Emergency in Azerbaijani Army

Emergency in Azerbaijani Army

Siranuysh Papyan, Interviewer
Interview – 02 April 2015, 16:21

The situation at the state border can be defined as stable escalation.
I think there is no reason to think that the Azerbaijani side will
observe the ceasefire.

The fact is that since the crackdown in the forest of Gyulistan a few
weeks ago the enemy has not attempted another attack against us. It is
also a fact that what happened on those days was one of the biggest
failures of the Azerbaijani army in the recent time. Over this time
Baku has been busy with “selling its losses”. Considering the
demoralizing potential of one-time high toll, this time too the enemy
used its frequent trick, i.e. inform the public on part of the losses,
gradually, with intervals of several days.

Currently, unprecedented attempts are made in Azerbaijan to prevent
spread of news on border incidents. There is information on total
control over the telephone conversations of soldiers. Even superficial
mentioning the situation at the border during telephone conversations
of soldiers will result in criminal liability. In other words,
everything is being done to keep the public unaware of the failures of
the Azerbaijani army and especially their enumerable losses. Judging
by this style, Baku is apparently afraid that the Azerbaijani
population will “break down” after such failures, the Transcaucasian
Turks will become convinced that they are dealing with a strong enemy,
will put up with the loss of the territory of Artsakh. Nevertheless,
we must be ready that as soon as the enemy comes round from this
failure, it will again resort to aggression.

Mr. Jamalyan, the servicemen killed at the border are mostly 18-20
year olds who are at the front line. What is your opinion, how should
this issue be resolved?

This issue actualizes regularly. Why are the conscripts standing along
the border? The concern of our compatriots is understood. What can I
say about this?

First, unfortunately, not only conscripts but also contractual
servicemen and commanders are killed at the border. A considerable
section of the border is guarded by contractual units. Moreover, the
process of recruitment of contractual units is actively going on.
Every citizen of the country can roll up for military service. As to
conscripts, they do their job well. Evidence to this is the failed
attacks of the enemy. After all, the front units accept the strike the
first.

We must be realistic. We cannot refrain from involving conscripts in
the protection of the state border – the country has limited
resources. Our goal is to make sentry duty safer. This is an ever
actual problem, Minister Ohanyan’s focus of constant concern. By the
way, Minister Ohanyan himself has authored a number of peculiar
engineering solutions for the improvement of military posts.

Freedom fighters announce now and then that they are beside soldiers,
they must be at the front line.

The readiness of the freedom fighters to defend the border is the
proof that we are strong, we are proud of this. Last August, as well
as on these days we understood that our freedom fighters are beside
our soldiers at the border. Last August my impression was that our
freedom fighters who visited the positions were missing the defeating
of Turks. But I would like to stress that our freedom fighters back
our army and are one of its main forces but the freedom fighters
cannot replace the professional army. A few days ago our front units
pushed back the offensive of the enemy’s elite units in the forests of
Artsakh, chased them and destroyed them. What other proof of defense
capability is needed to become convinced that our army is
professional. It is another issue that we should not be overwhelmed
with success. The army is a living being and sustaining such level of
defense capability requires daily, invisible work requiring immense
energy.

It is very important for the enemy to believe that our units on sentry
duty are capable. The point is that the enemy’s reconnaissance intends
to reveal the vulnerable spots of our defense. In this regard, our
victory at Gyulistan is notable because it prevented a large-scale
aggression.

What details of the incident of Gyulistan are known to you? How did
the Azerbaijani reconnaissance fail?

I think we need to go into detail. The reinforced commando could not
break through our defense, and shortly after the fight started it
recoiled and retreated chaotically. In addition, the fight began in
the area between the positions where we and the enemy were in equal
conditions, not near the position where our staff, being defended, has
an initial advantage over the commando. Even in this case the enemy
could not startle our conscripts. I would like to underline that the
guys fought in an organized way, were more resistant and with the help
of the forces sent from neighboring positions they were able to send
the enemy running.

It is also notable that high-ranking officials were participating in
the fight. Shortly after the fight began Lieutenant General Hakobyan,
the commander of the Defense Army, arrived. In other words, we kept
the situation under control. Our chasing units professionally used
controllable fire to force the enemy towards a minefield, in the
result of which the enemy sustained more losses. On the whole, the
enemy had around 20 losses, over ten were wounded. The greatest
success of the enemy was the evacuation of the bodies and the injured
personnel from the battlefield.

I don’t want to exaggerate what happened, paint it in brighter colors.
We had painful losses and we bow to their families. But we also have a
reason to be proud. It is very important for our compatriots to learn
about the feat of our front units, trust that work is being done in
the army which is producing results. I have had an opportunity to say
and I repeat that such an army deserves the trust of its people.

What are the conclusions from the failure of the enemy’s commando?

Although one cannot underestimate one’s enemy, nevertheless, the fact
is that the Azerbaijani army lacks professional personnel. We have
information that in the subversive operations of the recent period,
namely after the August beating, the enemy has been involving veterans
of war for a significant fee. There is a question why. I think the
answer is obvious – the lack of personnel who are psychologically
ready to fight, who can stand a battle, because one of the most weak
sides of the enemy is the chaotic retreat of the members of commandoes
shortly after the beginning of the fight. In other words, the enemy is
trying to fill in the gap of personnel ready to fight all the way
through with hired veterans. I think you will agree that this is a
desperate action because, I repeat, it indicates insufficient training
of special units. On the other hand, involving hired veterans in
special operations is convenient in terms of hiding the possible
losses. You know, we can hardly imagine that but hiding the death of
soldiers killed in a battle is something very typical of the
Azerbaijani reality. There is information that the hired veterans
acknowledge in written form that their relatives will not be informed
if they die in a battle. Anyway, even the involvement of hired
veterans did not produce the anticipated result.

What is the way out of this situation?

I have stated earlier that the enemy’s recent commando and sniper
activity, aside from military purposes, intends to shape an unhealthy
psychological atmosphere in Armenia. The enemy is trying to create the
impression of permanent killings and mature the idea of surrendering
liberated Artsakh against this heavy psychological backdrop. And since
we have no right to cede even a patch of land, we have only one way
out – painful counteraction.

Minister Ohanyan has set one goal before his team – not to wait until
the Azerbaijani side will take the initiative, hit all the time and
painfully, not letting the enemy to come round. Thanks to this we have
prevented a lot of attacks recently. It will continue until Azerbaijan
acknowledges that it has lost Artsakh forever.

From: A. Papazian

http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/interview/view/33871