ARIS KAZINYAN: "OWN GAME" OF MIKHAIL SAAKASHVILI AND ARMENIAN FACTOR
Regnum, Russia
Sept 9 2006
Aris Kazinyan – expert of the Caucasus analytical center
On Sept 1 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili appeared with a very
curious statement. While speaking in Sagarejo, he said that Russia is
pressuring Armenia into adopting an anti-Georgian policy. At least,
that’s how (and in no other way) one should understand his following
sentence: "Russia has finally closed the customs house in Lars; and
closed it not only for us, but also for Armenia, whose cargoes have
been going through Lars, because it tells Armenia too: let’s carry out
some plans together." Saakashvili did not care to specify what "plans"
(perhaps, because there was nothing to specify) he was talking about,
however, Saakashvili’s "Armenian emphasis" is quite symptomatic as
such. What made him appear with such a tactless (in every respect)
statement?
Saakashvili is hardly aware of what exactly the "relevant"
Armenian-Russian talks are about; of course, we do not doubt the
competence and awareness of the Georgian President, but the whole
point is that Moscow and Yerevan are not plotting anything against
Tbilisi. Anyway, Saakashvili appears to be sure of, at least, the
present Armenian authorities; dwelling on the subject of imaginary
Russian pressure on Armenia, he notes: "Naturally, nobody will agree
to this, but such a policy – of pressure on Armenia over Georgia –
is present!"
It may also happen – it may well be so – that the imperative of the
Georgian President – "naturally, nobody will agree to this" – has no
specific addressee and is just a preventive move. We can see this in
his following statement: "Nobody has ever succeeded through slavery.
Only proud, self-respecting countries succeed – countries like Poland,
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, who did the same a few years ago and
have become successful European states. I don’t want to name a few
other countries who are being led by those forces and are beggars
and, today, they are as impoverished as they were before." Let’s
not conjecture what Saakashvili meant; the more important point is
that Saakashvili’s speech in Sagarejo – and the quite unexpected –
at first glance – address to the Armenian issue – perfectly fits into
the context and logic of his present policy.
First of all, we should note that the process of ethnic consolidation
of the Kartvelian nations populating Georgia (in the scale and content
officially proclaimed by Tbilisi) is yet far from completion.
Georgian citizens – representatives of the Kartvelian group
of the Caucasian language family – are not objectively a single
ethno-political community and are quite diverse in terms of traditions,
culture, language, mentality and the perception of the very concept of
"Homeland." For quite a long period in history, there was almost no
consolidating ethnonyme in Georgia; even today, people representing
the Kartvelian group do not identify themselves according to the
state terminology. The diversity of dialects: Gurian, Imeretian,
Lechkhumian, Rachian, Kartlian, Kakhetian, Pshavian, Meskhetian,
Ingiloian and some others and the circumstance that Megrels (in
particular) speak their own language reflect not so much the purely
linguistic peculiarities of those groups as the extent of difference
in their traditions, mentality and values.
Particularly, the biggest Kartvelian group, Megrels, call themselves
not "Kartvelians" but "Margali" and their country (their historical
area – Homeland) – "Samargalio."
It is especially important to note that, from the ancient times
till the first half of XIX, the western and eastern parts of the
Kartvelian group had very little contact with one another. The Surami
Range dividing the territory of Georgia into two parts was a kind
of Great Dividing Range between two worlds, and this fact has given
rise to such concepts as "Amiereti" – the country behind the range –
and Imiereti – the country before the range (like Ciscaucasia and
Transcaucasia). It was exactly due to this historical division that
the western Kartvelians are initially called "Imeretians." But, in
fact, Imeretians are also Gurians (who call themselves "Guruli"),
Lechkhumians, Rachians, etc. Megrels live farther to the west and
have always been closer to Abkhazians than to Gurians or Imeretians.
Eastwards of the Surami Range was the land of the eastern sub-groups
– mostly Kartlians and Kakhetians, who have not historically had
close contacts with the western Georgians, not mentioning Megrels,
Abkhazians or Svans.
