In the late 1990s, the former Carter administration Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, characterised Azerbaijan and Ukraine as “geopolitical pivots” that were key nodes of regional power configuration, due to their strategic location on the post-Cold War European fault lines.
Today’s developments in and around the borders of these countries show they still continue to play a pivotal role in regional geopolitics, especially in the context of deterioration of the post-Cold War European security system. As Brzezinski argued, the future of Azerbaijan and Ukraine will be crucial in defining what Russia might or might not become, and thus the West ought to seek closer engagement with these two Eastern Partnership countries.
However, the Biden administration’s recent unbalanced approach to Armenia, a Russian ally, and Azerbaijan cast a shadow on the U.S.’ strategic partnership with the latter.
The American President’s invitation to Armenia to participate in the Summit for Democracy last December, while omitting Azerbaijan and Turkey, was viewed as a needless gesture at a time of a deepening security crisis in Europe, with Russia putting forward claims to spheres of influence and the West refusing to accept it. At the same time, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s meeting with his Armenian counterpart Armen Grigoryan in Washington on December 15, to discuss developments on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, provoked Baku’s ire as the Azerbaijani side was not offered a similar opportunity.
President Aliyev said pro-Armenian bias in Washington’s South Caucasus policy is its own business, but it could have repercussions for bilateral relations with Azerbaijan.
A month later, ironically, it was Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who jumped on the Russian bandwagon to send troops to Kazakhstan, as part of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) mission to clamp down on anti-government protests in major cities.
It should be noted that Pashinyan, who took power on the back of popular protests in 2018, characterised the civil unrest in Kazakhstan as externally orchestrated. According to Armenia’s leader, the unrest was sufficient to trigger Article 4 of the CSTO charter on mutual assistance.
By contributing to Russia’s efforts to prop up an authoritarian regime in the neighbourhood, Yerevan, on the one hand, showed its cards in the deepening divide between the democratic West and authoritarian Russia. As part of this “Holy Alliance” with Russia and Belarus, Armenia showed the lengths to which it is willing to go to preserve authoritarian stability in CSTO countries.
On the other hand, Armenia’s close involvement in the Central Asian nation – dubbed as ‘a mere pawn in Russia’s Kazakhstan strategy’ – amounted to nothing less than to serve Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions in the post-Soviet space, that recently became much clearer in the Kremlin’s ultimatum to the U.S. and NATO.
Yerevan`s support to the Kremlin`s overseas adventures is not new: back in February 2019, the Armenian side dispatched military servicemen, as part of the broad Russian engagement, to Syria. Usually ignored by Western observers, that move, too, happened under Pashinyan, whose coming to power in 2018 was generally hailed as a new, more pro-Western and less pro-Russian direction in Armenia`s foreign policy.
Compared to Armenia, Azerbaijan’s Russia policy has so far been more nuanced, giving it a bigger margin of error with regard to its dealings with the northern neighbour.
With a relatively strong economy and multifaceted alliances, Baku proactively participates in the geopolitical transformation of the wider Black Sea-Caspian Sea basin, where its arch-ally Turkey has also recently been shoring up its economic and military profile.
In an interview to local TV on January 12, President Aliyev, hinting at Russia’s notorious security proposals, claimed Azerbaijan, based on its own strength, is ready for any possibilities in case the current international relations system collapses.
Two days later, amid growing tensions around Ukraine’s borders, he visited Kyiv on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of its independence and met with his counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky. In a joint statement after the meeting, the two leaders expressed mutual support on matters of sovereignty and territorial integrity and that both would work to protect their internationally recognized borders.
In this context, Azerbaijan’s calculated support to Ukraine gained a new meaning as the other pro-Western in-between countries, especially Georgia, has largely laid low amid the increasing uncertainty around Ukraine’s borders. Except for Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani’s tweet expressing solidarity with Kyiv, Georgian leadership has so far shied away from open support to Ukraine’s cause.
The resolution adopted by the Georgian Parliament on February 1 interestingly omitted “Russian aggression”, prompting opposition figures to accuse the incumbent regime of turning a blind eye to what is happening to Tbilisi’s alleged closest friend.
Expectedly, Azerbaijan’s cautious support to Ukraine in a time of an acute security crisis and its capacity to play a pivotal role in the aftermath of a potential war – whether it be on energy supplies, connectivity projects or diplomatic linkages – have not gone unnoticed in Western capitals.
The EU has already started negotiations with Baku for potential emergency gas deliveries, in case Russia restricts gas supplies to Europe as a punitive measure against Western sanctions.
On January 30, EU foreign policy chief Joseph Borrell said the EU was coordinating its actions with partners such as the U.S., Qatar, and Azerbaijan to enhance its resilience against possible supply shocks emanating from Russia.
On February 4, EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi and Commissioner for Energy Kadri Simson visited Baku to discuss the possibility of ramping up gas deliveries to Europe. Attending the annual Southern Gas Corridor Corridor Advisory Council meeting, Commissioner Simson called the project “a continuing success story”, contributing to the EU’s energy security in increasingly uncertain market conditions.
In his meeting with Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, Commissioner Varhelyi said the EU counts on Azerbaijan as a reliable partner on energy supplies and wishes the latter will consider increasing the amount of gas deliveries to the EU and Western Balkans in the near future.
Azerbaijan has started to directly send its natural gas to European markets since December 2020. The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) as part of the Southern Gas Corridor brought more than 8 billion cubic metres of Azerbaijani gas from the Shah Deniz-2 field in the Caspian Sea to Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria in 2021, offering an alternative and reliable source of supply for EU members.
According to President Aliyev, Baku will export about 19 billion cubic metres of gas in 2022. More than 8 billion cubic metres of that amount will be directed to Turkey and a little more than 7 billion cubic metres will be sold to Italy.
In an interview given to Spain’s EFE news outlet in October, Azerbaijani President reiterated Baku is ready to boost natural gas exports to the EU but needs to negotiate a new agreement because “you must first sell gas and then produce it”.
Although the amount the Azerbaijani side could offer is in no way enough to fill the demand gap on its own, it could still provide a meaningful alternative for the EU’s energy diversification policy.
Against this background, the EU’s decision to allocate a financial package worth €2 billion to Azerbaijan to keep the parity with the amount of investments in Armenia within the recently declared Economic and Investment Plan, was a crucial step forward and similar moves by the U.S. administration would add a positive tone to U.S.-Azerbaijan relations in hard times for European security.
Rusif Huseynov is the Director of the Topchubashov Center, a think tank in Baku, Azerbaijan. He tweets as @RusifHuseynov2.
