Will Tbilisi facilitate an anti-Aliev revolution in Azerbaijan

Eurasia Daily Monitor
The Jamestown Foundation
Sept 13 2005

WILL TBILISI FACILITATE AN ANTI-ALIEV REVOLUTION IN AZERBAIJAN?

By Zaal Anjaparidze

Monday, September 12, 2005

In recent weeks both the Georgian and the Azerbaijani media have
actively speculated whether the government of Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili would support a popular revolution in neighboring
Azerbaijan. Some analysts tend to link the recently cooled relations
between Tbilisi and Baku with this issue.

On August 26 Azerbaijan’s State Border Service detained a Georgian
citizen, Merab Jibuti, for illegally crossing the border of
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani law-enforcement officials claim that Jibuti
was connected with the Azerbaijani opposition youth movement Yeni
Fikir (New Thinking), and he reportedly admitted to attending a
secret meeting with Yeni Fikir leader Ruslan Bashirli and his
associates in Tbilisi on July 28-29. Moreover, Bashirli, who was
arrested on August 3 on charges of plotting a coup in Azerbaijan, met
with an Armenian special services agent in Tbilisi and received cash
from him to organize public unrest in Baku. Against the backdrop of
hitherto good Georgian-Azerbaijani relations, this widely advertised
news could not pass unnoticed.

Before this incident Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev had told
border service officials on August 17 that he would not spare any
money in improving control over the border with Georgia in order to
“preserve stability in Azerbaijan.” Aliev’s statement was clear
evidence of Baku’s concerns.

On August 29, the Georgian Intelligence Agency confirmed reports by
Georgian and Azerbaijani media outlet that Batu Kutelia, chief of
Georgian intelligence, had visited Azerbaijan and met with Aliev to
discuss bilateral issues, including cooperation between the Georgian
and Azerbaijani special services to ensure the security of the
region. Meanwhile, the Georgian Interior Ministry denied that
Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili had visited Baku on August 15,
while the Azerbaijani media reported that Merabishvili had met with
Aliev. Georgian media speculated that both of these visits were
linked to the investigation of an alleged revolutionary plot in
Azerbaijan and aimed at warming the chilly relations between Aliev
and Saakashvili.

Symptomatically, on September 6 Saakashvili openly stated that
Georgia’s top priority is the victory of democracy worldwide.
Therefore Georgia would always support democracy in any region but
would do so within the parameters of the law. Saakashvili made this
announcement when he welcomed home two activists from the Georgian
youth movement Kmara (Enough) after they had been detained in Belarus
for one week for training the Belarusian opposition youth
organization Zubr in methods of civil disobedience. Kmara was modeled
after the Yugoslav youth group Otpor. It was a key player in the
Georgian Rose Revolution and a contributor to the Ukrainian Orange
Revolution.

The Azerbaijani media, both pro-governmental and opposition, have
actively speculated about the possibilities of a Western supported
“color revolution” in Azerbaijan and the inevitable replacement of
Aliev by an “Azerbaijani Saakashvili.” Russian analysts have
anxiously noted that the Azerbaijani opposition widely uses the
methods tested during the Rose and Orange Revolutions, hinting at the
possible involvement of Georgian envoys in training the anti-Aliev
opposition (RBK, August 17; Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 29). Some
supporters of Aliev have also accused Tbilisi of clandestinely
supporting the anti-Aliev opposition groups.

Aliev and his entourage likely suspect that Saakashvili might be
willing to sacrifice his friendship with Aliev to cause of global
democracy. Symptomatically, Aliev has so far refused to join the
declaration about a “Commonwealth of Democratic Choice,” that
Saakashvili and his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yushchenko signed at
the Georgian health-resort Borjomi on August 12 (see EDM, August 15).

Most Georgian officials and analysts have vehemently excluded any
possibility of Georgia’s involvement in the would-be revolution in
Azerbaijan.

Any support of an anti-Aliev revolution in Azerbaijan looks almost
suicidal for Georgia both politically and economically, taking into
account neighborly relations and Georgia’s dependence on Azerbaijan’s
goodwill regarding the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and other joint
international energy projects. However, Saakashvili’s opposition
argues that the concerns of Azerbaijani officials over Saakashvili’s
“revolutionary” plans are not groundless, because Saakashvili wants
to curry favor with the West.

Givi Targamadze, chair of the Georgian parliamentary committee for
defense and security, who was an informal consultant for the Kyrgyz
“Tulip Revolution” (see EDM, March 25) said that the Georgian
government “must help and helps indeed” the nationwide public
movements that fight the authoritarian rules “but it is not any kind
of force that plans revolution.” “So far, I don’t see this kind of
movement in Azerbaijan,” he added. Targamadze, a former member of the
influential NGO Liberty Institute, however said that some attempts
“on the level of individual initiative” might take place.

Meanwhile, Levan Ramishvili, director of the Liberty Institute, said
that although Georgian state bodies must not be involved in the
internal processes of Azerbaijan, “The NGOs’ hands are unbound in
this respect.” “We have contacts with certain Azerbaijani NGOs. We
share with them our experience on how to make the changes in a
bloodless way,” he added.

The meeting between Aliev and Saakashvili on the sidelines of the
August 26-27 Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Kazan was
quite cool, sources say. This suggests that, contrary to the claims
by some Georgian officials, the Azerbaijani leadership remains
concerned about the Georgian leadership’s plans regarding the
situation in Azerbaijan.

(Resonance, August 18, 21; , August 26; Civil Georgia,
Turan, Regnum, RBC daily, August 30;Caucasus Press, September 6)

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