NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A PLAN FOR PEACE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
International Crisis Group, Belgium
Tbilisi/Brussels, 11 October 2005
Europe Report N°167
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Settlement of the long running Nagorno-Karabakh conflict — the most
significant obstacle to stability in the South Caucasus — remains
elusive, despite more optimistic noises recently from Azerbaijan and
Armenia. Eleven years after the 1994 ceasefire, burgeoning defence
budgets, increasing ceasefire violations, and continuing demonisation
by each side of the other side are ominous signs that time for a peace
agreement is running out. But a compromise can now be constructed
around an approach that, while addressing all the matters in dispute,
leaves the core issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s ultimate status open for
later resolution, after other measures have been put in place.
Key elements of that proposed settlement package include the
withdrawal of the Armenia-backed Nagorno-Karabakh forces from
the occupied districts of Azerbaijan surrounding the entity; the
renunciation by Azerbaijan of the use of force to reintegrate the
entity; the deployment of international peacekeepers; the return
of displaced persons; and the re-opening of trade and communication
links. Nagorno-Karabakh’s status should ultimately be determined by an
internationally sanctioned referendum with the exclusive participation
of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris, but only after the above measures
have been implemented. Until then Nagorno-Karabakh would remain part
of Azerbaijan, though in practical terms it would be self-governing
and enjoy an internationally acknowledged interim status.
Today Armenia and Azerbaijan remain divided on vital points.
Azerbaijan does not accept any compromise of its territorial integrity,
nor does it agree that Nagorno-Karabakh’s population alone can vote
on determining its final status. Armenia is not willing to support
withdrawal from the seven occupied districts around Nagorno-Karabakh,
or allow the return of Azerbaijan internally displaced persons (IDPs)
to Nagorno-Karabakh, until the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh is a
reality. There has been tentative discussion of a possible plebiscite
to determine the entity’s final status, but with none of the necessary
detail agreed as to who would vote on what, when and how, nor any
agreement as to what other settlement conditions would create the
context for such a vote.
The Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), currently co-chaired by France, Russia and the U.S.,
has been facilitating negotiations since 1994. After a decade of
fruitless talks, a new format of meetings, the Prague Process,
involving direct bilateral contact between the foreign ministers
of Armenia and Azerbaijan was initiated in 2004. During the past
twelve months the participants and OSCE co-chairs alike have publicly
expressed optimism that a deal can be reached soon. But there is an
urgent need to translate that generalised optimism into very specific
agreement and action.
An earlier Crisis Group report explored how the Armenian and Azeri
communities of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts live
today and view resolution of the conflict.[1] Against that background,
this report examines the causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
analyses the OSCE-led negotiations process as it has evolved since
1992, and identifies the necessary elements of a workable and
achievable peace plan.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To Avoid a Resumption of Fighting:
1. All parties to the conflict should respect the 1994 ceasefire,
refrain from using force, not promote the use of force, and end the
arms race in the region by halting the rise of defence budgets.
To Create an Appropriate Environment for Conflict Settlement:
2. Azerbaijan should resume direct contact with the de facto
Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and facilitate the development of closer
contact between Karabakh Azeris and Karabakh Armenians.
3. The de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should end support
for settlement of formerly Azeri majority areas with Armenians,
including by:
(a) stopping privatisation of land, homes and businesses in those
areas;
(b) ceasing to establish local administrations and infrastructure in
the occupied areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh; and
(c) protecting the remaining Azeri homes.
4. Armenia should encourage the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities
to take a more conciliatory stance on resolution of the conflict.
