ISRAEL AND AZERBAIJAN’S FURTIVE EMBRACE
by Ilya Bourtman, Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2006
AZG Armenian Daily
29/08/2006
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed the geopolitical
landscape of the Middle East. Within weeks, six predominantly
Muslim countries along the southern rim of the Soviet Union gained
independence.
Israel, along with Turkey, Iran, and various Arab states, rushed
to establish embassies in capitals ranging from Ashgabat to
Tashkent. While Jerusalem maintains good working relations with
these newly independent states, few could have foreseen how Israel’s
relationship with Azerbaijan would blossom.
The two countries formally established relations in April 1992,
one year after Azerbaijan declared its independence. The idea that
a country 93 percent Muslim would cooperate closely with Israeli
intelligence, and even provide Israeli officials a defensive
platform in such a volatile region, was hardly considered. Yet,
Jerusalem and Baku have quietly become strategic partners-sharing
intelligence, developing trade relations, and together building
regional alliances. Although the Israel-Azerbaijan partnership has
had important regional implications, uncertainty remains how far
Azerbaijani elites are willing to pursue ties.
A Convergence of Interests
While the mutual relationship has not been a priority for either
Israel or Azerbaijan, both Jerusalem and Baku have expanded their
ties in response to the realization that policy coordination best
protects Caspian security and counters Iranian expansionism.
Both Israel and Azerbaijan face challenges to their legitimacy if not
their very existence. Both share a sense of trial by fire after winning
independence only after a territorial war with neighbors. While Israel
had to face down five invading Arab armies upon its independence and
remains in a technical state of war with Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq,
Azerbaijan remains embroiled in a decade-long military conflict with
Armenia over the mountainous enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani
territory occupied by an Armenian army. Indeed, unproven rumors persist
in the Arabic-language press and pro-Saudi journals suggesting Israeli
arms exports to Azerbaijan may have even preceded formal Azerbaijani
independence.[1]
Insecurity complexes born of war and siege cause both Jerusalem and
Baku to see the region through similar prisms. Both countries grapple
with identity problems: how can Azerbaijan be "the Azeri state"
when close to 20 million Azeris-almost twice its population-live
in neighboring Iran? Indeed, Iranian Supreme Leader ‘Ali Khamene’i
is an ethnic Azeri. Israel, meanwhile, grapples both to define its
relationship to the Jewish diaspora and to its own sizable Arab
minority.
The Israeli government reached out to Azerbaijan for a number
of reasons. Israeli policymakers, like their Arab and Iranian
counterparts, viewed Azerbaijan and the Caspian littoral as part of
the "Greater Middle East."[2] Expanding its influence into an area
of the world heavily Muslim but not Arab has long been a strategic
Israeli objective. After all, prior to the revolution in 1979, Israel
had sold weapons to the Iranian army and considered the shah a friend.
Similarly, since the early 1990s, Israel has reached out to Turkey. New
allies could also lead to new economic opportunities, greater energy
security, and, it was hoped, extra U.N. votes.[3] Israel aimed to
exploit the region’s energy resources by lobbying for the development
of gas and oil pipelines that would help its allies and circumvent
its foes. Finally, Israeli officials hoped that direct ties would
facilitate the immigration of Azerbaijan’s 20,000-strong Jewish
community to Israel.[4]
The Azerbaijani government, meanwhile, found itself cooperating with
Israel both out of respect for the Jewish state[5] and because of
lack of an alternative.
In 1991, Azerbaijan was economically fragile, politically unstable,
and militarily weak. Desperate for outside assistance, Baku turned
to Israel to provide leverage against a much stronger Iran and a
militarily superior Armenia. Israel promised to improve Azerbaijan’s
weak economy by developing trade ties.[6] It purchased Azerbaijani oil
and gas and sent medical, technological, and agricultural experts. Most
importantly for Azerbaijan, Israel’s foreign ministry vowed to lend
its lobby’s weight in Washington to improve Azeri-American relations,
providing a counterweight to the influential Armenian lobby.
