Politcom.ru, Russia July 11 2017 Hot July in Nagornyy Karabakh by Sergey Markedonov [Armenian News note: the below is translated from Russian] Things are once again unsettled in Nagornyy Karabakh. The latest armed flare-up has occurred on the line of contact of the parties to the conflict. Against a background of numerous violations of the cease-fire regime, the events of 4 and 7 July 2017 stood out particularly. As usual, Yerevan and Baku give their own version of the events, and the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group are eager to avoid unambiguous assessments, stressing the impermissibility of military incidents and the need for negotiations in point of substance. The July outbreak of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation was not the first of its kind and will most likely not be the last. Military flareups intermixed with negotiations and diplomatic summits long since firmly became an important element of the peace process. This point appears paradoxical only at first sight. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan derive certain benefits from the armed flareups. Baku is attempting with strong-arm pressure to alter in its favour the position of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group. The balancing on the brink of a big war and permanent military alert is to prompt in Russia, the United States, and France and also Iran, which is outside of the Minsk Group, the thought that all-around pressure on Armenia to coerce it into concessions should be intensified to prevent great bloodshed and regional instability. And Baku is attempting to represent Yerevan's readiness for negotiations, despite the regular violations of the truce, as visible proof that the Armenians intend to give up their maximalist dispositions. How far this representation corresponds to reality is another question. Exactly the other way about, no solid evidence in support of the Azerbaijani version has been presented as of this time. But it is being vigorously promoted in the information space not only within the Caspian republic but also in Russia, the European Union countries, and the United States, hereby becoming an additional political and diplomatic instrument. Yerevan, though, is attempting to demonstrate the intractability of the Azerbaijanis and their exclusive commitment to force instead of dialogue. Following last year's "four-day war," comparison of Azerbaijan with the Islamic State terrorist outfit, which is banned in Russia and a number of other countries, has become a commonplace in the speeches of Armenian politicians and diplomats. Eduard Nalbandyan, head of the Armenian Foreign Ministry, employed this metaphor at a briefing on 10 July 2017 at the outcome of the Chisinau meeting of foreign ministers of Eastern Partnership states. Neither Baku nor Yerevan are abandoning the negotiating process in principle here even after the new outbreaks of violence and casualties on the line of contact. To what extent does the July flareup stand out against the background of previous clashes which have occurred this year? Does it testify to some new trends in the development of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or, on the contrary, confirm the old trends? For an answer to these questions we shall consider briefly the events context. In 2017 we have observed several outbreaks of armed confrontation on the line of the contact of the parties to the conflict. The incidents in the early hours of 25 February, 15-17 May, and 16-17 June were of the largest scale. It should be noted also that the February flareup occurred a week after the negotiations with the participation of the heads of the foreign ministries of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. The May flareup occurred shortly after of the working visit of the foreign ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in Moscow. The June flareup is a special case. It occurred not before and not after the traditional regional visit of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group but during a short break in their tour. I would point out that the Caucasus visit of the mediator diplomats began on 10, continued on 12, and concluded on 19 June. The clashes, though, occurred 16-17 June, following the visit to Yerevan and Stepanakert and just prior to the visit of the Minsk Group co-chairmen to Baku. The July flareup developed largely per a similar algorithm. On 3 July 2017 the mediator diplomats in Vienna held a meeting (effectually a presentation of the results of their regional visit) with members of the Group. The report of the Minsk Group co-chairmen took place against the background of the preparation of an unofficial ministerial meeting of the heads of the foreign ministries of the OSCE members n Austria's Mayerbach. This event was planned for 11 June, "the building of trust through dialogue and cooperation," primarily in the process of a settlement of ethno-political conflicts, was declared its main slogan. You can criticize the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group and the Minsk Group as a whole for its low level of effectiveness as much as you like. But the proposition that a stimulation of "negotiations in point of substance" (not imitation meetings, that is, but a format which could culminate in the achievement of practical compromise solutions) should become the attainment of a certain level of trust between the antagonists sounds as the recurrent theme in its statements. The mediators may help achieve this goal, but they cannot substitute for the parties to the conflict themselves. Meanwhile, all that we had already seen in February, May, and June has been repeated in July also. Incidents outside the village of Alxanli of Fizuli District, as a result of which there were casualties among the peaceful citizens also, occurred literally the day after the presentation of the results of the regional tour of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairman. The Azerbaijanis represented the subsequent actions of 7 July as revenge for the victims of Alxanli, the Armenian military, in turn, spoke of the other side's employment of the civilian population as a "living shield". The week between the Vienna report and the ministerial meeting in Mayerbach (at which negotiations of the heads of the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Eduard Nalbandyan and Elmar Mamedyarov, had been anticipated) thus took in a new flareup. It should be noted here that the representatives of both Baku and Yerevan were in no hurry to dissociate themselves either from participation in the informal meeting in the Eastern Partnership format in Moldova or from the OSCE ministerial meeting in Austria. The books are not being closed on the negotiating process. But a no less important storyline, aside from the mere fact of diplomatic dialogue, is the substance of the negotiations. Yet on the fundamental points of a settlement no progress has been observed. The status of Nagornyy, the de-occupation of the adjacent areas, and the refugee problem remain stumbling-blocks. There are no hints of a possible compromise on these issues. We are thus observing a "flight from substance". And this policy is entirely rational and consistent. Both parties fear a withdrawal into isolation, with which a total renunciation of peace negotiations is fraught. But they are no less (if not more) afraid of a solution of the core issues. Putting them on the current agenda is practically impossible if each time the latest round of meetings and diplomatic consultations is followed by a violation of the truce and accusations against the other side of perfidy and an unwillingness to make concessions. Simply because after new armed exacerbations the peace process would need to be "salvaged". And this "salvage" would take some time. Both other provocations and casualties in this time are not ruled out. Once again, as in February, May, and June, there has been talk in July of the need to comply with the accords arrived at during last year's negotiations in Vienna and Saint Petersburg and last year's ministerial meeting in Moscow. Their common spirit is the proposition concerning stabilization of the situation in the conflict zone as the base prerequisite for passage to substantive negotiations. But without effective mechanisms of the prevention of military incidents, progress in this direction is practically impossible. But there are many obstacles to the creation of an effective set of instruments for preventing new flareups. Naming each time the party guilty of having incited the confrontation? A certain disbalance in this case is not ruled out, and with this the mediators' negative perception of one party to the conflict would grow. This is fraught with alienation from the negotiations as such and, in consequence, the de-legitimization of the present format, even an "unfreezing" of the confrontation. Increasing the political will? But without a fundamental improvement in relations between Russia and the West this is hardly possible, considering that the significance of Karabakh for Moscow and Washington today cannot be compared with Syria or Ukraine. The Karabakh trends in July 2017 also thus remain as before: maintenance of the peace process for the prevention of a large-scale war and the incitement of regular flareups for pressure on the opponent and the mediators at the negotiating table.