Georgian-Russian Relations at an All-time Low
Russia Profile, Russia
July 18 2006
TBILISI, Georgia. Since Mikheil Saakashvili and his Rose
revolutionaries came to power in 2003, relations between Georgia and
Russia have plummeted from strained cooperation to mutual distrust
and even hatred; bilateral communication between the two countries is
almost impossible without accusations and insults flying. On taking
the helm, Saakashvili’s government made two key promises, both of
which Moscow found extremely distasteful: Georgian control would be
restored in the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both
currently under Russian influence, and Georgia would be repositioned
internationally, pulling the South Caucasus country firmly away from
Moscow’s sphere of influence and integrating it as quickly as possible
into the "Euro-Atlantic community." While the first of these promises
has not yet been fulfilled, the second task is well underway.
The first clue to the change of geopolitical orientation in Georgia
comes immediately upon landing at the Tbilisi airport, where Westerners
breeze through passport control with a cursory passport check, while
Russians have their visas studied laboriously. The main route from
the airport is the recently renamed George W. Bush Street, leading to
Freedom Square (formerly Lenin Square) in the heart of the city. Just
off the square stands the newly opened Museum of the Soviet Occupation,
a set of exhibits detailing the "repression of the Georgian people"
between 1921 and 1991. The symbolism and timing of the museum’s opening
irked Russian President Vladimir Putin so much that he complained at
length to Saakashvili at their bilateral meeting in St. Petersburg
in June, pointing out that many of the top figures in the so-called
occupation, such as Joseph Stalin and Lavrenty Beria, were in fact
ethnic Georgians. According to a source in the Georgian government,
Saakashvili’s response was reportedly to suggest offering funds for
Putin to open a Museum of the Georgian Occupation in Moscow.
The tough words between the two countries at the highest levels have
not been restricted to private meetings, however. The spats have a
childish feel to them, with both sides crying that the other started
the hostile moves. Russia bans imports of Georgian wine in a move
that seems overtly political; a Georgian minister responds that the
Russian market is so low-grade that "even feces can be sold." Putin
calls for referenda in the conflict zones of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia; Georgians accuse Russia of military provocations on
Georgian territory. The list goes on and on. One of the bitterest
clashes came in the heart of winter, when pipeline explosions in
the North Caucasus caused a disruption in gas supplies from Russia
to Georgia for several days in January. When Saakashvili accused
Russia of "sabotage," the Russian Foreign Ministry responded that
the Georgians were suffering from "hysteria and bacchanalia." Shota
Utiashvili, head of the Information and Analysis Department at the
Interior Ministry, explained the Georgian suspicions. "Three pipelines
exploded at the same time. Our prime minister repeatedly tried to
call the Russian prime minister, but first they said he was busy,
then he was ill. We offered to send our experts to look at the pipes,
but the Russians refused. Our people were freezing, so we started
importing gas from Azerbaijan. The Russians then decreased the flow
to Azerbaijan." After this, asked Utiashvili, what conclusions could
the Georgian side draw? "What do they say in Russia when these crises
occur? People say they blame Georgia, but I just can’t understand how,"
he said with seemingly genuine bewilderment.
"Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia-Russia relations have
probably been the most difficult set of relations in the whole
post-Soviet space," said Oksana Antonenko, senior fellow at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "There was
always a perception in the Georgian elite that Russia is the main
enemy, and with the arrival of Saakashvili, these kinds of sentiments
have become mainstream."
The overwhelming view in Georgian political circles is that the
problem for Russia is simply Georgia’s aspirations to Western-style
democracy and prosperity. Temuri Yakobashvili, executive vice president
of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies,
a Tbilisi-based think tank, presented the choice facing the Georgian
leadership as simple. "We see countries that were in as difficult
a position as Georgia at the fall of the Soviet Union, but are now
integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures. The EU and NATO have
transformed these Central and Eastern European states into viable
democracies," he said. "It’s obvious that Euro-Atlantic integration is
the solution," said the analyst. Antonenko, on the other hand, believes
that the equation might not be so simple for the Georgians. "I’m not
sure that Georgia benefits at all from turning away from Russia," she
said. "It’s na?ve to think that the West will risk its relationship
with Russia over Georgia, and Georgia suffers much more than Russia
does from the worsening in relations."
Nevertheless, all over the country, the rhetorical shift from a
post-Soviet to a pre-EU society is startling. At official government
buildings, on billboards, even in giant horticultural arrangements,
the four crosses of the Georgian flag appear alongside the yellow stars
of the European Union’s. Flying the flags ahead of actual membership
of the institutions seems aimed at convincing both Georgians and
foreigners that the trajectory chosen by the Saakashvili government
is irreversible. Unlike in other CIS countries, the second language
in official circles has become English, and most ministers and top
government officials speak the language fluently.