According to Azerbaijan’s first president, Abulfas Elcibey, "Israel
could help Azerbaijan in [the] Karabakh problem by convincing the
Americans to stop the Armenians."[7] Azerbaijani diplomats recognized
the need to diversify their contacts in Washington, especially after
the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on Azerbaijan at the behest of
the Armenian lobby following the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani
military officials also believed that Israeli firms could better
equip the ragtag Azerbaijani army, which needed new weapons following
its defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh. On several occasions, Heydar Aliyev,
Azerbaijan’s president between 1993 and 2003, personally requested
military assistance from Israeli prime ministers.[8]
A Maturing Relationship
With Armenian troops and their proxies occupying 20 percent of
Azerbaijani territory, the influence of Moscow and Tehran growing, and
Islamist groups gaining strength in the region, Israel and Azerbaijan
built up their mutual defense capabilities.
Following its loss in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku reached out to Israel
for help in rebuilding its military.
Israeli defense firms obliged, selling Azerbaijan advanced aviation,
antitank, artillery, and anti-infantry weapon systems.[9] The arms
trade has continued. In 2004, the Azerbaijani and Israeli press
both reported that an undisclosed Israeli weapons system was being
sent to Turkey where it would be assembled and then delivered to
Azerbaijan.[10] While Israeli, Turkish, and Azerbaijani officials
denied the report-Israeli policy prohibits confirmation of such
deals-an Azerbaijani military official defended the purchase,
saying "our country’s interest in Israeli weapons is natural as this
country possesses up-to-date types of weapons, military hardware, and
special equipment."[11] Not every report is true, however. Seeking
to exploit Islamist and anti-Israel sentiment among some segments
of the population, neighboring states on occasion exaggerate the
Israel-Azerbaijan arms trade.[12]
Weapons sales and shared-threat perception have smoothed intelligence
and security cooperation.
Israeli firms built and guard the fence around Baku’s international
airport, monitor and help protect Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure,
and even provide security for Azerbaijan’s president on his foreign
visits.[13] Israeli intelligence operatives help collect human
intelligence about extremist Islamist organizations in the region and
monitor the troop deployments of Azerbaijan’s neighbors-especially
Iran.[14] In a Washington Institute for Near East Policy analysis,
analysts Soner Cagaptay and Alexander Murinson alluded to reports that
Israeli intelligence maintains listening posts along the Azerbaijani
border with Iran.[15]
Both the Israeli and Azerbaijani governments fear the growth of radical
Islam. Following an October 2001 meeting with Israeli ambassador
Eitan Naeh, Azerbaijan’s former president Heydar Aliyev declared
their positions in the fight against international terrorism to be
identical.[16] While the terrorist threat to Israel is well known,
Azerbaijan’s terrorist challenge is also significant. Azerbaijan is in
the cross hairs of both Sunni and Shi’ite Islamists. Among the Sunnis,
there is the spillover from the Chechen and Daghestani conflicts. Since
the 1994 signing of the "Genuine Islam for Brothers" agreement between
regional Wahhabi organizations, and in the wake of a southern expansion
by Wahhabi movements in the Russian Federation, Islamist cells have
sprung up around the country.[17] According to Axis Information and
Analysis, a watchdog of security developments in Eurasia, as of July
2005, roughly 15,000 Wahhabi activists were operating in Baku.[18]
Supporters of Chechen militants operate a lucrative arms trade along
Azerbaijan’s porous 175-mile (284 kilometer) border with Russia. Groups
like Hizb ut-Tahrir, which seek both Israel’s annihilation and the
replacement of regional nation-states with an Islamic caliphate,
threaten both Jerusalem and Baku. Hizb ut-Tahrir is suspected
of having several hundred members in Azerbaijan; dozens have been
arrested.[19] Tadeusz Swietochowski, professor emeritus of history at
Monmouth University and an expert on Azerbaijan, worries that Wahhabi
organizations may find a breeding ground in Azerbaijan. "There is
a vast potential for disaffection among the impoverished masses,
including the Karabakh war refugees, to whom the benefits from oil
wealth do not filter down through the more privileged elites, who are
perceived as corrupt unbelievers,"[20] he argued. The sheer number of
small terrorist networks setting up shop around Azerbaijan forced the
Azerbaijan Ministry of National Security to respond in August 2005 by
arresting suspects, placing mosques under direct government control,
and banning extremist religious literature.[21] Israeli officials,
for their part, worry about the recent spike in violence by radical
Islamists against Jewish communities in Azerbaijan.[22]
Iran, the benefactor of numerous terrorist organizations operating in
the region,[23] has sought to promote its radical ideology by funding
and building mosques and religious schools in the region.
Thus far, Azerbaijani officials have responded to this encroachment
of their space by outlawing radical imams and mosques. Indeed, while
reports of Israeli intelligence presence remain shadowy and imprecise,
failure of Baku and Jerusalem to work together to counter Iranian
ideological expansionism would be irresponsible.
