THE AUTHORITIES AND ETHNIC MINORITIES: EXACERBATION IN SPRING
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
May 10, 2006 Wednesday
“It’s hard to tell what is going on: neo-fascism run rampant, or
a full-scale campaign to eradicate it,” said [Newsweek Russia in
early May.
Throughout April, there were regular media reports of crimes being
committed against “aliens.” St. Petersburg took priority, confirming
its notoriety as the capital of Russian neo-fascism. Liana Sisoko,
a half-black nine-year-old girl, stabbed 11 times in the hallway
of her apartment building; Lamsar Samba from Senegal, shot dead;
Desire Da Leko from the Ivory Coast, attacked – that is by no means
a complete list of neo-Nazi victims in St. Petersburg.
“The cleansing of St. Petersburg continues,” said the Freedom Party’s
website after another “feat” by its fighters from the White Patrol
movement. They stabbed two guest-worker women: Ilfuza Babayeva from
Azerbaijan and Ainur Bulekbayeva from Kazakhstan.
The security and law enforcement seem to have become more active as
well, says [Newsweek Russia]: “Whole groups of neo-Nazis are being
arrested, and some of them are even getting prison sentences.”
According to official reports, 13 extremists have been convicted in
Russia since the start of this year (the same period of 2005 produced
four convictions). But a Prosecutor General’s Office source told
[Newsweek Russia] that this doesn’t offer any grounds for optimism:
“It’s a temporary phenomenon. They’re only going after the obvious
targets, those who have drawn police attention to themselves. There’s
no question of any systematic anti-xenophobia efforts – it’s just
another campaign.”
Indeed, says [Newsweek Russia], the number of convictions is growing –
but the sentences are becoming lighter. And this change has happened
in recent months. Only 57 people were convicted of inciting ethnic
hatred in 2005, and only two of them (minors) received suspended
sentences. But when six members of the St. Petersburg neo-Nazi group
Schultz-88 were tried in December for assaulting a man from Azerbaijan,
the court only sent one of them to jail: group leader Dmitri Bobrov,
sentenced to six years. The other gang members went free, with short
suspended sentences. Several months later, a jury found that the
people who killed Tajik girl Khursheda Sultonova were only guilty
of hooliganism.
Moscow has also shown what it is capable of: its subway system,
promoted as “the safest in the world,” was the scene of an attack
in April. Vagen Abramiants, a 17-year-old Armenian Moscow resident,
was stabbed to death.
[Novye Izvestia] reports that witnesses of this murder first said it
was an ethnically-motivated attack, and described the attackers as
typical skinheads: shaved heads, short black jackets, boots. Then
another theory emerged: a fight over a girl. But the only suspect
– Denis Kulagin, a senior student from School No. 674 in Moscow –
retracted his initial evidence and was released unconditionally,
while investigators returned to the hate crime theory.
That same day, the media reported another attack in Moscow on people
of non-Slavic appearance. Some unidentified individuals armed with
knives attacked two 25-year-old Tajiks near the Cherkizovsky market.
One of the Tajiks, stabbed 17 times, died there; the other was
hospitalized. According to [Novye Izvestia], the Prosecutor’s Office
“isn’t inclined to link this incident to ethnic issues.”
[Novye Izvestia] says that neither prosecutors nor rank-and-file
police officers want a conflict with Moscow police chief Vladimir
Pronin, who said recently: “The skinhead websites are outraged:
why does Pronin still refuse to recognize our existence? But I don’t
recognize them. We don’t have any such organization. They’re nothing
more than petty thugs from Moscow and the Moscow region who target
people because of the color of their skins and try to attack them.”
“We have developed a strange tradition,” says Maksim Sokolov in
[Izvestia], “whereby reclassifying a crime as hooliganism is regarded
as condescension, and quite often actually is.”
But according to the Criminal Code, murder motivated by hooliganism
is still aggravated murder (Article 105.2i), and the penalty for it is
no less severe than for ethnically-motivated murder (Article 105.2l):
up to and including capital punishment, although there’s a moratorium
on that.
The “only” difference is the murder motive, says Sokolov: “Specific
proof of ethnic hatred is required, but no one can really know what
another person is thinking. Hooliganism is much easier to prove,
since unmotivated aggression is the distinct qualifying sign.”
Indeed, “if a crime is not prompted by greed or a personal grudge –
that is, if there are no rational motives for the crime – only one
motive remains: obvious disrespect for society as such, the desire
to destroy for destruction’s sake, right up to unmotivated murder.”
Those are the “hooliganism motives” of which common-sense opinion
takes such a condescending view.
However, says Sokolov, from a legal standpoint there shouldn’t
be any grounds for condescension here: “Unmotivated aggression
is much more dangerous than motivated aggression. The latter is
somewhat predictable, at least, so some protective measures can be
taken – but the former is completely unpredictable. In other words,
‘hooliganism motives’ describes the behavior of a rabid animal,”
and the response to such acts should be appropriate.
Nevertheless, says the [Vedomosti] newspaper, Russian legal practice
still treats “ethnic hatred motives” as an aggravating factor in
any crime.
