GEORGIA, RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES
by Nikolai Zlobin
Director of Russian Programs at the World Security Institute (Washington)
Source: Izvestia, November 1, 2006, p. 6
Translated by Elena Leonova
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
November 1, 2006 Wednesday
Russia’s American-style treatment of Georgia; The crackdown on
Georgians seems to be an example of the Kremlin practising techniques
and methods for using a new array of tools in Russia’s foreign policy
arsenal. America has taught the current Russian leadership how to
operate in the international arena from a position of open cynicism.
One of Armenia’s leading politicians recently explained to me that
neither America nor Russia should delude themselves about their
influence on Armenia’s internal evolution, since its priorities
are largely determined by the attitudes and demands of the Armenian
diaspora worldwide. According to this politician, the diaspora will
never permit Armenia to be turned into a totalitarian state, since
money sent to Armenia from the diaspora (equivalent to Azerbaijan’s
entire energy export revenues) is the deciding factor in ensuring
the Armenian economy’s survival. Naturally, the money coming into
Armenia from abroad is accompanied by political messages which the
Armenian government cannot ignore if it wants to remain in power.
Apparently, Moscow has decided to take a similar approach to Georgia
– in reverse. A sweeping Russian-style crackdown on the Georgian
diaspora in Russia; luckily, this diaspora does indeed include
some crime bosses, illegal immigrants, and business owners whose
activities have nothing to do with morality and enlightenment. This
was supposed to result in Mikhail Saakashvili losing the support of
the Georgian community in Russia, and demonstrating to the rest of
the world, including Washington, that he’s completely incapable of
defending the interests of Georgian citizens. Naturally, this would
only provide further confirmation that Saakashvili’s regime is against
the Georgian people’s interests and Saakashvili himself is deficient
in personal ethics.
The crackdown on Georgians seems to be an example of the Kremlin
practising techniques and methods for using a new array of tools in
Russia’s foreign policy arsenal. As well as the power to cut off oil
and gas supplies, Moscow now has another way of putting pressure
on unsatisfactory regimes in the CIS: by using their diasporas in
Russia. It’s no secret that this form of leverage wasn’t invented
in Moscow; Washington has often used it in the past, and continues
to do so. America has taught the current Russian leadership how to
operate in the international arena from a position of open cynicism,
without indulging in melancholy reflections about morality and ethics,
using nothing but the vague term "realism in politics" as a cover.
The fact that the crackdown has only targeted Georgians shows that
the Kremlin has mastered another element from the arsenals of the US
elite: the ability to openly use double or triple standards in its
policies. This multi-standard approach in Putin’s foreign policy –
described as "multilateral," or even "flexible," by some embarrassed
Kremlin officials – actually does Vladimir Putin credit. Under his
influence, the Kremlin’s managers are gradually coming to realize
that any country aspiring to be a serious international player in
the world today must take a sophisticated (morally uninhibited, so
to speak) approach to foreign policy, in order to defend itself more
effectively while also separating other countries or bringing them
together. The more levels of standards foreign policy includes, the
more successful it will be. For a long time, Moscow didn’t understand
this. Now it’s Tbilisi that doesn’t understand it.
The irony is that Saakashvili has run up against exactly what the
White House taught the Kremlin in the process of supporting Georgia:
if anyone offends you, just beat them over the head with no hesitation
or regrets – rather than "clacking your beak to no purpose," to
borrow the elegant expression used recently by Putin, who is said
to have a personal dislike for Saakashvili. Russia has adopted a
purely American style of behavior towards Georgia; meanwhile, the
Russia-Georgia relationship has taken on an even closer resemblance
to the decades-old relationship between the United States and small,
impoverished Cuba, which continually accuses Washington of having
aggressive intentions and uses any pretext to escalate tension and
point the finger at its large northern neighbor’s imperial ambitions.
However, it’s not all that simple. Russia certainly had a good
chance of not only emerging victorious from the current conflict with
Georgia, but also reinforcing its image as a country that thinks and
acts strategically and is capable of participating effectively in
solving important international problems. Some experts in Washington
even suspected Russia of provoking Georgia into this escalation,
in order to get the chance to demonstrate its own wise and tolerant
statesmanship. But then, as the world watched, Moscow got into a
dither over trivialities and lost the game – regardless of the actual
outcome of the conflict as such.
In order to operate like the Americans do, Russia either needs to
be equally strong or to use a much smarter and more sophisticated
approach. Gun control opponents in the US have a slogan: "Guns don’t
kill people – people kill people." The same applies to politics. The
fact that Moscow wants to crack down on Georgians in Russia, and is
capable of doing so, doesn’t mean that it necessarily should do so.
Specific political methods are chosen by people, and these people
presumably calculate the potential effects. Actually, that’s what
they and their advisers are paid to do, with the money coming
from tax-payers. And that accounts for the widespread notion that a
government’s actions ought to benefit a country and its people. But in
this case, our country has shown itself to be extremly inhospitable
and the people have been taught another lesson in xenophobia and
intolerance.
But Moscow’s political recklessness is only partly to blame. The
primary cause concerns the fact that Saakashvili’s Dream Team has
turned into the region’s Nightmare Team. The Georgian president
continues to substantially – and groundlessly – exaggerate the
political support he has in the United States.
Two years ago, that support was almost absolute. Back then, Georgia
became the favorite country of ordinary Americans and President
George W. Bush. These days, however, that affection persists only
in the White House and the offices of a few senators, influential
as they may be. Bush has only two years left, and he won’t have time
for Georgia. The US political establishment is already showing signs
of skepticism and disillusionment, or even irritation, with regard
to the Saakashvili regime. America does indeed need Georgia – but
only as a democratic, stable, predictable country. In the event of a
serious conflict in Asia, Georgia could become an American airfield
or hospital, a workshop for repairing military hardware, a recreation
and redeployment base for the US Armed Forces, and so on. But will it?
The opinion in Washington is that the Georgian government’s major
mistake isn’t really its intention to reclaim the breakaway provinces
by means of armed force; rather, it’s Georgia’s demonstrative
reluctance or inability to work out a civilized relationship with
Russia. America won’t do that for Tbilisi. In the event of a military
conflict with Moscow, not a single American soldier would ever
be sent in to defend Georgia. NATO already has plenty of problems,
including problems with Russia, even without the addition of Georgia,
which is frantically trying to join NATO. As a result, Washington
is increasingly coming to doubt whether Saakashvili can deliver the
kind of Georgia that the United States needs. Consequently, unless
the situation in Georgia changes, Washington will have to choose
between withdrawing from Georgia, parting company with Saakashvili,
or a full-scale quarrel with Russia. It’s no exaggeration to say that
no one is seriously considering the last option.