Trade
Economic cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan has grown
significantly. As early as 1995, an Israeli journalist visiting Baku
observed that Israeli goods were flooding the market. "Strauss ice
cream, cell phones produced by Motorola’s Israeli division, Maccabee
beer, and other Israeli imports are ubiquitous," she wrote.[24] As
Azerbaijan deregulated its industries and liberalized some markets,
Israeli companies flocked to the country. Bezeq, a major telephone
subsidiary, was one of the first to do so.
Through a devalued contract bid in 1994, Bezeq bought a large share
of the telephone operating system. Today it installs phone lines
and operates regional services throughout much of the country.[25]
According to the president of the Azerbaijani-Israeli Business Forum,
dozens of Israeli companies operate in Azerbaijan, especially within
the energy sector.[26] In 2000 for example, Modcon Systems Ltd.,
an Israel-based supplier of high technology to the oil and gas
industries, opened shop in Azerbaijan. "The business," according to
Modcon Systems CEO Gregory Shahnovsky, is "very important to company
growth." He expects more Israeli companies to enter the market.[27]
Statistics support the anecdotes. Between 2000 and 2005, Israel has
gone from being Azerbaijan’s tenth largest trading partner to its
fifth.[28] Azerbaijani industry has benefited tremendously. According
to U.N. statistics, between 1997 and 2004, exports from Azerbaijan
to Israel increased from barely over US$2 million to $323 million,
fueled in recent years by the high price of oil.[29] Indeed,
Israeli-Azerbaijani trade now outweighs the trade relations Israel
has developed with the countries of Central Asia by at least a factor
of five.[30]
Indirectly, Israeli businessmen have helped encourage Azerbaijan
to pursue policies of strategic benefit to Jerusalem. Since 1993,
major Israeli entrepreneurs such as Shoul Eisenberg have spearheaded
large-scale energy projects in the Caspian region and Central Asia with
government support. Israeli businessman Yossi Maimon, for example, was
instrumental in brokering gas pipeline deals throughout Central Asia,
such as the March 1999 $2.5 billion pipeline deal from Turkmenistan
to Turkey. He boasted to The Wall Street Journal in 2001 that "this
is the Great Game all over [again] … we are doing what U.S. and
Israeli policy could not achieve. Controlling the transport route
is controlling the product."[31] Israeli strategic thinkers expected
that establishing friendly ties to Azerbaijan would not only provide
energy security but also allow Jerusalem to influence pipeline routes,
a benefit both to Israeli political clout and a factor to strengthen
Israel’s allies at the expense of its adversaries. In 2002, Israel
was Azerbaijan’s largest importer of oil after Italy.[32]
The ultimate route of the $3.2 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline,
for example, circumvents Iran and Russia and ties secular, pro-Western
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey together in a way that enhances
Israel’s strategic interests, an aspect acknowledged by Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in 1997[33] and recognized in Azerbaijan
as well.[34] Rafael Abbasov, former director of economic and trade
development at the Israeli embassy in Baku and now an economics officer
at the Asian Development Bank in Azerbaijan, believes that there is
growing covert collaboration in the energy sector between Israel and
Azerbaijan which does not show up on trade-balance sheets. "In terms
of oil, Israeli firms are a lot more involved than at first meets
the eye," Abbasov said.