On the other hand, the police find it advantagous to conceal racist
factors in any case: because “ethnically-motivated assault,” for
example, “isn’t just a common brawl, but a serious crime that threatens
the Constitution’s provision of equal rights for all citizens. In
other words, it’s a clear sign of failure for the police.”
Meanwhile, human rights organizations maintain that the killings are
the work of young skinheads, led by more experienced people. Antuan
Arakelian, an analyst with the Strategy Center, describes the murder
of Senegalese student Lamsar Samba as “an object lesson.”
Arakelian told [Novye Izvestia]: “There has been a series of
these demonstrative crimes in Moscow and St. Petersburg. They are
synchronized to some degree, indicating skilful management. The
skinheads are just the tools – and certain groups connected with
official structures are very good at using such tools.”
In Arakelian’s opinion, the climate of fear in society is being created
deliberately: “Russia is witnessing a purposeful campaign to tighten
the screws regarding legislation and its enforcement in the areas of
civil rights and liberties, non-governmental organizations, migrants,
and the Internet. There seems to be an effort to persuade the public
that a hardline approach to all these phenomena is required.”
The increase in ethnic hate crimes has intensified the public debate,
says [Vedomosti]: “Some are scaring ordinary citizens with the
prospect of neo-fascism, while others see a political game in all
this. One thing is clear: the state has all the leverage it needs to
fight crimes of this nature, but those abilities are not being used.”
[Ekspert] magazine takes a similar view: “Ethnically-motivated street
violence – that’s the most conspicuous and the most-discussed aspect
of xenophobia.” However, that is only the most obvious and scandalous
side of the situation, and it could be brought under control quite
quickly, given the political will to do so.
Boris Strugatsky, a prominent writer, says in an interview with
[Novaya Gazeta] that “yet another upswing in violent neo-Nazism is
taking place, and our leaders are either unable or – scary thought –
unwilling to take action against it.”
Of course, “all kinds of political forces” are seeking to take
advantage of the situation for their own purposes.
The situation “looks like an emergency,” says Strugatsky: “Unless
the authorities – at the very top, the presidential level – show some
political will, bloodshed and abominable events await us.”
Strugatsky went on to say: “I don’t rule out the possibility that
‘anti-fascist detachments’ might be established. And then we would
see a repeat of what happened in Germany in the early 1930s: a war
between ‘brown’ and ‘red’ storm-troopers. We remember where that led.
Or have we already forgotten?”
In [Literaturnaya Gazeta], historian Valery Solovei says that contrary
to the assertions of the authorities, “the situation in Russia isn’t
as good or stable as we are led to believe.” Solovei even reports that
“one of the Kremlin’s most well-known political strategists” is known
to “start repeating hysterically that Russia is heading for disaster”
whenever he has too much to drink in the company of friends.
Solovei participated in a [Literaturnaya Gazeta] debate on nationalist
issues in Russia and media coverage of them. In his opinion, Russia
“isn’t experiencing waves of public outrage yet, but the authorities
are seeking to prepare for them in advance by perfecting a system
for harsh suppression of mass protests.” Under the circumstances,
it can be “advantageous” for the authorities to “wave the bugaboo of
‘fascism’ – since ‘fascism’ provides excellent ideological cover for
the very toughest measures.”
And [Ekspert] magazine notes that “fascism-fighting month” on national
television networks in April “seems all the more ambiguous, given
that television broadcasting itself and Russia’s political class have
shown an increasing tolerance for xenophobic propaganda of late.”
[Ekspert] maintains that the “media tsunamis” on this issue “sometimes
resemble a game that’s convenient for everyone involved.”
[Ekspert] says: “In effect, the nationalists get access to television
airtime – if not directly, then via detailed coverage of their
activities. The authorities demonstrate that they’re concerned about
the problem. The opposition gets another opportunity to criticize
the authorities.”
Television networks themselves have an interest in this issue:
according to the laws of the genre, “news programs need at least a
dash of intrigue or suspense, but the political mainstream isn’t very
lively.” So the problem is solved by giving airtime to nationalists:
“since many of them refrain from saying anything too appalling, and
they don’t mention the issues that the Kremlin really dislikes: freedom
of speech, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and so on.” From this standpoint,
says [Ekspert], the television networks actually prefer Alexander
Prokhanov to Boris Nemtsov, for example.
“Whom do the authorities see as the true enemy: the political
opposition, or neo-fascism?” When [Novaya Gazeta] put this question
to Boris Strugatsky, he replied: “For the authorities, the enemy
is anyone who aspires to power – regardless of their ideological
convictions or preferences.”
However, Strugatsky says that the neo-Nazis are the most dangerous
from that standpoint: “They are better-organized ideologically and
have more support among the masses, who are inclined to xenophobia
and authoritarianism.”
Strugatsky says: “The neo-Nazis are the leading claimants to political
power. We can only hope that the authorities understand this.”
Analyst Alexander Verkhovsky, director of the Sova Center, tells
[Ekspert] that Russia’s nationalists have turned out to be quick
learners. They have fully “mastered the political techniques used
by extreme right-wing groups in Europe, known for their ability
to use propaganda that skirts the boundaries of what is legally
permissible.” From the legal standpoint, there’s nothing actionable
in the statements made by Russian neo-Nazi leaders.