The corridors of the Defense Ministry are lined with photographs of
Georgian troops in both peacekeeping and combat action. Georgia, as
a more-willing-than-most member of the "Coalition of the Willing,"
has around 900 troops in Iraq, the highest per-capita number of any
country. Georgian troops are also in Afghanistan and Kosovo. In his
office, Deputy Defense Minister Mamuka Kudava sits in front of two
large flags – Georgian and NATO. "Before the Rose Revolution, there
was basically no army and no combat capability," says Kudava. "Now
our troops are well trained and equipped to NATO standards. Before,
nobody wanted their children to join the army. Now, salaries have
increased by between six and 15 times, and it’s a prestigious job.
There is good morale and a sense of patriotism in the army."
Yakobashvili believes that the choice to look west is logical.
"There’s nothing that Russia can offer us from a security point of
view," he says. "What kind of security cooperation might Russia
offer? They would train our officers, but do we really want this
training? The Russian army is riddled with ‘dedovshchina,’ [hazing]
there is inappropriate use of funds, loss of equipment and so on.
It’s not an army that you’d wish to copy."
"A good way to look at how well Georgia is progressing with European
integration is to look at the statements coming out of the Russian
Foreign Ministry," said the Interior Ministry’s Utiashvili. "If they
are absolutely livid, it means we are doing well, but if they go
quiet for a while, we realize we must be doing something wrong."
Utiashvili had just returned from Rome, where a Georgian delegation
was making connections with the new government of Romano Prodi. In
contrast to these closely forged links with EU countries and the United
States, Utiashvili said there was very little routine interaction
between Georgian and Russian ministries. "We have perfectly good
relations and frequent contacts with the governments in Armenia and
Azerbaijan. They have different political systems, but it’s none of
our business, we can still deal with them. The problem with Russia
is that they always want to interfere with our affairs." Antonenko,
however, feels that there might be more the Georgian side could do
to engage Russia. "It’s very strange that the Georgians have failed
completely to identify any positive agenda with Russia – they are
the only country in the CIS that has failed to do so," she said.
"Russian-Azeri relations were also strained, and there was also
the issue of meddling in internal affairs over Karabakh. But now
Azerbaijan has managed on the one hand to have friendly relations
with the United States, including discussing U.S. military bases
on Azeri territory, and on the other to retain good relations with
Russia." She also pointed to the situation in Ukraine, where both
sides have made moderately successful attempts to mend relations in
the aftermath of the Orange Revolution.
Not everyone in Georgia is happy with the course that the Rose
Revolution has taken since the triumphant parliament takeover in
November 2003, when almost every pro-democracy politician in the
country jumped on the Saakashvili bandwagon to rid the country of
the government of Eduard Shevardnadze. Though individual opposition
parties remain marginal, the chorus of discontented voices is
growing. The most frequent accusations are that Saakashvili wheels
out the "freedom and democracy" rhetoric for Western leaders, but
the reality for ordinary Georgians is somewhat different. "Personal
freedoms are still sacrificed to achieve bigger societal objectives,"
said David Usupashvili, chairman of the Republican Party, a moderate
opposition force. "There’s no room for the rule of law, human rights
or other basic principles of democracy," he continued. A particular
sticking point is a high-profile murder case in which high-level
Interior Ministry officials are implicated in a cover-up.
When it comes to relations with Russia, Usupashvili feels that
Saakashvili’s "childish rhetoric" has inflamed the situation: "We
need to engage with Russia, and to behave as a mature government
that is willing to guarantee its own security, but also doesn’t
pose a threat to anyone." However, even the opposition leaders feel
that Moscow’s intentions are hostile. "It’s more than clear that the
current Russian government and leadership do not want a civilized and
normal relationship with Georgia, nor do they want to recognize its
territorial integrity," said Usupashvili. "There would be no talk of
NATO if it weren’t for the security threat coming from Russia. We saw
in the 1990s what it means to be alone facing Russia with its unclear,
unbalanced policies in the Caucasus region."
A particular thorn in the side of bilateral relations are the "frozen
conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Georgia has recently
been doing its best to thaw out. Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili
recently promised that if he does not celebrate the coming new year in
the South Ossetian capital, he will resign. In Tbilisi, the conflicts
are seen not as independence struggles but as proxy conflicts fought
by Russia to retain influence in the South Caucasus.
"There are two sides in these conflicts," said Kudava. "But it’s not
like Russia would like us to believe. This is not between Georgians
and Ossetians, or between Georgians and Abkhaz. These are conflicts
between Russia and Georgia."
Georgians at all levels are adamant that the impetus for improved
relations with Russia has to come from Russia itself. "Russia
should understand that it is in its best interests to have a stable,
prosperous, integrated and unified Georgia," said Kudava. "We need
Russia to be more flexible and constructive, and have stability on
the southern slopes of the Caucasus." Even those ordinary Georgians
who fondly eulogize that the standard of living was better in the
Soviet Union seem to have no warm feelings for the current Russian
leadership. Criticism and non-comprehension of the Putin government
is almost universal. But ultimately, it is Georgia that will lose
out the most from the current state of affairs. "Georgia, after all,
is not an island in the Indian Ocean," said Antonenko. "It’s on the
border with Russia and it cannot afford to have such poor relations
with its northern neighbor."