"Often they register as U.S. or U.K. branches and thus enter the
Azerbaijani energy market and participate in bidding for tender
contracts."[35]
As the Indian and Chinese appetites for oil increase, so too does
the possibility to expand cooperation further with the export of oil
through the Ashqelon-Eilat pipeline which could provide an alternative
to shipments through the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf.[36]
Politics
While trade has increased steadily, political cooperation has ebbed
and flowed. Mutual statements of diplomatic understanding have seldom
been followed by decisive action. Little came from the April 1992
agreement to exchange ambassadors. For several years, Benny Haddad,
a 24-year-old Israeli Defense Forces rifleman with no diplomatic
experience represented Israeli interests in Azerbaijan. Only later
was Eliezer Yotvat, Israel’s first ambassador to Azerbaijan, formally
appointed. Baku meanwhile made overtures toward Jerusalem by appealing
to Jewish investors and publicly sending state foreign policy advisor
Vafa Guluzade to Israel, but Baku did not nominate a permanent
ambassador. To date, Azerbaijan has not yet fulfilled its promise
to open an embassy in Israel. Likewise, nothing came of Azerbaijani
secretary of state Ali Karimov’s public attempt to organize a meeting
between Elcibey and then Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.[37]
The only public embrace came in August 1997 when Israeli prime minister
Netanyahu visited Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliyev in Baku. During
their brief meeting, they discussed various issues ranging from new oil
deals, to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, to trilateral cooperation between
Israel, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.[38] While the meeting solidified
strategic understanding and led to increased defense cooperation,
it had few positive diplomatic consequences. After fifteen years
of diplomatic relations, the two countries have not signed a single
official treaty. As one senior Israeli diplomat laments, "There is no
formalization of these relationships. Not even a cultural agreement,
or tourism … Formal relations have not yet yielded one single
agreement between the two states."[39]
Perhaps the only successful diplomatic initiatives have been in youth
exchanges. In 2003, Jerusalem and Baku agreed to facilitate study
opportunities for Azerbaijani scientists and doctors in Israel.[40]
The Azerbaijan-Israel Youth Friendship Society works to promote youth
relations through the teaching of each others’ histories. Kanan
Seyidov, the society’s deputy chief of international relations,
explained that the program works to explain "the real situation of
Israeli people living under the everyday terror threat, and the impact
of Armenian aggression and occupation on Azerbaijan."[41]
The New Great Game
Nevertheless, both Jerusalem and Baku recognize that they are better
off working with each other (and Turkey) than allowing Russian or
Iranian influence to become paramount. Even as diplomatic relations
remain less formal, Azerbaijan’s neighbors recognize the growing
importance of Israel-Azerbaijan ties.
Iran. At the heart of Azerbaijan-Israel cooperation lie their
mutual fear and distrust of Iran. Israel has obvious reasons for
distrusting the Islamic Republic: Iranian leaders from Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini to former presidents ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
and Muhammad Khatami to current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have all
called for Israel’s destruction.[42] Azerbaijan has a more complicated
relationship with Iran. On the one hand, Azerbaijan shares historic
ties and a religious bond with predominantly Shi’ite Iran. Far
more ethnic Azeris live in Iran than in independent Azerbaijan. But
Tehran has sought to destabilize Azerbaijan. It has engaged in arms
trafficking with Armenian separatists[43] and trained Azeri mullahs to
preach an Islamist message that has undercut traditional Azerbaijani
secularism.[44] Tehran gave little support to their Shi’ite brethren in
the early 1990s when Azerbaijan’s economy plummeted 58 percent.[45]
Competing claims to energy deposits in the Caspian Sea have also
harmed relations.
Today, Iran and Israel play a cat-and-mouse game in Azerbaijan. Both
have developed vast espionage networks in Azerbaijan. Israeli
intelligence maintains surveillance and listening outposts on
Azerbaijan’s border with Iran.[46] Published articles attest that
"Baku is a perfect base for Israeli intelligence operations … the
city is home to an Iranian embassy with 200 employees."[47] One
senior advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon even suggested that
some Azerbaijani Jews regularly infiltrate Iranian territory.[48]
Iran has followed suit, spying on Israeli targets in Azerbaijan. In
September 2004, Israeli security agents caught an Iranian operative
videotaping the Israeli embassy in Baku.[49]
Iran has vowed to exact revenge on Azerbaijan for its cooperation with
the "Zionist entity" and for following Israel and Turkey westward
after its 1991 independence. Following Netanyahu’s 1997 visit,
Iran’s state radio harshly criticized the meeting, declaring that
"Baku is playing a dangerous game by receiving the Zionist regime’s
expansionist prime minister. By doing this it has destabilized its
own ties with Islamic states in the region and the world."[50] The
Iranian foreign minister further threatened Azerbaijan saying that
Baku’s cooperation with Israel would cause instability in the Caucasus,
harm Islamic unity, and hurt "those governments themselves."[51] To
this day, Iranian officials are cited in the Iranian press stating
that Azerbaijan is cooperating with an "occupying power."[52]
Russia. Another area of mutual cooperation is shared suspicion
of Russian intentions. Both Jerusalem and Baku distrust Moscow’s
penchant for pursuing two-track policies that undermine regional
security. The Israeli government, for example, distrusts the Russian
sale of nuclear technology to Iran, arms to Syria, and legitimization
of Hamas and Hezbollah. The Azerbaijani government is meanwhile worried
about Russian bases in Ossetia and Abkhazia and Moscow’s support
for Armenian guerillas in Nagorno-Karabakh.[53] Russian cooperation
with Iran reinforces to Israeli and Azerbaijani strategic thinkers
that they must rely on each other.[54] The same dynamic has also
strengthened relations between Azerbaijan and Israel on one hand,
and Georgia on the other.[55]
Some Russian nationalists are displeased that Israel is intruding on
a region they believe part of their own sphere of influence. A 1998
article by Vitaliy Demin in the Russian newspaper Zavtra-generally
recognized as an anti-Semitic newspaper-accused Israel of becoming
to Russia what Cuba is to the United States. He also blamed Israel
for seeking to exploit regional energy resources.[56] Some of this
resentment stems from opposition to pipeline routes that bypass
Russian territory.