Due to this peculiar logic of historical development, the Kartvelian
group does not now have a single approach to the concept of
"Homeland." This is a very important aspect of the problem we are
considering – this aspect allows us to see how much interested the
present-day population of the Republic of Georgia can actually be in
"fighting and dying" for Abkhazia or South Ossetia. The foundations of
the nationalist ideology were laid by public figures Ilia Chavchavadze
and Akaky Tsereteli in late 19th century. It was exactly they who
tried to give the local concept of "Homeland" a larger – mass –
scale. And it was they who established a certain tradition: the factors
consolidating the nation are based not so much on (the assertion of)
the national – all-Kertvelian values – but on the search for the
image of "extra-Kartvelian" enemy. Particularly, in his works Ilia
Chavchavadze chose Armenians as "an enemy." "The Armenian choice"
of Chavchavadze was due mostly to the fact that, unable to adjust
themselves to the development of capitalist relations, the Georgian
noblemen were forced to sell their estates to rich Armenian merchants.
What really matters in this context is not so much the ethnicity of
the "external enemy" as the very ideological existence of such an
image. By the way, this ideology has lived up to now. The key weapon
of the Georgian parties in the first quarter of the 20th century,
this ideology predetermined the logic of the development of the
national life, and the First Georgian Republic (1918-1920) was also
based on the vector of United and Indivisible Georgia. At the same
time, it should be noted that in 20th century this ideology failed to
go outside the activities of the political elite and to grow into a
national (all-Kartvelian) feeling. Still, as we have already said,
the process of consolidation of the Kartvelian nations populating
Georgia (in the scale and content proclaimed by Tbilisi) is far from
completion. The political elite of new Georgia has failed to make the
Abkhazian problem a consolidating – all-Kartvelian – factor. People
have failed to see what exactly they must sacrifice themselves for.
And even the western Georgians, who still have mutual problems, have
refused to unite "for the sake of Abkhazia." Even more, in the most
concerned Megrel community, we can see diametrically opposite moods –
one part of Megrels is definitely closer to Abkhazians.
The historical "psychology of feudal principalities" in Georgia is
traditionally the most influential internal political factor in the
country. Even more, it is exactly this psychology that gives birth to
leaders of "national scale," whose political image reflects not only
the specificity of "own nation" but also the traditional separatism of
feudal princes. In this light, it should be noted that the concept of
"separatism" the Georgian authorities keep applying to Abkhazia and
South Ossetia is much more applicable to the lifestyle and traditional
mentality of the Kartvelian society. The separatism of feudal princes
has actually taken deep roots in the multi-layer Georgian soil, and the
modern history proves this mentality to be quite viable. It is typical
of almost every politically (publicly) significant figure in Georgia,
irrespective of his psychological, moral or intellectual image. It
is quite noteworthy that, right after his political fiasco, the first
Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia proclaimed the independence of
the Megrel-Abkhazian Republic. And even this rare historical example
is just the top of the iceberg of Georgian contradictions that is
drifting around the scattered "principalities" of Sakartvelo.
As we have already noted, besides the factor of linguistic isolation
of the Kartvelian society, there is also another nuance that
does not let the Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems become a
consolidating factor. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, just
like the Republic of Georgia, internationally recognized within its
territory, is a kind of empire, and the struggle of the country’s
leadership for Abkhazia is more like a colonial than patriotic war (in
fact, it is a war of robbers – it’s enough remembering the figures of
"the leaders of the Georgian home guards"). This is a very important
circumstance – as colonial wars more often shatter and even decay the
rear than consolidate it. With no all-national concept of "Homeland" in
Georgia, the local authorities still apply feudal ways of territorial
administration. What we could see during the civil war was exactly
a feudal rule; at a certain moment, the confrontation was very much
like the squabble of "feudal princes" – the only difference was that
the new rulers of the territories were not noblemen but criminals.
Emzar Kvitsiani is a typical representative of the Pleiad of
"Georgian feudal lords" of the epoch of independence. That’s why the
acting Georgian authorities tend to qualify almost every de facto
disobedient administrative-territorial unit as "a bed of criminal
structures." And they do this irrespective of the extent of their own
corruption. In this light, we would like to remind you the words of
the well-known Georgian historian Berdzenishvili, who wrote in 1937:
"Feudal Sakartvelo (Georgia) has never fully embraced the concepts of
‘Abkhazia,’ ‘Kartli,’ ‘Kakheti,’ ‘Somkheti’ and the title of the King
of United Georgia has never turned into a formula with historical
content."
The present Georgian President sees himself in the historical
chronicles standing beside the most respected monarchs of the past.