Then again, says [Ekspert], there might not be so much demand for
the issue of nationalism if public politics in Russia “wasn’t so
sterile.” When television broadcasts fail to discuss “many truly
important issues,” we inevitably see “phantom issues” – such as
those raised by the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, which
has managed to “adapt socially-acceptable political language for
xenophobic propaganda.”
These propaganda efforts haven’t been wasted.
The [Vedomosti] newspaper says: “Russia has had, and continues to
have, a favorable political and psychological climate for developing
xenophobic attitudes. Two wars in Chechnya fostered xenophobia among
Russia’s leaders – with the call to ‘wipe them out in the toilets’
being directed at bandits of a specific ethnic group.” Subsequently,
the war on international terrorism has only intensified Islamophobia.
These days, “patriotic” rhetoric at the federal level becomes actual
use of skinhead groups at the regional level: “They have been used
in several regional election campaigns, or even in business conflicts.”
What’s more, the [Kommersant] newspaper reports that during the
May Day holidays in Moscow, young nationalists from the Russian
All-National Union (RONS), with the support of Russian Orthodox
pensioner organizations, made a number of attacks on members of
sexual minorities.
RONS activists disrupted gay events at two Moscow night-clubs. Gay
rights groups have accused the Russian Orthodox Church and the federal
authorities of turning a blind eye to the activities of the RONS,
saying that the authorities are out to “score points in the lead-up
to elections.”
[Kommersant] notes: “Curiously enough, until now the radical
nationalist organizations had confined themselves to the ‘Russia for
Russians’ slogan and taken action against ‘aliens,’ mostly. But now,
according to the RONS, it’s the gays’ turn.”
RONS spokesman Miron Kravchenko described the purpose of the campaign
as follows: “We have to put a stop to promotion of this unnatural
way of life. They (gays) have to think about their behavior.”
Although the RONS claims to be motivated by religious beliefs,
the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has found it
necessary to emphasize that it has nothing to do with these actions.
Ed Mishin, a leader of Russia’s gay rights movement and
editor, says that the police only made a show of dispersing the
anti-gay activists. Mishin says: “The authorities are still aiming to
suppress dissent: it used to be the Jews, and now it’s us.” All the
same, he maintains that the authorities “will let these nationalists do
as they please for the next six to twelve months, and then start taking
measures against them – scoring points for the next parliamentary
and presidential elections.”
This view is also held by Stanislav Belkovsky, president of
the National Strategy Institute, who told [Kommersant] that “the
authorities are the catalyst for such incidents.” Although “Russia
doesn’t have a substantial skinhead movement – only groups of youths
who gather for specific events,” the authorities aim to use such
incidents as proof that “fascists could take power tomorrow,” and
“citizens need to be shown that the present authorities are the
lesser evil.”
However, Boris Strugatsky says that it isn’t the worst-case scenario
for the authorities to take this attitude to neo-Nazis: “The real
worst-case scenario would be if Nazis (in one form or another)
actually came to power.”
Then again, Strugatsky considers this unlikely: “That place is
taken, and no one’s planning to give it up to anyone, including
the neo-Nazis.”
All the same, when this interview (done shortly before Victory Day)
asked him why the fascism-immunity our country acquired in 1941-45
has turned out to be so weak, Strugatsky replied that our country has
never developed immunity to fascism as such. What it had was hatred
of German fascism: “All those visuals of SS officers, death camps,
murdered civilians, our country’s devastations, the millions who
never came back from the war – all this, taken together, was called
‘the brutal face of German fascism.'” But in the Russian mindset,
all this coexisted easily with “our innate xenophobia, our approval
of strong-man rule and harsh measures, the notorious concept of
‘order,’ and the other attributes of common Nazism – nothing other
than dictatorship of the nationalists.”
These days, opinion polls indicate that xenophobic attitudes are on
the rise: over 50% of respondents approve of the “Russia for Russians”
slogan to some extent. [Ekspert] magazine reports that “over half
of respondents dislike Chechens and Roma; these figures reach 60-70%
among respondents under 25.”
[Novoe Vremya] magazine maintains that xenophobia is “a consequence
of the lawlessness that has come to dominate Russia.”
According to [Novoe Vremya], the prolonged period of Communist rule
produced a “special kind of morality” and a “special, communal type
of person” to go with it: “When those in power can steal openly and
kill with impunity, theft and murder cease to be sins. Everything is
permitted – as long as ‘they’ remain untouched.”
[Novoe Vremya] quotes the radical Petr Yakovlevich Chaadaev from almost
two centuries ago: “In the face of our misfortunes, I believe it is
permissible to refrain from sharing the ambitions of the unbridled
patriotism that has brought our country to the brink of destruction and
now thinks to rescue the country by persisting in its own illusions,
unwilling to acknowledge the desperate situation those illusions
have created.”
The 19th Century writer’s thoughts are echoed by Boris Strugatsky:
“As long as xenophobia and approval of dictatorship exist in Russia,
neo-Nazism will remain a first-degree looming threat.”
These statements appear to be two sides of the same coin.