Persian Gulf states. The Azerbaijan-Israel relationship has
successfully shut out the influence of Persian Gulf states in the
Caspian. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the Persian Gulf emirates have
substantial trade with Azerbaijan. In 2004, none of the Persian Gulf
states made the top twenty-five of Azerbaijan’s trade partners.[57]
In the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia used its Islamic Development Bank
to provide Baku with loans and credits, but that money has dried-up
in recent years.[58] Riyadh seldom invests in countries if they do
not tow an increasingly Islamist line.
Saudi ideologues would much rather fund a government like Turkey’s
which seeks to erode secular protections than one like Baku’s which has
worked to preserve them. That none of the Persian Gulf states supply
Azerbaijan with weapons or have long-standing relations with Baku’s
defense establishment limits their reach in the region. According to
analyst Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Saudi Arabia, the most active of all
the Persian Gulf states in the Caspian region, plays no more than
an "indirect role … in countering Israeli expanding influence in
Central Asia."[59] If oil-rich Azerbaijan is successful in cultivating
an independent energy relationship with Israel and the West, then the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in general
and the Persian Gulf emirates in particular may lose influence. It
is certainly a glaring reality that Israel is the only Middle Eastern
country with real influence in the region.[60]
Turkey. Among regional countries, Turkey has benefited most from
the development of Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation. When the Soviet
Union disintegrated, Turkish officials began wooing Azerbaijani
politicians-stressing their shared ethnicity, language, and Armenian
experiences.[61] Ankara has encouraged the development of a secular,
free market government in Baku oriented to Europe and the West. In
2004, official Turkish-Azerbaijani trade amounted to slightly over
US$400 million with Turkey claiming the fourth largest share of
Azerbaijan’s foreign trade.[62] In 2003, Turkey’s leader Recep Tayyip
Erdoðan expressed his expectation that Azerbaijani-Turkish trade
would grow to $1 billion.[63] The blossoming of Turkish-Azerbaijani
ties reinforces Israel’s own strategic vision for the region.[64]
Meanwhile, thanks to Ankara, the partnership between Baku and Jerusalem
continues to mature. This was demonstrated by the July 2001 "Caspian
Sea incident."
That month, the Iranian warship Geophysics 3 threatened an Azerbaijani
oil exploration ship in the Caspian Sea. As emotions and militaries
flared, Turkey issued a statement promising to defend Azerbaijan.[65]
It was clear that Israel would also take part. As an Israeli defense
minister who was in Turkey shortly thereafter insisted, Israel would
have joined the triumvirate against "Iranian aggression."[66] Just
a week earlier, Sharon told journalists in Ankara that Israel would
expand ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey.[67]
The United States. The U.S. government also remains a player. Baku
cooperated with Jerusalem in the hope of improving ties with
Washington.[68] Not too long ago, U.S. policymakers considered
Azerbaijan to be, at best, irrelevant and at worst, a nuisance. In
1992, the United States Congress passed the Freedom Support Act
promising economic and humanitarian aid to all the former Soviet
republics except Azerbaijan. Muscled through by the Armenian lobby,
Section 907 of the act legislated that Washington would not give aid to
Azerbaijan until the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[69]
As a result, Azerbaijan received no economic aid from the United
States in the 1990s while Armenia received over $1 billion.[70]
In the mid 1990s, struggling to piece together the weak and
dysfunctional Azerbaijani state, President Aliyev moved towards
Jerusalem, thereby winning the allegiance of the pro-Israel lobby
in Washington. As Hassan Hassanov, Azerbaijan’s foreign minister,
stated in 1997, "We don’t conceal that we rely on the Israeli lobby
in the U.S."[71] This paid dividends when, in 2002, President Bush
waived Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act.[72] In a rare and
understated public admission, an official at the Azerbaijani embassy
in Washington acknowledged that, "Jewish organizations made a certain
contribution in the Section 907 waving process."[73]
In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks, the Bush administration
recognized what a strategic asset Azerbaijan could be. Baku allowed