His fixed idea is to restore the territorial integrity of the
Georgian state and, more importantly, to resolve the historical
internal Kartvelian conflicts. He truly imagines himself to be
the monarch of United Georgia. This is a very important nuance –
a nuance that must be always kept in mind; the present Georgian
President is capable of any most unexpected and thoughtless action:
he is really unsurpassed in giving political surprises. He can take
aback even the most sophisticated technologists; the ace of political
intrigue, feudal lord Aslan Abashidze, was unable to oppose anything
(constructive) to the irrationalism of Mikheil Saakashvili; the
President is illogical and sure of being the chosen one. He really
believes that his destination is to unite Great Georgia. Being the US’
protege, he is not like his "nest brothers" – Viktor Yushchenko or
Alexander Milinkevich, who are being actively built up by the masters
of Hammer and Angle Bar; unlike them, Saakashvili has the Idea. The
first thing that comes into mind is the famous phrase: "If Garibaldi
had not been a Mason, Italy would not have united." That’s probably
how Saakashvili interprets his position of a "protege" – at least,
for the time being.
The first Georgian President also felt himself as a kind of missionary,
but, among other things, he lacked extravagance: pedantic Zviad was
not a trouble maker. He clearly saw that his country was "a patchwork
blanket" and realized that this mosaic posed a real threat to the
idea of United Georgia. At first, he also tried to implant the idea
of Common and United Homeland into the minds of all the Kartvelians
and traveled the whole Sakartvelo for this purpose; emotionally
restrained, seaside Megrel, he praised Kakhetia as the first wine
grower. "Demographically, Kakhetia has always been a mono-national
region, and Georgians have always been a majority here," he said in
the Kakhetian village of Akhalsopeli in 1989.
"Today, we are facing a serious problem. Tatars, Armenians and
Ossetians have risen to their feet. We must save from foreigners
Kakhetia – our holy land!" Could Gamsakhurdia imagine then that
some few years later he would be forced to rise with the idea of a
Megrel-Abkhazian Republic?
Today, there are no grounds for speaking about serious prerequisites
for changing the state structure exactly as a mechanism consolidating
the nation, especially as there was almost no concept of "the King
of All Georgia" in Georgia’s history; at the time of the signing of
the Treaty of Georgievsk (in Aug 1783) Irakly II was called the King
of Kartli-Kakheti. The authority of the Georgian King has never been
a consolidating force as people in other regions swore allegiance
to other rulers – the King of Imeretia and others; in fact, the
restoration of monarchy in the disintegrated Georgian society may
disintegrate the Georgian state.
President Saakashvili, who is really daydreaming of a Place in the
chronicles of the Georgian history (certainly, next to the most
outstanding rulers), is going to solve this problem too; of course,
not as a King but as the ruler of "All Georgia." He openly views the
period of his accession to "the presidential throne" in the context
of the events of early XIX. The starting point for him is 1801 when
the western Georgian Kingdom was abolished and annexed to Russia. The
supporters of the ambitious President consider the following 205
years as the "frozen interval" of the national life.
In this context, we would like to point to the speech of the advisor of
the Georgian president, former prime minister and MP of Estonia Mart
Laar: "The so-called ‘Russian peacekeepers’ are not keeping peace,
they are trying to keep the last fragments of the Russian Empire." The
July 28 article in the Akhali 7 Dge daily is also quite symptomatic:
"It is exactly the strong powers that tell the other countries involved
in international relations how to play in the political game and
often decide in their stead. As a rule, small and weak countries are
‘oppressed’ in international relations. For such countries it is very
dangerous to be neighbor to a strong country as stronger neighbors
leave weaker countries no chance for maneuver or choice. Unfortunately,
Georgia is a small country neighboring on Russia – this is our ‘gift
of fortune.’ Russia’s policy on the Caucasus has not changed. Czarism
is still Russia’s ideology. This crossroads of the world civilization
is still the axis of the Russian neo-imperialism, and Georgia is part
of this axis. For years Russia has refused to put up with the lost
of this rebellious country. They can’t put up with the fact that our
small country is showing resistance to Great Russia. Russia has failed
to enslave Georgia even though for many years it has been pressuring
our country economically and supporting separatist regimes."