To Address the Substantive Matters in Dispute:
5. The parties should sign an agreement that includes the following
elements:
(a) renunciation of the threat or use of force to settle disputes,
including any that may arise in connection with the implementation
of the peace agreement;
(b) creation of a joint commission including Azerbaijan and
Nagorno-Karabakh representatives and chaired by the OSCE to supervise
implementation;
(c) incremental withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces backed by
Armenia from all occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, but
beginning with five districts and occurring simultaneously with the
deployment of international peacekeepers;
(d) withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces backed by Armenia from the
Kelbajar district once appropriate security measures are in place
at the Murov mountain pass, and from the Lachin district following
agreements guaranteeing secure communications through the Lachin
corridor;
(e) safe and voluntary return of displaced persons to their pre-war
homes in the formerly occupied districts, once withdrawal and
international deployment have been completed;
(f) assurances for free movement of people and goods, including the
lifting of all blockades and the reopening of all transport and trade
routes (road and rail) closed as a result of the conflict;
(g) implementation of confidence-building measures in cooperation with
international organisations including the UN, International Committee
of the Red Cross, OSCE and non-governmental organisations; and
(h) identification of a referendum mechanism for resolving the final
status of Nagorno-Karabakh, as set out below, with provision until
then for the entity to have internationally recognised interim status,
and its governing bodies to be elected under international supervision.
6. The final status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be decided by a
self-determination referendum, which would:
(a) be held after the return of displaced Azeris to former
Azeri-majority areas in Nagorno-Karabakh and after an international
conference determines that Nagorno-Karabakh has met international
preconditions for statehood, including the protection of minority
rights, such review to be conducted for the first time five years
after the signing of the peace agreement;
(b) give Nagorno-Karabakh an appropriate range of options, including
unity with, and secession from, Azerbaijan;
(c) be held with the exclusive participation of Karabakh Armenians
and Azeris; and
(d) have its exact modalities agreed upon in talks chaired by the OSCE,
based on the principle that all parties will recognise the validity
of its result.
To Facilitate Public Acceptance of the Settlement:
7. Azerbaijan should allow Karabakh Azeris to play a bigger role
in the negotiations and the internal political process, including
by passing legislation allowing Karabakh Azeris to elect the head
of their community, ensuring voting rights for displaced persons in
the 2005 parliamentary elections, and permitting all candidates to
campaign in collective centres.
8. Government officials and media in Azerbaijan and Armenia should
refrain from using belligerent and xenophobic language against
“the other”.
9. Officials involved in the negotiations process should agree to
a broad common strategy for disseminating information about that
process, coordinate efforts to present to the public elements of a
possible agreement, and not be reluctant to start a debate on highly
sensitive questions.
To Build Confidence and Guarantee Sustainable Peace:
10. Donors should assist Armenia and Azerbaijan in developing and
carrying out small, cross-border, sub-regional trade, humanitarian
and public health projects, including in response to disasters, and
should fund and help carry out programs aimed at improving mutual
understanding, tolerance and reconciliation that target civil society,
teachers and journalists.
11. Donors should carry out a common assessment mission of needs in
Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied districts, and once a peace
agreement is signed should hold an international donor coordination
conference and begin implementing projects in the former conflict zone.
12. Armenia and Azerbaijan should each investigate war crimes,
prosecute those responsible and adopt legislation to give amnesty
to those who participated in the conflict but did not commit serious
offences.
13. Armenia and Azerbaijan should establish joint commissions to:
(a) make a political assessment of the conflict’s causes and
consequences; and
(b) deal with inter-state property return and compensation questions.
To Increase the Prospects for a Peace Agreement and to Give It
Stability:
14. The UN Security Council, the OSCE and the EU Council of Ministers
should pledge to serve as guarantors of the peace agreement.
15. The OSCE should expand the mandate of the Personal Representative
of the Chairman-in-Office to include working with civil society,
media and opposition political forces in order to facilitate contacts
between the sides at the local level and build confidence and opening
an office in the occupied territories, staffed with political, human
rights and elections officers.
16. The EU should become more actively engaged in the conflict
resolution effort by basing the office of its Special Representative
for the South Caucasus in the region.
17. The EU should include long-term programs and strategies to promote
confidence building in its Action Plans with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
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[1] Crisis Group Europe Report N°166, Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the
Conflict from the Ground, 14 September 2005.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress