating French army mercilessly. Their performance
against regular troops in open battle was less than great, but then
that wasn’t their role anyway.
On the other hand Cossack units, from the days of Peter the Great
until modern time, have a well-deserved reputation for brutality,
anti-Semitism, and looting. They have always been notoriously difficult
to control, with Russian officers in past wars becoming frustrated
and enraged with drunken, mutinous Cossack soldiers. During the
Russian Civil War, Cossacks fought for both sides, especially for the
anti-Communist White forces, but they were often divisive, unreliable,
and preoccupied with looting and general destruction.
Also, many Russians regarded them as potential rebels, given their
unruly history, large numbers, and independent-minded spirit, and
those familiar with history know that for a two century period, every
major rebellion against the Russian Empire was led by Cossack troops.
During the Soviet period, Cossacks were among the many ill-treated
minorities, having their distinct culture and language suppressed by
the Communist authorities.
Since the 1990s Cossacks are once again involved in Russian conflicts.
In an effort to bolster national pride and recover some of the distinct
Russian heritage that was suppressed during 70 years of Soviet rule
Russia has officially brought back the formation of exclusively
Cossack military units, and in a big way. This has accompanied a
general explosion of Cossack culture in recent years.
Cossack military schools have been established, where student ages
10 to 17 attend classes in army fatigues and learn military tactics
alongside regular academic subjects. An entire Kuban Cossack Army,
headquartered in Krasnodar, has been established and is incorporated
as a unique, but fully integrated, part of the Russian Army. The
Russian Minister for Cossack Affairs, general Gennady Troshev (until
his death in 2009) was a Cossack himself and had been instrumental
in the remilitarization of the Cossack society.
Irregular Cossack paramilitary units fought on the Russian/separatist
side in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, which saw South Ossetia taken
from Georgia and made a de facto part of Russia. Cossack volunteers
by the hundreds mobilized during the Georgian attack of South Ossetia
and crossed the border to engage Georgian forces. Cossacks in nearby
North Ossetia apparently organized a relatively efficient and rapid
system for clothing, equipping and transporting their paramilitaries
into the breakaway province to feed them into combat. Cossack fighters
entered South Ossetia by bus, having been issued combat uniforms and
gear on the way to the border, and were issued small arms and light
weapons once they arrived at the border. Cossack volunteers formed
the second major paramilitary force in the war, the first being the
South Ossetian militias. According to reports, the Cossack forces
fought with dogged determination. Russian army commanders noted the
effectiveness of the Cossacks in Georgia which appears to be why the
Cossacks showed up in Donbas so quickly. The big difference is that
Russian forces soon withdrew from most of Georgia while in Donbas
the conflict has gone on for months.
Paramilitary forces and semi-standing armies of “volunteers”,
of various ethnic and political lines, are a major part of armed
conflict in Russia and the former Soviet Union, particularly among
Slavic ethnicities. Such forces exist in disputed territories between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, where a majority of ethnic Armenians live in
the unrecognized Republic of Nogorno-Karabakh. The Nogorno-Karabakh
Defense Army is the formal defense force of the Nogorno-Karabakh
Republic. Similar forces exist in both breakaway republics of South
Ossetia and Azkaban. Now Cossacks are trying to settle down in eastern
Ukraine (parts of which were once “Cossack lands”).
The new Russian policy is to encourage, with cash investments and
monthly payments to adult Cossacks willing to undergo military
training, the establishment of Cossack communities in the Caucasus.
These towns and villages would be in touch with the surrounding
non-Cossack population and able, if there were problems with the
natives, to defend themselves until Russian reinforcements show up.
That’s a strategy that is centuries old and Russia sees it
as succeeding again. The Caucasus natives have a long-standing
dislike for the Cossacks, but at the same time fear and respect them,
especially when the Cossacks are acting as paramilitary forces. But
in Ukraine the Cossacks often led Ukrainian rebellions against the
Russian government. That distant memory is now being reexamined in
Moscow and the policies of how to use the Cossacks being reconsidered.