overflight rights to U.S. planes flying to Afghanistan and supported
Iraq’s liberation.[74] Azerbaijani oil provides a useful counterweight
to that of Saudi Arabia and other states supporting radical Islam. In
March 2002, the U.S. State Department reversed a ban on arms sales to
Azerbaijan that had been in effect since 1993.[75] Simultaneously, the
U.S. government granted $4.4 million in U.S. foreign military financing
grants to Azerbaijan with which to purchase American-made weapons.[76]
In return, Azerbaijan sent peacekeepers to Iraq in 2003.[77]
Publicly the Bush administration has pledged that it remains
committed to seeing a more democratic Azerbaijan. In the run-up to
Azerbaijan’s parliamentary elections in November 2005, Assistant
Secretary of State Daniel Fried stated that the United States is
"serious" about democracy-building in Azerbaijan.[78] Yet just how
serious Washington is remains a question. U.S. foreign policymakers
need Azerbaijan to continue providing much needed energy security
and bases for U.S. special operations.
Upsetting the already volatile regime of Heydar Aliyev’s son may do
more harm than good to U.S. interests. Authorities in Tehran remain
ready to exploit any political instability.
Increased U.S. attention to Azerbaijan has been a double-edged sword
for Israel, though. While the Baku-Washington rapprochement helped
cement Azerbaijan in a pro-Western, anti-Islamist camp, it has also
reduced Jerusalem’s leverage. Azerbaijani authorities, feeling that
they have exhausted the use of pro-Israel groups in Washington,
now worry they will be seen by others in the region as too close
to Israel.[79]
Where Goes the Israel-Azerbaijan Relationship?
The relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan is at a
crossroads. While Baku once embraced ties to Israel, many Azerbaijani
elites are privately reconsidering their strategy.
Azerbaijan’s recent decision to curtail expansion of cooperation with
Israel is part of a trend.[80] While Azerbaijani officials travel to
Israel at unprecedented levels, the visits are rarely covered in the
press and produce few results. Still, there remains potential for
expansion of cooperation not only in the energy sector but also in
agriculture, Azerbaijan’s largest employer and second largest sector
after oil.[81]
The most vital question for both states remains Iran.
While there is broad bilateral consensus that countering Iranian
influence is vital to both Azerbaijan and Israel’s national
security,[82] Iranian officials remain dedicated to reversing
that perspective. Many Iranian officials remind their Azerbaijani
counterparts that Iran will always be present, long after U.S. and
Israeli attention focuses elsewhere.[83] Here, any Israeli-Azerbaijan
cooperation could be beneficial. As Azerbaijani foreign policy expert
Vafa Guluzade has said, if "Israel will construct a factory that
will give jobs to thousands, or even to hundreds, it will be good
anti-Iranian propaganda."[84]
Yet there is little evidence that Azerbaijani elites will take
advantage of the opportunities Israel presents. Many of the same issues
that hampered cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan in the 1990s
remain unresolved. One Israeli diplomatic likened the relationship
to that between "a virgin and a gentlemen caller … she wants it
but is afraid."[85]
Israeli politicians, while always calling for closer cooperation with
Azerbaijan, have become frustrated with Azerbaijan’s cold feet. Some
high-level Israeli diplomats privately wonder whether state interests
or personal interests such as business contacts with senior Iranians
are driving Azerbaijani officials away.[86] They wonder whether Arab
refusal to support pro-Azerbaijani U.N. resolutions regarding issues
such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute may erode Azerbaijani resolve.[87]
The ball is largely in Azerbaijan’s court. As Rafael Abbasov said,
there is "a huge demand on both sides for cooperation, but a lack of
eye-level cooperation and a lack of political backbone hurts future
prospects. Specifically harmful is the lack of an Azerbaijani embassy
in Israel."[88]
Many Azerbaijanis recognize that their ties to Israel have benefited
their state. As one Azeri columnist wrote in 2002, "Everybody knows
well that Israel is one of the few countries with which Azerbaijan has
only positive experiences. It is high time for Azerbaijan to dare to
have its own path."[89] Indeed, as Iran’s nuclear program and Saudi
support for Islamist groups threaten regional security, it is also in
Washington’s interest to help cement the Baku-Jerusalem relationship.