It is noteworthy that the emphasis on the year 1801 (just like on
the Treaty of Georgievsk) goes well together with Saakashvili’s
world-view; it allows him to kill several birds at once: to
demonstrate his ambitions and succession to royal traditions, to
present the Georgians as a chosen noble society (thereby, increasing
discrimination against other non-Kartvelian citizens), to show why
Georgia has lost its independence – because of Russia. Each of these
vectors is a doctrine for a special study – a self-sufficient policy –
but only taken together, do they form the "effect of Saakashvili."
The policy to blame Russia for the loss of the Georgian throne
fits well into the context of the present developments in Georgia;
the American strategy of expansion into the region requires further
aggravation of Russian-Georgian relations, and this fits well with the
mood and ambitions of Mikheil Saakashvili. The July 5 2006 meeting of
the US and Georgian presidents resulted in George Bush’s statement
that each state has the right to carry out military actions against
radical forces with a view to protect its own security and sovereignty.
Even though this statement was made in connection with the Middle
East events and was aimed at justifying the policy of Israel, it was
equally referred to Georgia. Some sources say that this issue was even
discussed during the Washington meeting. "This meeting was absolutely
historic for Georgia," Saakashvili said. "I am sure it was, and the
Georgian people will certainly see its results. It is absolutely
clear that the US will support our struggle for freedom till the
end." We should note that, when saying "struggle for freedom,"
the Georgian President also means the restoration of Georgia’s
territorial integrity.
It is especially important to note that, when speaking about the
right of each country to protect its independence and security by
any means, George Bush emphasized the destructive influence on one or
another region by exactly the forces supporting terrorism. As early
as July 9 – just four days after the meeting – a terrorist act in
Tskhinvali claimed the life of South Ossetian Security Secretary Oleg
Alborov; two weeks later the Georgian Parliament adopted a resolution
"On Peacekeeping Forces in the Conflict Zones"; and on July 21 the
Georgian President dismissed his State Minister for Conflict Resolution
Giorgy Khaindrava. The next step was the "anti-criminal operation in
Kodori Gorge."
The royal hunt for birds has revealed one more target for the
indignant Georgian "monarchists" – Armenians. In the context of the
constantly discussed topic of 1801 and the policy of making an enemy
of Russia, the researchers cannot but point out that "the decree
on the liquidation of the Georgian throne was read out in Tiflis
(Tbilisi) by Armenian Iosif Argutinsky, and the first governor
general was Armenian general Lazarev." In the first half of the
20th century Georgians began showing increasingly negative attitude
towards Armenians; they regarded Armenians as Russia’s proteges and
the heralds of the loss of the Georgian throne. The founder of the
Georgian nationalist ideology Ilia Chavchavadze wrote: "Armenian
scholars are standing their ground, they are seeking to get home in
a place they have never had home… they wish to convince everybody
that they allegedly have the historical right to live here."
This idea runs through the nationalist ideology to these days. No
coincidence that during the "revolution of roses" certain
representatives of the Georgian nation, particularly, those from
the nobles, expressed concern for the presence of Armenian blood in
the veins of all the three leaders of the revolution; those times
were not easy for Saakashvili… "Christian Georgians have always
felt danger on the part of Armenians," says the academic head of the
Russian Project of Jerusalem University, Dr. Dan Shapira. "Armenians
have lived in Georgia since the beginning of time. Even the capital
of Georgia, Tbilisi, has until recently been the Armenian city
and the key Armenian cultural center eastwards of Istanbul. Thus,
Jews have never been regarded in Georgia as a problem or threat –
the traditional place of ‘Jew’ was occupied by Armenians."
In other words, anti-Semitism in Georgia has traditionally been
expressed in the form of Armeno-phobia. As we have already noted, the
Georgian President is trying to implant the idea of Common Homeland
in the minds of the Kartvelians and to make this a basis for a new
scale of values. Language is not a consolidating factor, that’s why
general consciousness of Homeland is given an exclusive role.
This is also important from pragmatic point of view; only if generally
conscious of their Homeland, will the Kartvelian people be able to
perceive the unprecedented achievements the acting president has made
in the last years – first of all, the establishment of control over
Ajaria and Abkhazian Svanetia. Otherwise, all his achievements will
look just a zero (in the general consciousness).
That’s why he is forced to regularly appear with the story about
notorious Armenian-Russian plot against Georgia in hope that the
factor of external enemy will consolidate the Georgian society. In
"his game" Mikheil Saakashvili actually needs nationalists.