BAKU: stagnation in political life in wake of presidential polls

Azeri daily says stagnation in political life in wake of presidential polls

Zerkalo, Baku
26 Jun 04

Zerkalo daily has surveyed Azerbaijan’s political scene in the wake of
the latest presidential election last October. The following is the
text of A. Rasidoglu’s report by Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo on 26
June headlined “Stagnation. Effectively nothing happens in political
life of Azerbaijan”; subheadings as published:

Analysts describe the current political situation in the country as
stagnant. The point is that, after the latest presidential election
[15 October 2003], effectively all parties have suffered a fiasco to a
certain extent.

Paradoxical though this might sound, this applies to the ruling New
Azerbaijan Party as well, which, despite the fact that it was
precisely itscandidate who has won the election, has nonetheless
failed to obtain the coveted “pieces of the cake of power”.

New Azerbaijan Party

After the election, the New Azerbaijan Party continues to “cruise on
its own”, without opponents on either its right or left. And now the
ideologists of the party openly say that they will never leave the
corridors of power.

In addition, despite the fact that, according to its charter, the New
Azerbaijan Party is currently managed by First Deputy Chairman of the
party[and Azerbaijani President] Ilham Aliyev, in fact it is run by
Ali Ahmadov, executive secretary, who in principle does not hold any
administrative levers. Nonetheless, the party continues to hold its
dominating position in society.

However, whatever they might say both in and outside the country, the
New Azerbaijan Party is by far not the party which was headed by [the
late President] Heydar Aliyev any longer, because his death caused
thoughtless radicalisation of some senior party members, who demand
that government officials delegate the increasing share of their
authorities to party functionaries.

Essentially, the party functionaries who push the authorities toward
thoughtless radicalism cling to the totalitarian way of thinking, do
they not? This, in turn, leads to the demolition of the “temple of New
Azerbaijan members”, which Heydar Aliyev had built over 10 years.

And this is precisely when the first question arises: does Ilham
Aliyev need to strive for the consolidation of the party nomenclature?
The answer is unambiguous: he does, it is even necessary, as the point
is that New Azerbaijan’s nomenclature, certain of its
indispensability, might one day start to ignore orders of the new
president. And then it is all gone: this would certainly lead to
attempts to split power and leave Ilham Aliyev, who wants to make some
changes for the better, “overboard”. Obviously, functionaries from the
New Azerbaijan Party would have never dared to do this during the
Heydar Aliyevrule. This has become possible only now, for how else
should we qualify the newly chosen line of behaviour of some senior
New Azerbaijan officials who point out that they are untouchable?
Understanding this mood and undesirable processes, Heydar Aliyev would
say that he was the leader of not only the New Azerbaijan Party, but
also of all the nation.

It is most likely, however, that Aliyev Jr already understands how to
restrain the ambitions of his “loyal team-mates” who have become a
burden for him. And factors like the population being tired of the
rule of some of the senior members of the New Azerbaijan Party force
Ilham Aliyev to no longer resort to the services of such odious
persons.

But what political course can the new leader of the country uphold to
confront the functionaries’ scenario? And is the son capable of what
his father – a very skilled and, as universally admitted, very
exceptional and powerful politician – managed to accomplish?

Despite the extension of the tenure of all of “his father’s”
ministers, Ilham Aliyev has said on more than one occasion: “I would
like a new generation of property owners to emerge in our society. I
am certain that the people will then gain economic freedom. They will
no longer depend on officials, on so-called ‘big shots’. Then they
will make their decisions independently. The absence of economic
freedom of an individual means the absence of freedom of action- this
is my fundamental principle of freedom of an individual.”

In principle, this approach is a verdict for the senior members of the
New Azerbaijan Party and implies that the president himself has
consolidated his positions.

Musavat

Everyone thought that after the election, the engine of the opposition
camp- the Musavat Party – would muster its force and emerge from the
crisis. The court trial of the leadership of this party was supposed
to force Musavat into resorting to mass protest actions and other
radical moves. But for some reason, this party has failed to come to
its senses since the “16 October syndrome” [post-election riots] and
thereby loses its chance of self-resuscitation.

After the release from detention of its Deputy Chairman Rauf Arifoglu,
the head will find himself in quite a plight. Because Arifoglu is
perhaps the only politician in the country who strongly criticized his
chairman for his “failure to make Musavat the ruling party”. Moreover,
he formulated his statement roughly in the following way: “If I was
the head of Musavat, the party would be in power.” After this
statement, leaders of many parties started to think about their
political future. This statement stunned many people. The belief of
many leaders of opposition parties that the party was their property
was shaken. The realization of impossibility to privatize their
parties began to loom before their eyes. Maybe this is one of the
signs that the opposition comesof ageý [ellipses as given]

People’s Front of Azerbaijan Party

The People’s Front [of Azerbaijan Party, PFAP] is perhaps the only
leading party which entered the presidential race with the established
image of a serious organization which is ready to renounce its
personal ambitions to achieve a common goal. From the very outset and
to the end, the party supported the idea of a single candidate from
the opposition.

PFAP leader A. [Ali] Karimli’s ability to reach a compromise not only
saved him and his team – soon he might even be able to lay claims to
the Musavat and AMIP [Azarbaycan Milli Istiqlal Party] electorates.

By staging mass protest actions, the PFAP seized the initiative. But
the authorities had managed to create a team of “Trojan horses” around
it long before the presidential election, which greatly weakened its
positions.

Democratic Party of Azerbaijan

Virtually nothing remains of the former radicalism of this party after
the election. Perhaps the reason is that, by his thoughtless moves in
the run-up to the election, R. [Chairman Rasul] Quliyev brought the
party to the verge of disaster. The electorate of Democratic Party of
Azerbaijan leader Rasul Quliyev has finally realized, among other
things, that there is not even a single chance of former parliament
speaker returning to motherland.

AMIP

The leader of Milli Istiqlal [Etibar Mammadov] realizes very well that
while the authorities wield powerful resources, it is impossible to
combat them effectively. As a representative of one of the most
powerful electorates, “immigrants from Armenia”, he has set about
implementing the policy of fragmentation of the authorities’ public
support. He realizes that he is unable to stage mass protest actions
and does not believe in this method of struggle.