Ilya Bourtman is a former researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies in Ramat Gan, Israel.
[1] Jane Hunter, "Israel and Turkey: Arms for Azerbaijan?" Middle East
International, Oct. 23, 1992; Soner Cagaptay and Alexander Murinson,
"Good Relations between Azerbaijan and Israel: A Model for Other
Muslim States in Eurasia?" The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, PolicyWatch, no. 982, Mar. 30, 2005.
[2] Bulent Aras, "Post-Cold War Realities: Israel’s Strategy in
Azerbaijan and Central Asia," Middle East Policy, Jan. 1998, p. 68-9.
[3] Jacob Abadi, "Israel’s Quest for Normalization with Azerbaijan and
the Muslim States of Central Asia," Journal of Third World Studies,
Fall 2002, p. 66.
[4] Ibid., p. 74.
[5] Aras, "Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia," p. 68-9.
[6] Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Dec. 21, 1993.
[7] Sedat Laciner, "Armenia’s Jewish Skepticism and Its Impact on
Armenia-Israel Relations," The Journal of Turkish Weekly, Oct. 11,
2004.
[8] Ma’ariv (Tel Aviv), Oct. 24, 1995.
[9] Jane’s Defense Weekly, Oct. 16, 1996.
[10] Ekho (Baku), Apr. 16, 2004.
[11] Ekho, Apr. 16, 2004.
[12] See A. I. Novikov, "Otnoshenia Izrailia co stranami bivchsego
SSSR," Institute Blizhnego Vostoka, Jan. 25, 2005.
[13] Personal e-mail correspondence with senior official, Israeli
Foreign Ministry, June 10, 2005.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Cagaptay and Murinson, "Good Relations between Azerbaijan and
Israel."
[16] Itar-TASS News Agency (Moscow), Oct. 22, 2001.
[17] Zerkalo (Baku), Jan. 4, 2002.
[18] "Baku Is Fearful of Mojahedin," Axis Information and Analysis,
July 17, 2005.
[19] "Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami," Global Security.org, accessed
Mar. 13, 2006.
[20] Tadeusz Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan: The Hidden Faces of Islam,"
World Policy Journal, Fall 2002, p.
75.
[21] Shahin Abbasov and Khadija Ismailova, "The Wahhabi Watch,"
Transitions Online, Aug. 22, 2005.
[22] Ha’aretz, Feb. 15, 2006.
[23] "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism," Patterns of Global
Terrorism: 2002 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, 2003), accessed Apr. 19, 2006.
[24] The Jerusalem Report, Sept. 21, 1995.
[25] The Jerusalem Report, May 19, 1994.
[26] BBC News, July 26, 2002.
[27] Personal e-mail correspondence with author, June 14, 2005.
[28] "Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan, 2005," The State Statistical
Committee of Azerbaijan Republic, Baku, accessed Feb. 21, 2006.
[29] Data compiled from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database, accessed July 17, 2005.
[30] Data compiled from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
Database, accessed Feb. 22, 2005.
[31] The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 2, 2001.
[32] United Press International, Nov. 4, 2002.
[33] The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 31, 1997.
[34] Personal e-mail correspondence with Elshan Gurbanov, professor
of political science, Baku State University, June 20, 2005.
[35] Personal e-mail correspondence with Rafael Abbasov, July 20, 2005.
[36] The Financial Express (New Delhi), June 10, 2005.
[37] The Jerusalem Report, June 17, 1993.
[38] "Turco-Israeli Oil Agreement," Turkish Press Review, Directorate
General of Press and Information, Office of the Prime Minister,
Istanbul, Sept. 1, 1997.
[39] Personal e-mail correspondence with senior official, Israeli
Foreign Ministry, June 10, 2005.
[40] Baku Today, Jan. 29, 2003; Azerbaijan International Independent
News Agency (AssA-Irada, Baku), Jan. 27, 2005.
[41] Personal e-mail correspondence with Kanan Seyidov, July 18, 2005.
[42] Michael Rubin, "Iran Means What It Says," On the Issues, American
Enterprise Institute, Jan. 25, 2006.
[43] Alex Wagner, "Washington Levies Sanctions for WMD-Related
Transfers to Iran," Arms Control Today, June 2002.
[44] Swietochowski, "Azerbaijan: The Hidden Faces of Islam," p. 73;
The Jerusalem Report, June 17, 1993.
[45] "The Republic of Azerbaijan: Country Profile 2005," Ministry of
Economic Development and Azerbaijan Investment Promotion and Advisory
Foundation, Baku, p. 3.
[46] Cagaptay and Murinson, "Good Relations between Azerbaijan and
Israel."
[47] Avi Machlis, "Azerbaijan Courts Jews, Israel to Win Favor with
U.S.," Jewish Telegraphic Agency news service (New York), Feb. 1, 2000.
[48] Personal interview with a representative of the Israeli government
involved in discussions, Tel Aviv, June 13, 2005.
[49] The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 20, 2004.
[50] The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 31, 1997.
[51] OMRI Daily Digest, Open Media Research Institute, Washington,
D.C., Aug. 10, 1995.
[52] Tehran Times, Jan. 25, 2005.
[53] Turkish Daily News (Ankara), Dec. 28, 1998.
[54] The Jerusalem Post, June 10, 2005.
[55] Novikov, "Otnoshenia Izrailia co stranami bivchsego SSSR."
[56] Zavtra (Moscow), June 23, 1998.
[57] "Azerbaijan in Figures 2005: Azerbaijan’s Main Trading Partners
in 2004 (thsd. US$)," The State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan
Republic , accessed Mar. 1, 2006.
[58] Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "New Frontiers: Iran, the GCC and the
CCAR’s," in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ed., >>From the Gulf of Central
Asia: Players in the New Great Game (Exeter: University of Exeter
Press, 1994), p. 96.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Shirin Akiner, "Political Processes in Post-Soviet Central Asia,"
in Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling, eds., Central Eurasia
in Global Politics: Conflict, Security and Development (Leiden:
Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004), p. 137.
[61] Svante E. Cornell, "Iran and the Caucasus," Middle East Policy,
Jan. 1998, p. 51.
[62] "Azerbaijan’s Main Trading Partners."
[63] Eurasia Insight (New York), Jan. 22, 2003.
[64] Aras, "Israel’s Strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia,"
pp. 68-9.
[65] Hurriyet (Istanbul), Aug. 13, 2001.
[66] Hurriyet, Aug. 13, 2001.
[67] Hurriyet, Aug. 8, 2001.
[68] Hershel Shanks and Suzanne Singer, "Oil and Jews on the Silk
Road," Moment, Oct. 1998, p. 68.
[69] The Freedom Support Act, Public Law 102-511, Sec.
907, Oct. 24, 1992.
[70] Shanks and Singer, "Oil and Jews on the Silk Road," p. 70.
[71] TURAN Information Agency (Baku), Aug. 21, 1997.
[72] "Presidential Waiver of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act,"
White House press statement, Jan. 30, 2002.
[73] Personal e-mail correspondence with Sultan Malikov, July 28, 2005.
[74] Amb. Hafiz Pashayev, Embassy of Azerbaijan, "Iraq and the
Caucasus: How Will War Affect the Region?"
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 27, 2003.
[75] Wade Boese, "U.S. Halts Arms Sales to Zimbabwe, Lifts Ban on
Armenia, Azerbaijan," Arms Control Today, May 2002, p. 38.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Agence France-Presse, Aug. 13, 2003.
[78] The National Interest, Nov. 8, 2005.
[79] Cameron S. Brown, "Observations from Azerbaijan," Middle East
Review of International Affairs, Dec.
2002, p. 2.
[80] Personal e-mail correspondence with senior official, Israeli
Foreign Ministry, June 10, 2005.
[81] "Azerbaijan at a Glance, Agriculture," Embassy of Israel,
Azerbaijan, Economic and Trade Relations Department, accessed Mar. 1,
2006.
[82] The Jerusalem Post, June 10, 2005, Feb. 12, 2006.
[83] Personal e-mail correspondence with senior official, Israeli
Foreign Ministry, June 10, 2005.
[84] Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Sept. 11, 2002.
[85] Personal e-mail correspondence with senior official, Israeli
Foreign Ministry, June 10, 2005.
[86] Personal e-mail correspondence with senior official, Israeli
Foreign Ministry, June 10, 2005.
[87] Ekho, Mar. 26, 2005.
[88] Personal e-mail correspondence with Rafael Abbasov, economics
officer, Asian Development Bank, Azerbaijan, July 20, 2005.
[89] Zerkalo, Feb. 7, 2002.
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